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The study is a part of a larger research program undertaken by IDRC to investigate the status of competition in six developing 
countries. The main aim of the study is to investigate whether the economic reforms undertaken in the 1990s have led to 
increased competition in the form of inter-firm rivalry or not. The time period on which the study focuses is between 1990 and 
2004, however in many cases the time period is extended to 2005 whenever data permit, and in some cases it is shortened to 
before 2004 if data is not available. The main theme of the study tries to investigate whether economic reforms undertaken on 
both macro and micro levels have led to enhance competitive markets or economic reforms have left aside the issue of 
competition. Moreover, we investigate whether in the case of privately dominated markets there have been mechanisms which 
led to enhanced competition if the government has failed to introduce such pro-competitive measures or such mechanisms have 
been absent. We intend to provide some policy suggestions on how to improve the competition environment in the markets that 
have failed to include elements of competition. Along the study, two hypotheses are investigated, namely, the hard budget 
constraint has a negative impact on competition and free trade has a positive impact on competition. The study is divided into 
five main parts. Part I aims at delimiting the size of the private sector in Egypt. The data reveal that the size of the private sector 
has been increasing in relative terms as percentage of GDP over the 1990s. The privatization program adopted in the 1990s has 
been responsible for the main bulk of such increase in the size of the private sector. However such increase in the size of the 
private sector has not been always accompanied by increase in the status of competition. The fact that the government has 
remained controlling various sectors has decreased the expected rise in the degree of competition. This has been revealed by the 
various sectors investigated where the type of privatization affected the status of competition. In other cases, the government 
control has been replaced by high private concentration either in the form of monopoly or oligopoly hence having negative 
impact on inter-firm rivalry and competition. 
 
Part II is devoted to the analysis of policies, rules and regulations that affect the status of competition in the Egyptian economy. 
Moreover, in Part II the role of quasi governmental bodies and regulatory bodies in affecting the status of competition and inter-
firm rivalry is also investigated. Among the most important laws that affect competition is competition law, investment laws, 
special economic zones law, labor law, and small enterprise law, and trade regulations. The analysis showed that these laws are 
inefficient in enhancing competition in the Egyptian market for several reasons. The reasons ranged from absence of human 
capacity needed to implement effectively such laws, to lack of market data, to presence of provisions that encourage large size 
enterprises. Policies that affect competition were also analyzed. Such polices included trade policy, fiscal and especially tax 
policy, and monetary policy. The analysis of different polices pointed out that policies in general are not pro competition, where 
trade policy has remained restrictive, corporate taxes have remained relatively high. However, in 2004 a change in the 
government took place and the appointed cabinet undertook several expansiory policies in fiscal, and trade fields. The impact of 
such policies was not discussed in the study as no enough time has elapsed to discuss their impacts.. Finally the role of regulatory 
bodies in specific sectors has been relatively humble in enhancing competition and increasing inter-firm rivalry whereas quasi 
governmental bodies (e.g. governorates) have discretionary power which affects negatively the status of competition. 
 
Part III is devoted to analyzing a number of different indicators related to competition environment in Egypt. Two types of data 
sets are used, the World Bank Doing Business which is employed to compare Egypt with other countries in the study; and 
national data to investigate the status of competition and private sector over time. The World Bank indicators identified several 
main points. Comparing Egypt with other countries, Egypt does not seem to be lagging behind on average. It is highly 
comparable with countries in the region as Jordan and Morocco, as well as other countries included in the overall study, and in 
many cases the indicators are highly similar to those of other advanced countries like South Korea. 
 
As for the national indicators, it seems that the structure of the market is still dominated by the public sector though privatization 
has significantly decreased such dominance. The performance of the private sector in general improved in the period 1995 to 
2004 when compared to the period 1990 to 1995 with the exception of the growth rate of value added. There is no consistency 
across the board either between the performance of different sectors or among the different indicators used. However, with regard 
to competition, it could be safely argued that most of the indicators on average point out that the degree of competition increased. 
However, increased competition was not necessarily correlated with better performance of the private sector using the different 
indicators shown. The most obvious example of a highly non competitive industry is the basic metal sector which performed well 
using different indicators although it remained relatively highly concentrated. In other words, the indicators used showed that 
economic efficiency of the sectors investigated are not related to the degree of competition prevailing in their markets where 
some sectors that are highly concentrated experienced good economic performance so as the case with highly competitive 
sectors. On the other hand, there have been sectors which performed in an inefficient manner from an economic perspective 
although they are highly competitive, so as the case with highly concentrated sectors.  
 
Part IV is devoted to discussing three cases studies of anti-competitive behavior in details. The case studies were selected based 
on the public debate that they have been experiencing anti-competitive behavior. There were no actual cases raised, since there 
has been no Competition Law or Competition Authority (during the time of investigation as the Competition Law has been 
introduced in January 2005 and the Competition Authority has started functioning only in April 2006). The three cases include 
steel, cement and cinema industries. Each of the three cases is characterized by a different type of anti-competitive behavior. In 
the case of steel, there has been abuse of dominant position whereas in the case of cement there was collusion among firms 
forming some sort of a cartel. The case of film industry has been characterized by both antic-competitive behavior on the 
horizontal level in the form of abuse of dominant position as well as anti-competitive behavior on the vertical level. The three 
cases studies focus on different aspects including the impact on consumers, impact on producers, as well as the government 
interference, and impact of soft versus hard budget constraints and liberalization of trade policies. 
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In summary, the three case studies revealed that the steel and cement cases had negative impact on consumers whereas the 
cinema industry’s effect was not clear. Moreover, in all the cases the budget constraint variable had an impact on the status of 
competition in the market whereas the trade liberalization did not impact the anti-competitive behavior. 
 
Part V applies some econometric exercises to investigate the status of competition in the Egyptian market. The econometric 
analysis is heavily constrained by the availability of data, however we were able to reach some results, namely that inter firm 
rivalry (as proxied by increase number of private firms and entry of new firms) has a positive impact on exports. Moreover 
market openness as proxied by import penetration has a positive impact on exports. Moreover, entry of new firms is likely to 
have a positive impact on the achieving a better distribution of firms as reflected by GINI coefficient. The empirical analysis was 
not able to achieve any concrete results regarding the impact of more intensive competition of total factor productivity and higher 
price margin costs. 
 
In general, the study showed that budget constraint has a significant impact on competition. The impact in some cases has been 
negative whereas in other cases has been positive in terms of enhancing competition and inter-firm rivalry, however in general a 
soft budget constraint where accessibility to undertaking independent and flexible financial decisions enhance competition and 
allow more inter-firm rivalry. The effect of free trade on the status of competition is minor and insignificant to a large extent 
though it has proven to be positive in some cases. The main reason behind the lack of strong positive impact of trade 
liberalization on the status of competition is that anti-competitive practices have rooted themselves in the Egyptian economy to 
the extent that free trade is not able alone to cure the roots of the anti-competitive behavior. This implies that liberalization and 
economic reform measures undertaken by the government are not sufficient to enhance competition. Rather additional measures 
need to be undertaken to ensure that a competitive environment prevails so as to ensure that the benefits of economic reform in 
terms of selling at marginal cost are passed to consumers. In general, the study showed as well that high concentration in the 
Egyptian different markets is not necessarily correlated with the status of competition. In some cases, there is high concentration 
and high level of competition whereas in other cases high concentration is accompanied by lack of competition. 
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OVERALL INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY 
Competition environment has gained increased importance in the last two years in Egypt. Several reasons were behind such 
increased attention which ranged from the increased anti-competitive behavior in several markets, to the urgency and pressure to 
enact the competition law. The lack of understanding on the effect of competition on producers and consumers in different 
markets has been the main driving force behind undertaking this study. The lack of studies on competition environment whether 
on the macro or sectoral level, accompanied by the urgency of such matter both on the policy as well as the economic research 
fronts were among the main motivations behind the initiation of the current study. The study focuses mainly on investigating the 
status of inter-firm rivalry in the Egyptian market and whether greater competition leads always to positive results for consumers 
and producers. Two hypotheses are investigated, namely, the hard budget constraint has a negative impact on competition and 
free trade has a positive impact on competition. 
 
The study has two main objectives. The first is determining the size of the private sector in the Egyptian economy, while taking 
in consideration any changes that happened over time since the beginning of the 1990s. The second is investigating the degree of 
competition prevailing in the Egyptian market. We test two main hypotheses, the first is that restrictive trade policy has a 
negative impact on the degree of competition prevailing in the Egyptian market, and the second is that hard budget constraints of 
firms (mainly government controlled) have negative impact on competition. The study is undertaken within a larger IDRC 
research project that encompasses six countries, following to a large extent, the same methodology, and includes Brazil, India, 
Mexico, South Africa, and Argentina. The aim of the study is to investigate in depth the evolution of the change in size of the 
private sector and the related policies and institutions. Another important aspect of the study is that it assesses the role of quasi 
governmental bodies in controlling the performance of the private sector. Moreover, the study deals with the role of the 
regulatory bodies in controlling the behavior of the private sector whenever the privatization process has taken place. The study 
deals with different aspects of the market structures in different sectors, including manufacturing, and services. 
 
The study is divided into five main parts: Part I deals with delimiting the scope of the private sector, where we provide an 
overview of the private sector in Egypt and try to estimate its size given the different indicators as size of firms, labor employed, 
etc. We deal in this part with the privatization process and how it affects the size of the private sector. Part II provides an 
overview of selected policies affecting markets where firms operate, whereas Part III benchmarks the private sector in Egypt with 
other countries included in the study. Part IV provides three case studies of the status of competition in steel, cement, and cinema 
industries. Finally, in Part V we undertake some econometric analysis to arrive at estimates of competition variables including 
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PART I:  
DELIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
Introduction 
Egypt, as many other developing countries, has experienced an increase in the size of the private sector during the 1990s. The 
drive toward smaller government and more active private sector participation in economic activity is part of global trends (ERF, 
1996). This drive stems mainly from the failure of the government in managing economic activities and the widening budget 
deficits which ultimately led to the failure of the government led strategy. Nevertheless, such increase in the size of the private 
sector has been subject to a number of limitations that need to be considered if we want to arrive at an accurate estimate of the 
size of the private sector in Egypt. The intention of Part I of the study is to shed light on the size of the private sector in the 
Egyptian economy. We intend to focus on the industrial sector, however we include the services and agriculture sectors whenever 
data permit. Moreover, we emphasize the cases where quasi governmental bodies exist, which neither qualify as pure public or 
governmental sector nor as pure private sector. In other cases, where the private sector exists, we identify its exercising of 
freedom in terms of taking decisions and not being subject to government rules and regulations. Finally, we provide some 
sectoral case studies that differentiate between the relatively high power executed by the private sector in some fields and other 
sectors where such power is relatively limited. 
 
Part I of the study proceeds as follows; in Section One we provide an overview of the public versus private sector shares in the 
economy from a macro perspective. We include as well quasi governmental bodies that exist in Egypt and how they are related to 
the government and affect private sector performance. In Section Two we discuss the process of privatization in the Egyptian 
economy during the 1990s. Section Three provides some sectoral case studies. Section Four concludes and summarizes the status 
of the private sector in Egypt.  
 
In Section Three we devote special attention to testing our two main hypotheses, namely trade liberalization does not enhance 
competition and increase inter-firm rivalry and, soft budget constraints enhance competition and inter-firm rivalry. By soft 
budget constraint we mean that there is autonomy in undertaking financial decisions without interference from the government. 
Moreover, there is a room for enjoying a budget that allows undertaking risky actions being backed up by sufficient collateral. By 
hard budget constraint we mean that there is constraints on using budget efficiently which either arises from continued 
government interference or small size of firm which does not have the sufficient collateral to undertake its independent decisions. 
 
A number of new terms should be clarified at the beginning of this part to avoid confusion. The term public enterprise sector 
differs from public sector. In the conventional terminology both would mean the same thing, that is that they are owned and run 
by the government. In the Egyptian context, a public sector means that firms are owned and run by the government, but public 
enterprise is slightly different where as will be explained later in details, they follow a different law, controlled by a holding 
company, and are separated from the government budget. They are firms set to be privatized. Some of them are still not 
privatized, while others are wholly or partially privatized. The degree of government's involvement in their management differs 
to a large extent as will be explained later. Moreover, there are some specific terminology that need to be identified, that includes 
for example, the economic authorities, service authorities and the National Investment Bank.  
 
Both economic authorities and services authorities are public authorities in charge of providing public services. The financial 
contributions of the government to these authorities are different although the pricing of public services is still controlled by the 
government. The services authorities are defined as a part of the government and consequently their budgets are completely 
incorporated in the consolidated government budget. Since early 70's, the economic authorities have separate budgets yet the 
central government budget still supports most of these authorities. Regarding the National Investment Bank (NIB), it is one of the 
specialized public banks on which the government relies to finance its public investment. On the other hand, Pension Funds 
transfers are the main source of the NIB deposits. 
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Section One: Overview of Public and Private Sectors from a 
Macroeconomic Perspective: 
The size of the public sector declined significantly over the last decade whereas the size of the privates sector increased. During 
the period 1991/1992 to 2001/2002 the relative share of the public sector in GDP decreased by ten percentage points, and 
experienced a reversed trend in the last two years identified as shown in Table 1a and Table 1b. Moreover, the sectoral 
distribution of the public versus private sector changed from one sector to another. In some of the sectors as commodity sectors, 
hotels and restaurants, and industry and mining there was a huge decrease in the size of the public sector (mainly due to 
privatization). In other sectors, the reduction in the size of the public sector was minor as the case of agriculture, where the 
private sector is the dominant sector, and electricity, where the public sector dominates this activity. Other sectors’ structure did 
not change where it either remained dominated by the public sector as public utilities or by private sector as personal services. It 
was only in the construction and building sector where the size of the public sector increased significantly. The data presented 
underestimate the size of the public sector to a certain extent. In relation to GDP, the underestimation arises because the national 
income accounts do not include grant-financed military expenditures, which constitute about 3 percent of GDP. Also, the joint-
venture companies in the industrial sector (about 184) are classified as private sector, whereas in reality some of them are 
majority owned or controlled by the public sector. 
  
There exist various categories of economic participants within Egypt's private sector. On one end of the size spectrum, formal 
medium and large enterprises enjoy a high degree of protection, get all the institutional private credit, use relatively advanced 
technologies and management, make most of the country's private investment, deliver most of its private exports, and pay 
relatively higher salaries. On the other end, there exist small and micro, largely informal, units that are financially constrained, 
turn out most of the country's private output and account for most of its private jobs (World Bank, 1994). 
 
The medium and large enterprise sector is not numerically large, where almost 99 percent of the private non-agricultural 
establishments are either micro or small firms; that percentage is not much smaller within private agriculture (about 90 percent). 
Yet, medium and large enterprises are institutionally visible, well connected and incorporated into relatively sophisticated legal 
forms (joint-stock companies, limited liability concerns, partnerships with shares) while micro and small firms are broadly 
unrepresented, inconsistently regulated (even when fully registered) and set up in simple ownership structures (single 
proprietorships, partnerships). The distinction between "large" and "small" within Egypt's private sector is also manifested in 
terms of policy sensitiveness and across types of activity (World Bank, 1994).  
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Table 1a: Private versus Public Shares in GDP, and Different Sectors 
1991/92 1995/96 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 
Sectors Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
GDP 38.8 61.2 36.6 63.4 28.2 71.8 27.9 72.1 27.3 72.7 
Commodity Sectors 37.2 62.8 35.7 64.3 23.6 76.4 22.5 77.5 21.5 78.5 
Agriculture 1.2 98.8 0.7 99.3 0.4 99.6 0.4 99.6 0.4 99.6 
Industry & Mining 41.9 58.1 37.8 62.2 13.3 86.7 11.9 88.1 10.1 89.9 
Petroleum & Products 82.7 17.3 83.9 16.1 86.2 13.8 82.9 17.1 81.6 18.4 
Electricity 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 97.9 2.1 
Construction & Building 29.2 70.8 27.9 72.1 40.9 59.1 40.9 59.1 40.8 59.2 
Productive Services Sectors 37.9 62.1 33.6 66.4 24.0 76.0 24.5 75.5 24.0 76.0 
Transportation & Communications 52.1 47.9 48.7 51.3 17.4 82.6 17.4 82.6 16.5 83.5 
Suez Canal 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Trade 10.3 89.7 6.7 93.3 3.7 96.3 3.2 96.8 3.2 96.8 
Finance 70.7 29.3 69.5 30.5 67.8 32.2 65.8 34.2 65.5 34.5 
Insurance 60.5 39.5 59.6 40.4 82.2 17.8 77.2 22.8 75.8 24.2 
Restaurants,  & Hotels 15.3 84.7 14.8 85.2 1.7 98.3 1.7 98.3 1.3 98.7 
Social Services Sectors 45.1 54.9 45.0 55.0 48.2 51.8 48.1 51.9 48.4 51.6 
Real Estate ownership 5.4 94.6 5.6 94.4 3.7 96.3 3.5 96.5 3.3 96.7 
Public Utilities 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Social insurance 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Government services 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Personal services 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculation based on: 






Table 1b: Private versus Public Shares in GDP, and Different Sectors1
 
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Sectors Public Private Public Private Public Private 
GDP 34.6 65.4 35.1 64.9 36.3 63.7 
Total Commodity Sector 27.1 72.9 27.0 73.0 29.1 70.9 
  Agriculture, Irrigation & Fishing 0.4 99.6 0.6 99.4 0.6 99.4 
  Extractions 86.2 13.8 85.2 14.8 84.2 15.8 
     A)  Petroleum & Products 87.3 12.7 86.2 13.8 84.9 15.1 
     B) Other Mining 42.8 57.2 42.7 57.3 42.8 57.2 
Manufacturing industries 13.5 86.5 13.5 86.5 13.2 86.8 
    A) Oil products 66.4 33.6 63.0 37.0 58.9 41.1 
    B) Other Manufacturing 11.2 88.8 11.1 88.9 10.6 89.4 
  Electricity  98.0 2.0 92.8 7.2 84.3 15.7 
  Water  100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
  Construction & Building 41.5 58.5 41.5 58.5 41.4 58.6 
Total Production Services 33.0 67.0 33.8 66.2 34.3 65.7 
  Transportation  & Communication  16.8 83.2 16.8 83.2 16.8 83.2 
  Suez Canal 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
  Internal Trade 4.2 95.8 3.9 96.1 3.9 96.1 
  Financial Services 65.1 34.9 65.1 34.9 65.0 35.0 
  Insurance & Social Security 98.3 1.7 97.9 2.1 97.9 2.1 
  Hotels and Restaurants 1.4 98.6 1.3 98.7 1.4 98.6 
Total Social Services 59.9 40.1 61.6 38.4 62.0 38.0 
Real estate activities 4.1 95.9 4.1 95.9 4.1 95.9 
  A) Rent 3.3 96.7 3.2 96.8 3.2 96.8 
  B)Other Real estate & Business services 5.1 94.9 5.1 94.9 5.0 95.0 
Government Services (Utilities) 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Government Social  Services 2/ 6.4 93.6 6.3 93.7 6.2 93.8 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, Monthly  Bulletin, June 2005  
1/ Starting from 2001/2002 Ministry of Planning reclassified the national account according to 
classification1993 
2/ Includes education, health, social, cultural, entertainment & personal services 
 
 
The size of the government in Egypt is considered large by international standards (see for example, ERF, 1996). The 
government-controlled sectors account for more than almost a quarter of economic activity in Egypt and employ around a third of 
Egypt's labor force. The public sector enterprises operate in virtually all sectors of the economy, their activity ranges from the 
production of iron and steel to soap, cement to movies, phosphates, ceramics, hotels, etc.  The government dominates also the 
banking and insurance sectors (Carana, 2002, Abdel Latif, 2002), however starting 2005 serious steps towards privatization in the 
banking sector started to take place. The government’s overall contribution to GDP has remained virtually unchanged since the 
late 1980s (IMF, 1998).  For example, as identified in Table 2, the percentage of government expenditure to GDP remained high. 
The situation is highly similar to the case of other countries including both developed and developing ones.  
 
Table 2: Government Expenditures* as Percentage of GDP 
 1990 1995 1997 2000 2001 2003 
Egypt 27.8 33.7 30.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany 26.3 33.7 33.2 n.a. n.a. 32.8 
South Korea 16.2 16.5 17.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Jordan 35.8 30.8 32.4 n.a. 32.4 30.5 
Tunisia 34.6 32.8 31.9 32.0 32.0 27.9 
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Morocco 28.8 32.9 30.6 n.a. 32.5 n.a. 
Mexico 17.9 15.9 16.3 16.0 15.9 15.4 
Turkey 17.4 22.2 29.9 39.4 49.5 n.a. 
* Total expenditure includes both current and capital expenditures. It does not include government lending 
or repayments to the government or government acquisition of equity for public purposes. Data are shown 
for central government only. 
n.a.: Not Available 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, CDRom,2005 
 
 
In 1952, the private sector had the largest share of investment, 76% of the total. By 1960, the situation changed completely, and 
the public sector handled 94% of total investment where it has attained a dominant position till the early 1970s. In 1971, the first 
Law introduced to enhance private investment (Law 65 of 1971) identified certain fields of investment and offered foreign 
investors in those domains generous benefits. Such sectors included tourism, banking, agriculture and several industrial activities 
(Abdel Hamid and Bahaaeddin, 2003).  The year 1974 witnessed the start of the “Open Door” policy (Infetah), where many laws 
and regulations were incorporated to encourage the private sector. The most important was Law 43 of 1974 and its amending 
Law 32 of 1977. It is worth mentioning that at the time, the public sector was undertaking almost 90% of total investment, versus 
10% for the private sector. By the end of the period from 1974 - 1983, the public sector was responsible for 81% of total 
investment, while the private sector share increased to 19%. By 1990, the public sector’s share was 68% against 32% for the 
private sector, although of a much higher total (Carana, 2002, IMF, 1998). 
 
During the 1990's, the percentage of public share in implemented investment decreased by two percentage points between 
1991/1992 (54%) and 2002/2003 (51.9%)  (see Figure 1).  Among the most important indicators of the relative size and role of 
the public and private sectors in economic development before the start of the privatization program in 1991, is the relative 
amount of public to private investment.  
Figure 1: Gross Implemented Investments (1991-2003) 

































 Source: Central Bank of Egypt (2004)– Annual Time Series  
 
The public enterprises were estimated to produce about one-tenth of the GDP and employ about six percent of the labor force on 
average in the early 1990s (World Bank, 1994). During the 1990s the situation started to change where Egypt embarked on an 
economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) implemented jointly with the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). A major component of this reform program was reducing the size of the government and increasing the 
size of the private sector by adopting an ambitious privatization program (the progress of the privatization program will be 
discussed in Section Two). As shown in Table32., this has been achieved in almost all industrial sector activities with the 
exception of mining and quarries. In general the size of the public sector in industrial production decreased from 68.7% in 
1990/1991 to around 30% in 2002/2003. 























2 Tables containing values are in Appendix B 
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Table 3: Total Public and Private Industrial Production Distributed by Sector 
         Percentage 
Sector 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 
Mining & Quarrying 
public sector 100 100 100 100 100 100 91.8 86.8 
private sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.2 13.2 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 
public sector 71.5 69.5 66.9 64.7 56.6 52.4 51.5 44.0 
private sector 28.5 30.5 33.1 35.3 43.4 47.6 48.5 56.0 
Spinning, Weaving, Textile & Garments 
public sector 63.3 62.4 43.3 37.9 25.2 33.8 27.7 28.3 
private sector 36.7 37.6 56.7 62.1 74.8 66.2 72.3 71.7 
Wood & its products 
public sector 29.8 23.2 19.6 8.4 8.9 13.7 12.3 15.8 
private sector 70.2 76.8 80.4 91.6 91.1 86.3 87.7 84.2 
Paper & Chemical products 
public sector 56.1 51.9 30.8 22.9 21.7 21.5 21.6 20.3 
private sector 43.9 48.1 69.2 77.1 78.3 78.5 78.4 79.7 
Pharmaceutical, Drugs & Medical Supplies 
public sector 41.0 38.5 35.6 37.6 29.8 31.0 28.2 28.2 
private sector 59.0 61.5 64.4 62.4 70.2 69.0 71.8 71.8 
Non-metal Mining products 
public sector 65.1 62.9 59.3 55.4 25.7 9.9 7.6 9.1 
private sector 34.9 37.1 40.7 44.6 74.3 90.1 92.4 90.9 
Basic metal products 
public sector 63.6 65.9 59.0 40.2 31.5 30.1 37.3 37.9 
private sector 36.4 34.1 41.0 59.8 68.5 69.9 62.7 62.1 
Metal products, machinery & equipment 
public sector 37.2 38.6 30.8 18.8 15.5 13.0 13.7 14.6 
private sector 62.8 61.4 69.2 81.2 84.5 87.0 86.3 85.4 
Electric Machines 
public sector 42.9 33.7 28.6 13.2 13.4 6.9 5.0 3.4 
private sector 57.1 66.3 71.4 86.8 86.6 93.1 95.0 96.6 
Total 
public sector 59.5 57.7 48.6 41.5 33.4 32.3 32.5 30.0 
private sector 40.5 42.3 51.4 58.5 66.6 67.7 67.5 70.0 




The history of the public and private sectors in Egypt: 
The private sector was dominant in the Egyptian economy during the era of monarchy. Starting the national revolution 
in 1952 and Suez War in 1956, the situation changed dramatically. Nationalization started with the near century old 
Suez Canal Company in the summer of 1956, under Law 285 of 1956, and was followed by the nationalization of the 
majority of foreign economic assets operating in the country, as well as land, real estate and other economic assets 
owned by Egypt’s private sector.  
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In 1960s the nationalized companies and newly created public enterprises were initially placed under the administrative 
responsibility of three giant state-owned holding companies and then re-organized under approximately 40 public 
holding companies. Each holding company was given managerial responsibility for a group of affiliate public 
enterprises engaged in a particular branch of economic activity. The holding companies regulated their affiliate firms 
and were placed under the administration of a line ministry, which oversaw economic activity in its sector. These new 
institutions did not practice economic activity on their own. They were considered as ‘economic holding units’ with 
affiliated public companies who undertook the economic activity. As the owner of capital, the institutions’ role was to 
plan, monitor the achievement of targeted goals, and evaluate performance of affiliated companies, without interference 
in their operations. 
 
The activities of the private sector during that period were limited to small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
industrial, agricultural and internal trade sectors, as well as sharing international trade with the public sector. Many 
laws were passed to organize the public sector and designate its responsibilities. 
 
By 1964 the state owned or controlled most of the enterprises within the modern sectors of the economy as reflected in 
the following list: 
All banking and insurance, all foreign trade; 
All “strategic” industries, all medium to heavy industries, infrastructure assets such as the Suez Canal and the Aswan 
Dam, all major textile, sugar-refining and food processing plants; 
Most maritime and all air transport, all ports and port facilities; 
All public utilities and urban transport, modest public housing; 
Major department stores, some of the urban retail trade, hotels, cinemas and theatres; 
All newspapers and publishing houses; 
All reclaimed land, all irrigation canals; 
All major construction companies. 
 
In the early 1970s the Government of Egypt (GOE) decided to enhance the role of the private sector in the economy 
and adopted the so called “Open Door” (Infitah) policy. The policy was successful in increasing the role of the private 
sector in the economy, however, the final implication of the Open Door policy is that it contributed to an increase in the 
relative role of the private sector while in absolute terms the public sector continued to grow. For example, while 
private investment increased by a factor of approximately 130 times between 1974 and 1990, public investment still 
increased by a factor of 18 times the 1974 level (in current terms).  
 
Table 4 identifies the shares of the public and private sectors regarding employment in manufacturing. It shows the 
tremendous increase in the private sector employment which increased by around 40 percentage points from 19.9% in 
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Table 4: Public and Private Sectors’ Share in Employment in Manufacturing 
 
Percentage 
Year Public Sector Private Sector 
69/70 80.1 19.9 
70/71 81.0 19.0 
71/72 81.4 18.6 
73 82.0 18.0 
74 83.3 16.7 
75 83.8 16.2 
76 84.0 16.0 
77 82.4 17.6 
78 82.0 18.0 
79 81.1 18.9 
80/81 81.9 18.1 
81/82 81.4 18.6 
82/83 81.5 18.5 
83/84 77.3 22.7 
84/85 80.0 20.0 
85/86 78.6 21.4 
86/87 78.7 21.3 
87/88 75.5 24.5 
88/89 74.4 25.6 
89/90 84.9 15.1 
90/91 72.9 27.1 
91/92 68.0 32.0 
92/93 69.6 30.4 
93/94 67.4 32.6 
94/95 65.2 34.8 
95/96 60.7 39.3 
96/97 58.1 41.9 
97/98 52.5 47.5 
98/99 44.5 55.5 
99/2000 42.0 58.0 
2000/2001 40.5 59.5 
2002/2003 37.9 62.1 
2003/2004 36.6 63.4 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CAPMAS Industrial Statistics Bulletin, various issues 
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In 1991, the total number of the public enterprises reached 500. They were responsible for more than half of total 
industrial production, the majority of total export and import activities and, the banking and insurance sectors as 
identified above. The public sector’s economic performance was weak as it turned to fulfill more social objectives than 
economic aims due to the high population growth and the inability of the government to resolve this growing problem 
in an effective way. The performance of the public sector continued to deteriorate over the 1990s.  Within the public 
sector, the public enterprise sector3 consisted of some 300+ industrial enterprises. Debt and other financial burdens on 
the public sector have gradually increased. Debt in public enterprises increased relative to total invested capital, from 
30.3% in 1975 to 74.3% in 1988. This led to aggregate losses over the period 1975 to 1988 of around LE 24.5 billion, 
with total debt reaching LE 80 billion by 1988. As of June 30, 1991, 399 public enterprises showed the following: 
The average return on total invested capital was 6.39% at the end of fiscal year 1991, slightly increasing from the figure 
one year before.  The number of companies that suffered from financial difficulties reached 85 out of 399, representing 
21% of the total companies.  
 
Despite such losses of the public sector and public enterprise sector and the trials to revive and enhance the role of the 
private sector, the size of the government remained large as well the scope of activities falling under its control.  
 
Regarding the activities falling under the control of the government they can be classified as follows: 
The Central Government which consists of all the line ministries (34)4. 
The local governments (There are about 2000 medium-size enterprises belonging to the local governorates, operating in 
an array of activities (from chicken farming to manufacturing workshops). They are normally incorporated as 
"economic units" and compete, more or less on equal footing, with the local private sector. 
The service authorities, about 100 in number and consisting of (1) various bodies in the fields of communication, trade, 
finance, transportation, finance (including the capital market authority), housing and reconstruction and health; (2) the 
educational institutions, including universities and; (3) assorted other bodies in culture, tourism, and presidential 
services. Examples of such service institutions include institutions of higher education, science and technology, the 
antiquities department, university hospitals. mass media, the sanitary and sewage organizations, and the High Dam 
Authority. Most of them enjoy institutionalized or natural monopolistic positions (eg., sewage, High Dam) that fence 
off private sector competition; 
The economic authorities, over 60 in number, which operate in areas of public utilities including those responsible for 
power generation, telecommunications, the Suez Canal, the petroleum company (EGPC), the railways and national 
airline5, the post office, government supplies, and water and port authorities. They are semi-autonomous corporations 
and are estimated to turn out a third of the economy's GDP, transfer their profits to (or cover their losses from) the 
state's budget. Almost all of them have legally established monopolistic rights. In 2004 the Minister of Finance 
announced that 15 economic authorities will be transformed to holding companies as they were facing financial 























3 The difference between the public sector and the public enterprise sector is that the public sector firms were not planned to be privatized, whereas the public 
enterprise sector were set to be privatized following Law 203 of 1991. 
4 The number of ministries can increase or decrease with each ministerial change due to addition of new ministries, abolishing some, merging some and splitting 
some. 
5 This was transformed in 2002 into a holding company and a special ministry was established for Civil Aviation. 
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problems and hence such a decision will help to lessen the fiscal burden on the government budget (Al Ahram 
Newspaper, 29/5/2004); 
The non financial public economic enterprises, about 319 in number (called affiliated companies) and covered by Law 
2036, which are largely concentrated in the industrial sector, but also include hotels, electricity distribution companies, 
and transport and port-related companies. These affiliated companies are distributed between and controlled by 17 
holding companies (changed later to 16 and then later to 10). The affiliated companies in turn own holdings in about 
184 joint venture companies, which are partnerships between the private and the public sectors. They operate virtually 
in all the areas of the local economy. Their business interests range from cement, iron, phosphate, and ceramics, to 
soap, hotels, and movies.  They employ about 6% of Egypt’s total labor force. 
There are also a few large industrial enterprises, military production, iron, and steel and so forth that fall under Law 
97/1983. Such enterprises remain pure public sector and are not included under Law 203. 
The banking sector comprises 4 public commercial banks, 26 joint venture banks and 21 public specialized banks, 
which are in turn supervised by the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). 
The insurance sector comprises the three public insurance companies, a reinsurance company, and five joint venture 
insurance companies, which are supervised by the Egyptian Insurance Supervisory Authority (EISA) and finally  
The public pension fund and social security systems, and the National Investment Bank (NIB) which invests the surplus 
of contribution of social funds over payments (IMF, 1998, World Bank, 1994). 
 
The financial relationship between the governmental entities is depicted in table 5. 
Table 5: Financial Transactions between Public Entities 
 Budget1 Banking Sector Economic Authorities 
National Investment 
Bank 
Budget  Borrows from the 
Central Bank and 
the banking system 
and maintains 
deposits.  
Plays the role of the 
Guarantor for any 
financing provide to 
economic 




Bank (NIB). Interest 
rate on debt varies 
considerably.  
Law 203 companies Excluded from 
budget;  
Outstanding debt to 
banking system of 
which about 60-70 
percent is estimated 
as doubtful or bad.  
Electricity 
distribution 
companies owe  
debts and arrears to 
the electricity 
authority. 
Outstanding debt of 
Law 203 
companies; extent 
of bad or doubtful 
debt unknown. 
Social insurance 
and pension fund 
Budget contributes 
to pension fund in 
  Pension fund 
transfers excess of 























6 This law is concerned with privatization and is discussed in more details in the second part of the study. 
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 Budget1 Banking Sector Economic National Investment Authorities Bank 
the form of 
employer’s 
contribution as well 





includes returns on 
deposits with NIB) 
less payments to 
beneficiaries to 






 NIB cannot borrow 
from banking 
system but operates 
a deposit account at 
the CBE. 
 
Outstanding debt of 
EAs to NIB. Size of 









1 Central, local government, and service authorities. 
Source: IMF (1998) 
 
As shown in table 6, the largest contributors to GDP are the economic authorities (18 percent of total GDP), which 
account for less than 3 percent of the total labor force. At the other extreme, the civil service (comprising the central 
and local governments and service authorities) accounts for about 7 percent of total economic activity but a 
disproportionate share (25 percent) of the total labor force and nearly two-thirds of total government employment. The 
public enterprise sector, including the Law 97 companies, produces about 10 percent of the economy's GDP, while em-
ploying about 6 percent of the total labor force. As we can see from table 6, the share of the public sector slightly 
differs from the closest period (1997) identified in table 6 as it showed 36% in 1995/1996 (Table 1.). 
 
Table 6: Size and Composition of the Public Sector in Egypt (1997) 
Percentage 
Public Sector Entity Share of Public Sector Output 
Public Sector Share in 
Total GDP 
Public Sector 
Employment as Share of 
Labor Force 
Central and Local Government 
and Services Authorities1 19.4 7.3 24.9 
Economic Authorities2 46.7 17.5 2.8 
Public Enterprise Sector3 25.8 9.6 5.9 
Banking 7.0 2.6 0.4 
Insurance 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Social Insurance 0.2 0.1 n.a. 
Others4 0.9 0.3 n.a. 
Total 100 37.4 34.0 
1Service Authorities include regulatory bodies for agriculture, industry, transportation and communication, trade and 
finance, housing, reconstruction and health, the educational institutions, and other bodies providing tourist, cultural, and 
presidential support services. 
2 includes petroleum, electricity, transportation and communication, Suez canal, and tourism and hotels. 
3includes industry and mining, construction and building, trade and restaurants, and tourism and hotels. 
4includes agriculture and real estate 
Source: IMF (1998). 
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During the 1980s and the 1990s the manufacturing sector attracted private enterprises to contribute to the 
manufacturing of some intermediate products especially in the fields of basic metals, non-metal and 
engineering activities and the size of the private sector increased significantly compared to the public sector 
whether in terms of number of firms, capital, output or value added (see Table 7.).  
 
The new production capacity helped the sector to restore, to an extent, its historical contribution to macro 
value added.   The beginning of this period witnessed the progression of the private sector. Growth rates of 
the private firms – on average – reflected the impressive growth rates undertaken in investment, and 
registered impressive rates during the period that followed the open-up of the economy. Yet, due to the 
humble growth rates of the public portion of the sector- which constituted the bulk of the sector then, as 
well as the very high growth rates experienced by service sector, the manufacturing sector in total could not 
maintain its high contribution to GDP witnessed in the 1960s. Also, at the outset of the opening, services 
sectors experienced huge rates of growth, which made the contribution of the manufacturing to appear less 
than the 1960s (Abdel Latif, 2002).  
 
Table 7: Distribution of some industrial indicators between private and public sectors 
Average Distribution  
Sector 1970-19741 1975-19911 1992-19971 1998-20002 2000/20013 2001/20023 2002/20033
Public 19 16.2 12.9 6.8 2.7 2.8 2.7 
Private 81 83.8 87.1 93.2 97.3 97.2 97.3 
Number 
of Firms 
Total 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Public 96.7 86.7 72.4 .. .. .. .. 
Private 3.3 13.3 27.6 .. .. .. .. 
Capital 
Total 100 100 100 .. .. .. .. 
Public 86.7 78.1 60.7 39.1 32.0 32.2 29.6 
Private 13.3 21.9 39.3 60.9 68.0 67.8 70.4 
Output 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Public 90.3 81.3 58.8 25.9 .. .. .. 




Total 100 100 100 100 .. .. .. 
Sources: 
1: Abdel Latif (2002), and Author’s own calculations, based on Industrial Production Statistics, CAPMAS 
2: Author’s calculation based on CAPMAS, Industrial Statistics Bulletin, various issues 
3: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS, Statistical Yearbook, June 2004 
 
 
The participation of the private sector in infrastructure and public utility projects has been kept to a minimum till late 
1990s where it increased in a number of fields including power (mainly electricity) through BOOT, BOT operations. 
This trend has been accelerating significantly in the last few years. 
 
The private sector operates in free zones as well. In Egypt, free zones have been established following Law 43/1974 
which was later incorporated under Law 8/1997 (see second part of the study for more details on this law). There are 
two types of free zones, namely public and private. There are seven public free zones with 674 firms operating whereas 
there are only two private free zones with a total of 177 firms. The main difference is that private free zones are zones 
established for a specific project or company after the approval of the General Authority for Investment (GAFI), to 
accommodate storage, warehousing (an activity that has been abolished in 2002), mixing and repackaging, assembly 
and manufacturing for exports and services.  All free zones extend life-time investment incentives, in addition to 
complete exemption from all Egyptian income taxes, the general sales tax, and other direct or indirect taxes. There are 
no restrictions on investment activities and no custom duties or charges are levied on imports or exports of intermediate 
and final goods. Additionally, projects are exempted from regulations related to import/export activities. They are 
subject only to a duty of 1% of the value of goods entering free zone warehouses, and 1% of the annual value added for 
manufacturing or assembly projects. However, the executive regulations of the Law 8/97 stipulate that, inter alia, at 
least 50 per cent of production should be exported. Free-zone investors may sell their products on the Egyptian market 
after paying a normal tariff rates on imported components (Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2003). 
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In addition to the free zones there is the so called industrial parks which are regulated as well by Law 8/1997. There are 
63 industrial parks, amongst which 1 is established by a presidential decree, 41 established by a Prime-ministerial 
decrees and supervised by GAFI, whereas 21 are established by Governors decrees, and supervised by governerates. 
Industrial parks are distributed throughout 19 governorates7. As at the end of February 2005, 60161 workers were 
employed in these parks. A total of 930 companies started production and 2191 are authorized – but didn’t actually 
operate there, all governorates combined, an indication of there areas’ capacity to attract foreign direct investments. 
Major activities include pharmaceuticals, ready-made garments, petrochemicals, appliances, ceramics and cement.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows have been decreasing over time. There are continuous efforts to attract FDI in 
Egypt by trying to establish a conducive business environment, nevertheless, they remain short of reaching their targets 
due to administrative and red tape measures which increases the transaction costs of doing business in Egypt, political 
circumstances affecting the whole Middle East North Africa (MENA) region and lagging macroeconomic reforms. 
However, Egypt still remains one of the major recipients of FDI in the MENA region. Figure 2 identifies the 5 years 
average of FDI inflows in Egypt in the period 1981 to 2000. The years starting 2001 and ending 2003 witnessed a 
decline in the FDI inflows to reach a minimum of 237 million US dollars in 2003. The FDI inflows picked up again in 
2004 and 2005 to reach $ 2,157 million and $5,376 million respectively (UNCTAD, 2006). Most of the FDI is 
concentrated in the oil sector. Table 8 shows the activities where FDI is concentrated outside the oil sector and it is 
interesting to note that foreign capital participation did not change significantly in the different sectors between 1999 
and 2005, with the exception of building materials, mainly attributed to cement sector, and services where financial and 
tourism sectors have attracted a large portion of non-oil FDI. 
 























7 GAFI database, March 2005. 
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Table 8: Foreign Participation in Investment Companies by Activity in December 31, 1999, and 
March 2005 
 
















Costs Capital Activity 
24% 1,276 8,628 5,241 24.1% 652 5,134 2,708 Textile 
36% 3,896 17,105 10,707 38.9 % 2,047 9,330 5,268 
Food & 
Beverages 
20% 3,162 27,468 16,027 18.8 % 1,801 17,789 9,571 Chemicals 
9% 80 1,404 894 11.1% 52 792 468 
Wood 
Production 
23% 2,690 17,515 11,490 19.6% 1,096 9,981 5,583 Engineering 
28% 1,810 21,197 6,495 19.1% 911 10,847 4,777 
Building 
Materials 
18% 1,066 10,862 6,064 16.3% 748 9,839 4,581 Metallurgical 
27% 1,453 7,113 5,404 29.1% 595 3,400 2,044 Pharmaceuticals 
10% 51 9,050 512 10.4% 41 722 393 Mining 
25% 15,487 112,200 62,837 22.5% 7,943 67,834 35,348 Total Industry 
19% 1,120 10,889 5,938 16.6% 678 11,245 4,085 Agriculture 
28% 2,457 20,221 8,653 30.1% 2,110 17,046 7,005 Construction 
20% 7,773 69,190 38,952 17.3% 4,478 47,708 25,938 Tourism 
37% 9,451 25,679 25,506 28.6% 4,919 17,191 17,191 Finance 
17% 1,557 15,968 9,345 11.6% 803 13,061 6,928 Services 
24% 36,847 254,148 151,234 24% 27,764 222,569 115,042 Grand Total  
Source: General Authority For Investment (GAFI) database, 2005 
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Table 9 identifies the latest figure available on total number of private firms operating under Law 8/1997, which in fact 
encompasses most of the private firms in Egypt (compared with firms registered under law 159 as shown in the table). 
It identifies as well the sectors where private firms operate which are concentrated in the industrial sector and absorb 
the highest number of employees.  
 
Table 9: Total Number of Firms Registered under the General Authority For Investments (GAFI), (by economic 
sector) 
 
 Capital Increase and Expansion Growth(L.E. billion) 
Cumulative Number of Companies Established Under 
Law 8/1997
(End Sep 2004) 
LE billions (End – Sept. 2004) 
% 2000 2001 2002 2003 Sept. 2004 No. of Companies 
Issued 
Capital Employment (thousands) 
Industry 2.9 2.7 2.2 3.4 3.2 10630 57.80 722 
Agriculture 0.1 0.07 0.5 0.3 0.5 1101 5.6 97 
Construction 0.03 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.5 386 8.3 74 
Tourism 0.8 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1444 35.4 193 
Finance and Services 1.5 0.8 1.8 2.1 0.4 1735 33 73 
Total In-Land 5.3 4.2 6.2 7.1 6 15296 140.1 1159 
Free zones 0.2 2.4 1.7 1.6 2.8 763 35.6 113 
Total 5.5 6.6 7.9 8.7 8.8 16059 175.7 1272 
Companies under 
law 159 
2.6 1.5 1 1.6 0.9 17706 35.6 71 
Grand Total 8.1 8.1 8.9 10.3 9.7 33765 211.3 1343 
Source: General Authority For Investment (GAFI) database, 2005
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Section Two: Process of Privatization in the Egyptian 
Economy During the 1990s: 
The process of privatization in Egypt, as the case of other countries in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, 
has lagged behind world trends. The main reasons in Egypt and other Arab countries were merely political where many 
governments in the region were reluctant to give up the power that state-owned enterprises provide, despite growing of 
their economic and financial failure. The press in much of the region tends to be critical about the social impact of 
privatization. Public sector employees and trade unions which are important supporters of many governments in the 
region have been wary of potential layoffs and wage cuts associated with privatization (ERF, 1996). Nevertheless, with 
the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991, an ambitious privatization program was set and gained momentum. In 1990, the 
portfolio of state-owned enterprises consisted of a mix of profit (about 250) and loss making enterprises (54), public 
enterprise sector operated with a hard budget and their deficit was financed by the government budget. Although this 
portfolio showed a profit of L.E. 1.2 billion, accumulated losses reached some L.E. 2.37 billion. In addition, the debt of 
public enterprises was some L.E. 47 billion, a huge burden on government finances and state commercial banks, main 
financiers of public enterprises at the time. The companies privatized or set for privatization are diversified over a 
number of sectors including agriculture, real estate and construction, food and beverages, milling, pharmaceuticals, 
cement, chemicals and fertilizers, engineering, retail, textiles, housing tourism and hotels (Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Egypt 2003). The privatization process has been projected to reduce the public sector's role in industrial sector activity 
by about 25 percentage points, from 38% to 13% and in total output from about 9.6% to 3.2% (see for example Khatab, 
1998; World Bank, 1999; Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2002). 
 
Since the launching of Egypt's privatization program in 1991, three companies were 100 percent sold to the private 
sector, minority holdings in 18 companies were partially floated on the stock exchange, several hotels were sold, and 
employee share ownership (Employee Shareholder Association) schemes valued at about $1.8 billion have been 
structured. Estimates of the total value of share offerings have reached about $800 million, but more than $30 billion in 
state-owned assets remain. There was a clear commitment to accelerate privatization since the appointment of a new 
government in January 1996, as exemplified by the recent sale of majority stakes in several companies. During the next 
five years of the privatization program (1996-2000), the Government of Egypt (GOE) successfully privatized some 170 
companies under Law 203. The period 1996 to 1998 witnessed the privatization of 85 companies and production units. 
Privatization continued at a fast pace through 1999. A total of 137 Law 203 enterprises had been (majority and 
minority) privatized by the start of the year 2000, along with: 
Public sector shares in 21 joint venture industrial companies, 
16 joint venture banks, 
2 joint venture insurance companies, 
Various other entities. 
Starting 1999 the privatization pace slowed down till the appointment of a new cabinet in 2004 where the pace started 
to accelerate as shown in Figure 3. 
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The GOE used several methods of privatization as summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10: Egyptian Privatization Techniques 
Sales to anchor investors 
 
Sale of a majority of shares to a strategic / controlling 
investor 
 
Majority initial public offerings (IPOs) 
 
Tender of a majority of shares on the Cairo and 
Alexandria Stock Exchange 
 
Sales to employee shareholder 
associations (ESAs) 
 
Sale of a majority of shares to the company’s ESA 
 
Liquidation Liquidation of the company as going concern and the sale 




Tender of a minority of shares on the Cairo and 








Sale of company assets 
 
 
Figure 3. provides an overview of the privatization proceeds whereas Table 11. identifies a summary of the 
privatization process progress up till end of 2005. (for the whole list of privatized firms with the method of 
privatization see appendix A). 
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July 2004 - 
March 2005 
Stock Market 
(majority)     1 14 14 8   1           
Sale to Anchor 
Investor   3   3 3 2 9 5 4     2 9 
Sale to ESAs   7 3   3 12 5   1 2       
Companies Sold As 
Assets 6 2 2 1 3 6 7 3 2 1       
Trenches to Stock 
Market   1  6 6 2 1               
Sale of Separate 
Assets        1 1 3 4 6 3 3 6 3 9 
Companies / Assets 
leased         1   6 10 1   3     
Total Value of 
Sales (LE million) 0 664 1216 2792 3148 2358 2785 2476 1075 51 114 424.2 2877 
 
 
Source: Egyptian Investment Portal – www.investment.gov.eg - Ministry of Investment, Arab Republic of Egypt (2005) 
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Evaluating the Privatization Process: 
During the initial three years of the privatization program (1993 to 1995), the pace of privatization was slow.  In 1996, 
the constitutional court upheld the right of the government to privatize the public sector. After this favorable legal 
ruling, the privatization program gained momentum, mainly through flotation of shares of public enterprises on the 
stock market.  The program slowed significantly in early 1997 as the government began to move to problematic 
companies with massive overstaffing, huge debts and large unsold inventories. Debt-rescheduling agreements were 
reached with public banks, and an early-retirement program initiated with union consent in March 1997. The 
government accelerated the pace of privatization in the aftermath of the Luxor massacre8 in November 1997, and 
placed more stress on corporate investor transactions, in part to reassure investors but also in recognition of the need to 
upgrade management, technology and marketing.  
 
As of June 1998 the total number of privatized companies was 96. Since mid-1999, however, privatization has been 
hampered by political concerns, poor market conditions, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and a lack of official 
pricing flexibility. This has mainly confined the program to liquidations and the sales of small firms to their employees, 
as well as the odd high-profile sale, notably of cement companies to international producers. Although a number of 
sectors remain off limits, notably the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation and the Suez Canal, and a 40% limit 
have been set for strategic sectors such as pharmaceuticals and flour mills, the government has relaxed its ban on the 
privatization of utilities. An initial public offering (IPO) of a 20% stake in the state telecommunications monopoly, 
Telecom Egypt, has been repeatedly postponed since October 2000 owing to poor market conditions.  
 
Moreover, in 1998 the government opened up the state-run mobile phone network to two private operators. The 
generation and distribution activities of the seven state-owned electricity distribution companies have been separated 
and a regulator established as part of the pre-privatization restructuring process. However, the sectors debt burden of 
L.E.15bn (US$3.4bn) remains a major constraint to progress on privatization. In September 2001 the government 
announced that it would offer for sale 15% in the electricity distribution companies and 40% in the state oil distribution 
companies, but no progress has been made. By end-June 2002 the government had completed 135 majority and 58 
minority privatizations, out of 314 public enterprises slated for privatization, generating revenue of L.E.14.4bn (around 
4.5% of GDP). These transactions included the sale of majority stakes in 38 companies and minority stakes in 16 
companies through a public offering, the liquidation of 32 unviable companies, 28 anchor investor sales, 20 companies 
leased, 21 asset sales and 30 companies sold to employee shareholder associations. As a result, the public sector 
enterprises’ share of total employment has been reduced from 6% in 1991 to 2.5% by mid-2002. However, the 
government is behind schedule: the privatization program for public enterprises was planned to be completed by end-
2002. The Ministry of Public Enterprise (MPE) announced in late 2002 an effort to gradually privatize some state-
owned enterprises by participation of private investors in capital increases for the companies. The MPE also announced 
it would retain the services of foreign and domestic financial advisors to assist it in the privatization program. 
Nevertheless, progress remained slow over the past year through August 2003. 
 























8 The Luxor incident was a terrorist attack on one of the touristic places in Luxor which affected the tourism (the main source of foreign exchange) in negative terms.
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As of March 2003, 193 entities had been privatized since 1993, generating proceeds of  
LE 17.1 billion. However, only 10 deals valued at LE 346 million were completed in 2002, including asset sales, 
anchor sales and sales to employee shareholders associations, compared to an annual average of 25-30 transactions 
worth LE 2.5-3.5 billion from 1996 through 2000. During the first quarter of 2003, the only privatization transactions 
that took place were the leasing of two minor state-owned assets to private firms. In fact, in 2004, the Minister of 
Public Enterprise announced that a number of companies (68) which were set for privatization will not be privatized. 
He related this decision to taking in consideration social and strategic aspects (El Ahram Newspaper, 12/04/2004). The 
main signal that is captured from this announcement and the slow down of the privatization process is that hard budget 
constraints have affected negatively the privatization process, which in turn affects negatively the status of competition. 
 
Conventionally the objectives governing privatization were only limited to the types of sales activities; however there is 
a new approach and thinking now involved with privatization, that has expanded to include the effective management 
of state owned assets. 
 
With the cabinet shuffle that took place in July 2004, the Ministry of Investment (MOI) was established to encompass 
several organizations including the former Ministry of Public Enterprise, the Capital Market Authority and GAFI. 
 
MOI has adopted a different approach to privatization whereby it now follows an asset management approach.  With 
this approach, all state-owned assets are treated as one pool that has to be managed in order to maximize returns. 
 
MOI ambitious plan started to yield as it succeeded to sell 12 firms and asset during the period July – December 2004 
with a total proceeds reading L.E. 268 Million, whilst till March 2005, 6 large transactions took place totaling to L.E. 
2608 million, and pushing the prospected sales proceeds for the fiscal year 2004/2005 to read as double as the overall 
proceeds of the program since Jan 2001 till June 2004. 
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Section Three: Share of Public and Private Sectors in 
Egypt: Sectoral Focus 
The public sector still accounts for a large share of economic activity, about one third of economic output and 
employment.  The value of privatization transactions has been the equivalent of 0.46% of GDP annually. This 
represents the percent of GDP transferred on an annual basis from the public sector to the private sector. There was 
virtually no government investment in public sector enterprises after 1991/92 (LE3.9 billion), except for LE226 million 
in 1998/99 (as reported by the CBE). However, the Government made additional new investments of LE 7.7 billion in 
Industry and Mining projects between 1992/93-2000/01, as well as LE21.4 billion in Agriculture and Irrigation, and 
LE70.4 billion for Infrastructure and Construction. Thus, it can be concluded that the investments previously made in 
public sector enterprises were channeled into other public sector entities and projects. This also helps explain why the 
public sector continues to represent a high percentage of GDP, despite the privatization program (Carana, 2002). 
Moreover, privatization did not help to attract FDI as expected. Out of the 29 anchor investor privatizations listed by 
the Ministry of Public Enterprise (MPE), only 11 have involved sales to foreign strategic investors. This implies that 
the privatization did not have a significant impact on FDI. The volume of proceeds since the initiation of the 
privatization program read LE. 20.7 billion Egyptian pounds, amongst which L.E. 10 billion were foreign participation 
or FDI related transactions, which almost contributes to 50% of the overall program proceeds till June 2004, that were 
recovered over 21 transaction out of 202 sales transaction that were conducted over the same mentioned period 1994 – 
June 2004. 
 
In this section we provide an overview of a number of manufacturing, services and public utilities sectors and identify 
the scope of private sector involvement. 
 
Manufacturing: 
In the 1970s and early 1980s industrial production grew at an annual rate of 10% or more, after the oil price explosion 
of 1973-74 encouraged Gulf countries to invest in Egypt, but growth has since slowed. During the 1990s, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for approximately 20% of GDP of which some 65.5% was contributed by the private 
sector. In 2001/02 and in the previous year the manufacturing sector employed about 13.8% of the workforce. Main 
sub-sectors include metallurgy, cement, fertilizers, textile/clothing, food processing, and other consumer goods. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, while industrial production in the past was once dominated by the public sector, such 
dominance has declined in recent years, and the private-sector production has increased sharply in response to 
privatization and liberalization. The sector as a whole has, however, been in decline since 1999 as domestic economic 
conditions have deteriorated. The vast majority of private industries are small units where some 93% of employment is 
in enterprises of 15 or less people. The food-processing and textiles industries account for the bulk of Egypt’s 
manufacturing value added (MVA), although there has been a gradual increase in the share of MVA accounted for by 
the furniture, ceramic and pharmaceutical industries, and most branches of the metallurgical and engineering industries. 
The government has recently been keen to promote the computer software industry (Abdel Latif, 2002).  
 
1) Textiles: 
The textile industry has been always viewed as the most important industry in Egypt. It dates back to more than a 
century. According to the Egyptian Textile Manufacturers Federation (ETMF), there are about 42 public enterprises 
and 2,356 private enterprises engaged in the Egyptian textiles industry. It is estimated that there are also thousands of 
small textiles workshops and factories around the country that are not members of the ETMF. The ETMF states that the 
textiles industry employs an estimated one million workers – around 30% of Egypt’s industrial workforce (Carana, 
2002).  Other sources report different figures where the current number of public enterprises is 27, larger number of 
private firms and less but unspecified number of workers (Ghoneim, 2006, forthcoming). The textiles industry has 
always been historically suffering from permanent problems despite its great importance as a contributor to the 
economy in terms of value added, output and exports. The chronic problems include outdated technology, excess labor, 
lack of quality control, etc.  The industry is divided into several sub sectors. For example, in the case of spinning and 
weaving the state is still in large control where for example the state enterprises control almost 100% of firms in the 
case of spinning and 70% in the case of weaving, whereas in the case of ready made garments, 90% of the firms are 
owned by the private sector where it attracts a large amount of FDI. The performance of the private sector has 
improved tremendously after the introduction of the international franchising which became highly popular in the 
1990s especially in menswear and children wear (UNCTAD, 1999; Abdel Latif, 2002). Such improved performance 
does not support our main hypothesis that trade liberalization in the form of international franchising has a positive 
impact on enhancing competition and improving the performance of the private sector. Figure 4 shows the relative size 
of the private sector in the different sectors of textiles and clothing industry. 
 
Figure 4: Private Sector Share in the Textile and Clothing Industry 
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Until the last few years, the public sector had a monopoly in all the “upstream” stages in the supply chain for cotton 
textiles, by far the most important in Egypt: internal trade and supply of cotton, cotton ginning, spinning of yarn and 
weaving and dyeing of fabric. With no option to import inputs, this meant that private garment producers were 
dependent on these public sector suppliers in terms of price, quality and availability. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that these policies negatively impacted the competitiveness and dynamism of a sector that could have 
been a much larger exporter and source of jobs (see for example, Kheir El Din and El Sayed, 1997; and Fawzy, 2003). 
 
In the past few years, as shown in Figure 4 above, the combination of privatizations and policy liberalization have 
allowed increasing private sector participation. For example, in cotton ginning, there are 7 major gins: two state owned, 
two privatized and two new private. The result is a greater degree of choice of suppliers for downstream producers and 
the new owners are rationalizing production by reducing the work force and upgrading the machine portfolio to meet 
quality and efficiency standards. However, the poor financial performance (hard budget constraint) of the remaining 
Law 203 companies, and the difficulties that the holding company has had in privatizing them, indicate the depth of 
structural and competitive difficulties that developed in this highly globalized and competitive industry (Carana, 2002).  
 
In 2003, 43 textile companies were still listed under Law 203, of which only 14 were slated for privatization. The 
remaining 30 companies have limited potential for privatization due to their relatively poor and unattractive current 
financial conditions. However, these remaining companies represent more than 50% of the labor force and more than 
70% of the assets of the total textile sector companies under Law 203. This segmented or partial approach yet again 
delays the essential sector reforms that are necessary to accompany the privatization of distressed companies in the 
textile sector. Within the 14 distressed textile companies scheduled for privatization, revenues have declined by more 
than 50% in the past three years, while cost reductions have not kept corresponding pace. These companies are facing 
rapid deterioration in earnings and labor productivity. Ownership change, if possible, may not solve the sector’s long-
term viability and sustainability. 
 
The future of this industry is subject to a high degree of uncertainty due to the persisting structural problems and the 
erosion of preferences with the abolishment of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (e.g. lack of sufficient 
investments in essential services as sewages, and water systems, shift of cotton producers to other more profitable cash 
crops, and threat from effective competitors within the region as Turkey, Morocco or outside the region as China). 
Synthetic textiles is the fast-growing segment of textiles in export markets due to increased utilization in diversified 
segments ranging from automobiles (airbags, cars' interior), to health care and leisure (sport equipment, sportswear). 
However, Egypt does not have a competitive advantage in the production of synthetic textiles. The difficulties that such 
industry faces has been reflected in its weak performance in the international market where for example Tables 12a, 
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12b, and 12c.  show that Egypt was not able to utilize its textiles related quotas in the US and the EU markets. 
Nevertheless, Egypt still acquires a competitive advantage in the production of fine cotton goods (UNCTAD, 1999). 
 
Moreover, the spinning and weaving of synthetic fibers is highly capital intensive, and the dyeing, printing and 
finishing sectors need to be developed to support the move towards high value-added man-made fiber products both in 
textiles and clothing which does not fit with Egypt capabilities.  
 
Table 12 A: Quota Utilization of Textiles and Yarn Exports to the European Union 
(January - December 2004) 
Item Unit Quota Usage Percentage of Usage  
Cotton Yarn Ton 64,860 17,413 27  
Cotton Textiles Ton 22,950 3,785 16.5  
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, Aggregated Foreign Trade Report, March 2005 
 
Table 12 B: Quota Utilization of Textiles and Yarn Exports to the United States  
(position up to 29/12/2004) 
Item Unit Quota since 2004 Usage Percentage of Usage 
Yarn Kg. 19274100 3315145.2 19.7
Brushed Yarn  Kg 6045035 2230618 40.6   
Towels Kg. 52.02774069   1251105
Knitted Shirts & T-
Shirts Dozen 5287822 3003483 64.9
Un-Knitted Shirts Dozen 2190671 260670 13.3 
Women wool 
trousers Dozen 21315 12789 65.8 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, Aggregated Foreign Trade Report, March 2005. 
 
Table 12 C: Quota Utilization of Cotton Yarn and Cotton Cloth Exports to Turkey 
(position  up to January - June 2004) 
Item Quota (Ton) Usage (Ton)  Percentage of Usage 
Cotton Yarn 7055 2742.9 38.8 
Cotton Cloth 1457 141 9.6 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, Aggregated Foreign Trade Report, March 2005. 
 
 
The textiles and ready-made garments industry has experienced increased inter-firm rivalry due to the liberalization of 
trade beside other main factors, namely engagement in the value chain world production and the increased numbers of 
upstream and downstream industries which are necessary to enhance competition. Privatization played a role in this 
regard by softening the hard budget constraint faced by the public sector firms. The case of the textiles industry 
supports one of our main hypothesis which is soft budget constraint enhances competition whereas it does not support 
our other main hypothesis where trade liberalization had a partial positive impact on the status of competition in this 
industry. 
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2) Assembling Cars: 
The decision to end the public-sector monopoly of the production of passenger cars in 1991 led to renewed growth in 
the vehicle assembly sector. A number of foreign firms have begun local manufacturing, either through joint ventures 
or licensing agreements. However, over half the inputs utilized in the assembly process are imported from abroad, 
significantly raising costs, particularly in light of the depreciation of the Egyptian pound over the past few years. There 
are 17 private vehicle factories located in and around Cairo, employing some 60,000 workers. They tend to operate at 
around 30-35% capacity. The economic downturn since 1998-99 has affected consumer spending, and domestic 
automobile production fell 6% to 37,500 units in 2001 from 39,616 units in 2000 (Carana, 2002). The industry is highly 
protected with prohibitive tariffs. Even after a reduction in such prohibitive tariffs on some categories of passenger 
cares took place in 2004, the high effective rate of protection was maintained. Moreover, special incentives are 
provided to enhance investments in this industry where manufacturers are repaid tariffs they have paid on imports in 
equivalent with the local value added they have produced. Such evidence does not support the hypothesis of that trade 
liberalization is important factor in determining the degree of competition in the industry and its performance. Where 
liberalization is limited, it is not expected that performance will be highly positive. This contrasts with the first case of 
franchising in the ready made garments industry where the ready made garments industry focused on exports, whereas 




Despite the highly acclaimed privatization of Al Ahram Beverages, Egypt’s monopoly brewer in 1997, the beer 
industry in Egypt remains a monopoly, albeit private. High barriers to entry have traditionally protected the beer 
industry through prohibited tariffs. The privatized Al Ahram Beverages company controls over 90% of sales in the 
market for beer, with imports and other producers constituting an insignificant market position. In 2002 the largest 
acquisition in the Egyptian capital market took place where Heineken’s acquired Al Ahram Beverages Co. for a value 
of $280 million. However, while the private sector has replaced the government’s former monopoly, the quality and 
availability of beer in Egypt has generally improved. Al Ahram has introduced several new brands of beer into the 
market since the privatization and has invested heavily into ensuring that adequate quality controls are adopted. Product 
availability has generally improved, due to major investment in new production facilities and an expansion in the 
distribution network in parts of the country characterized by heavy market demand. The diversity of products under the 
private sector’s existing monopoly and low import penetration has also resulted in a minor price rise for original brand 
name products. The new brands of beer introduced have tended to carry a higher price tag than the original brands, 
although these are still price competitive compared to imported products. 
 
Since its privatization in 1997, Al Ahram Beverage Co. has been expanding rapidly with new investments reaching 
LE1 billion. It is one of Egypt's nine companies with shares traded internationally as global depository receipts 
(GDR's). It was chosen in October 2001 by the American Forbes Global magazine as one of the 20 best performing 
small companies worldwide.  Launched in April 1999, the El-Gouna Beverage Group captured a 15 per cent share of 
Egypt's alcoholic beer market and 40 per cent of the wine market.  In 2001 ABC announced its acquisition of El-Gouna 
Beverages LE 215 million in cash and  assuming LE40 million worth of El-Gouna's debt (Al-Ahram Weekly 2001). 
The important aspect of the beer industry, is that despite the high protectionism it enjoys, it remains highly competitive.  
The beer industry is a case which supports our hypothesis that soft budget constraints have a positive impact on 
competition. We cannot test the hypothesis related to trade liberalization as it did not take place, but we assume that 
contrary to our hypothesis that trade liberalization will lead to more competition and enhance inter-firm rivalry. This is 
due to the fact that the internal market for this industry is considered relatively limited due to cultural and religious 
factors. Hence, in order to succeed the industry depends heavily on the exports market which forces it to be 
competitive.  
 
The market for carbonated soft drinks was transformed as a result of the privatization of the state owned bottling plants 
producing Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola in April 1994. Up until privatization, government enterprises dominated the 
sector, though private firms were also present in the market. Since the privatization of the Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola in 
1994, as well as Al Ahram Beverages in 1997, the private sector has controlled the market, with the major players 
being: 
1. Coca Cola (45% market share) 
2. Pepsi Cola (40% market share) 
3. Al Ahram (8% market share) 
4. Schweppes (4% market share) 
 
The price for the mainstream bottled products has increased marginally since privatization, though the quality is said to 
have improved and has been standardized, since all the main players in the market have invested heavily in quality 
control and improved production methods. Distribution channels have been enhanced by the private sector, expanding 
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accessibility of products to the consumer. New products have been introduced by the private sector entities, and there 
has been a general shift to canned products, which are more expensive than bottled soft drinks (Carana, 2002). 
 
 
4) Cement Industry (see Part IV for the case study on cement) 
Egypt produced 28.6 million tons per year of cement in 2002/2003 compared with 26.8 million tons in 2001/2002 and 
another 4.8 million tones per year are imported. Government statistics put cement production in fiscal year 2002/2003 
at 28.6 million tons. Domestic sales actually fell from 26.5 million tons to 26.4 million tons, but Egypt has taken 
advantage of the pound's depreciation to increase exports (2.6 million tons in calendar year 2002 (US Embassy, 2002). 
Since 1998, there has been something of a revolution in the Egyptian cement industry which has been monopolized by 
the government with very few private players in the market. During the era of governmental control the industry 
suffered from a number of problems ranging from low utilization of production facilities to low productivity and high 
dependence on imports. Moreover, the distribution of the cement was controlled by a number of licensed cement 
distributors where construction companies had to order the cement from those distributors and not from the cement 
producers directly (Jenny, 2003). The government has sold majority stakes in four state-owned firms to foreign 
companies, a minority stake in one, and another company to an Egyptian consultancy. Some of the world’s biggest 
cement companies, such as Lafarge, Holderbank (which took a stake in a private sector Egyptian start-up), and Cemex 
of Mexico, have been attracted by the booming construction industry of the 1990s and the government’s grand 
infrastructure ambitions (World bank, 1999). However, with wave of privatization, another wave of mergers and 
acquisitions occurred (Nassar, 1999). The industry has been controlled since then by six companies. The largest three 
accounted for 50% of total production as shown in Table 13.  
  
Table13: The Egyptian Cement Market in 2000-2001 
Law 43/159 Egyptian Suez Cement/Tourah* 30% 
Law 159 Foreign Assuit Cement/Cemex Egypt 15% 
Law 159 Foreign Beni Suef/Lafarge Titan 6% 
Law 159 Foreign Amriyah/Cimpor 9% 
Law 159 Foreign Alexandria/Blue Circle** 3% 
Law 159 Egyptian Egyptian Cement Company *** 12% 
Law 203 Egyptian Helwan Cement 13% 
Law 203 Public National Cement 12% 
Total Public Sector market share 12% 
Total Private Sector market share 88% 
* Established as private /JV company in 1997 under Law 43 of 1974 
** now owned by Lafarge 
*** Greenfield Egyptian and foreign investor private sector from early 1990s  
Source: Carana, 2002 
 
   
 
Because of the acquisition of local cement companies by large international firms (for example there were five 
acquisitions in 2005), competition from imports has declined in Egypt since these international firms were the main 
importers of cement in Egypt. Moreover, attracted by the profit opportunities, four new private companies, the 
Egyptian Cement Company, Misr Beni Suef, Qena Cement and Sinai Cement also entered the market supplying nearly 
1.4 million tons each.  Altogether, market capacity increased by 7.5 million tons between 1999 (when the government 
privatized the local cement industry) and 2002, still there is a gap which is supplied by imports. The entrance of new 
comers intensified competition and lowered prices which were sometimes forced upon new comers to preserve their 
existence in the market even if they had to sell at the break even point (Jenny, 2003). The presence of small players, 
helped by a network of wholesalers is the leading factor since, unlike in the public sector era, distributors now deal with 
any cement company which gives them a good bargain". Moreover, The Egyptian Cement Company started exporting 
its production to the Spanish Canary Islands at much lower prices than that offered by Cemex, the Mexican cement 
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producer with a majority stake in Assiut Cement. According to some interviews as shown in Jenney, 2003, 
anticompetitive behavior started to be realized in the cement market where big players started a price war to get the 
small players out of the market. To avoid continuing such price war, some sort of price fixing and market sharing 
agreements were set.  
 
The Egyptian consumption of cement in 2002 was 26,682,000 tons.  The cement producers agreed to increase the price 
of cement from L.E. 125 to L.E. 171 (on average), an increase of about L.E. 46 per ton.  The annual costs to Egyptian 
consumers of this price fixing agreement are L.E. 1.227 billion or US$ 227,111 per year. The Egyptian government 
stood powerless to prevent either the predatory pricing or price fixing because there is no competition law in Egypt 
(Jenny, 2003). Hence, the story of the cement industry in Egypt shows that despite the opening up of the industry 
through privatization, following the beer and the ready made garments, the absence of a competition law in this 
industry affected the competition negatively and did not benefit the consumers. The cement industry as will be seen in 
Part IV supports the hypothesis that trade liberalization did not enhance competition and increase inter-firm rivalry. On 
the other hand, soft budget enjoyed by privatized firms increased inter-firm rivalry to a certain extent leading to a price 
war which was followed then by a collusion due to the absence of one of the main pillars of a market economy, namely 
competition law. 
 
6) Pharmaceutical Industry: 
The industry consists of 64 firms divided between multinationals (8 firms), private (48 firms), and public enterprise 
firms (8 firms) The domestic private sector has become an important player and currently accounts for more than half 
of total output The multinationals’ market share is around 30 per cent. The traditional dominance of public-sector 
enterprises has been consistently subsiding, from a market share of 76 per cent in 1981 to 15 per cent today. The 
presence of multinationals in Egypt dates back to the 1960s following government control of all imports and 
distribution of pharmaceuticals, albeit leaving a low tariff structure intact. This move, and the limited patent protection 
of imports of pharmaceutical products, created the incentive for foreign companies to set up production facilities in 
Egypt. The Egyptian pharmaceuticals sector was thus among the first recipients of FDI, when Pfizer, Hoechst and the 
Swiss consortium of Ciba Geigy, Sandoz and Wander (Swiss Pharma) established joint ventures in Egypt. 
 
Typical of the pharmaceuticals industry world wide, production in Egypt is characterized by a relatively high degree of 
concentration. The top ten firms operating in the Egyptian market control over 44 per cent of market share, while the 
top 5 companies control 27 per cent of the market. The Government hedges against possible oligopolistic behavior by 
regulating the movement of drug prices. Drug prices in Egypt are administered by a cost plus formula, which allows a 
profit margin of 15 per cent on essential drugs and 25 per cent on non-essentials. 
 
An additional feature of the Egyptian pharmaceuticals industry is that local production is concentrated on end-use 
products for final consumption. The industry imports nearly 90 per cent of its raw material and intermediate inputs with 
its total import bill reaching US$ 221 million in 1995. 
 
The industry has thus achieved limited success in developing backward linkages, with little local production of 
intermediate inputs. Companies attribute this to the discouraging pricing regulations and inadequate economies of 
scale.  The Egyptian pharmaceuticals industry has excelled in terms of manufacturing generics. More than two thirds of 
the output of the public and private (national) sectors is accounted for by generic products, while the remainder is 
produced under license. Egypt's pharmaceutical exports are almost exclusively in the generic (off-patent) category of 
drugs (UNCTAD, 1999). 
 
Neither trade liberalization, nor soft budget affect the status of competition in this industry as the pricing is subject to 
government’s intervention. However, it can be predicted that soft budget will lead to more inter-firm rivalry which is 
not necessarily the case with trade liberalization. The main reason behind our judgment is that hard budget prevents the 
public sector firms from increasing their prices which is relatively enjoyed by foreign firms. Hence, an opening up of 
the market will not enhance competition but a soft budget for public sector firms will allow them to price their products 
on more realistic basis which will enhance competition. 
  
7) Rice Milling 
There have been substantial changes in the Egyptian market for rice milling during the 1990s as a result of sector 
liberalization and privatization of public sector mills. During the early 1990s, rice became one of the first agricultural 
commodities to be liberalized in Egypt. The government’s 8 public sector rice milling enterprises comprised a virtual 
state monopoly with 88.2% of the milling capacity. Liberalization of the rice-milling sector resulted in substantial 
market entry by private sector firms. The rice milling sector is now highly competitive and vibrant. Private sector 
players dominate the industry. The privatized companies have recovered some market share, but seem destined to be 
small players in the industry. The large expansion of private sector rice milling capacity in Egypt has resulted in the 
eight public sector mills having a small share of total rice production, perhaps 15% of the total output (Carana, 2002). 
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Economic returns of growing rice increased relative to other crops, attracting substantial private sector activity. By 
1997 private mills overtook public mills in milling capacity. Public sector milling companies rapidly lost market share 
to the private sector, and were operating well below full capacity amidst the intense private sector competition. By 
1998/99, the private sector firms constituted 78.6% of the total milling capacity of the sector. Competition in the 
Egyptian rice-milling sector was therefore already thriving when the concerned holding company 7 out of its 8 rice 
mills (through ESAs) in 1998. The final Law 203 rice milling company was also sold (through ESA) in 2001. The 
Egyptian rice-milling sector is now highly dynamic and competitive, although this is more directly the result of market 
liberalization policies as opposed to privatization of state mills specifically. The new private sector projects in the 
market have been the prime contributors to a vast increase in Egypt’s rice production and new levels of product quality 
that are now available to the consumer. 
 
However, the holding company continues to be heavily involved in the management of the rice mills, and continues to 
provide implicit and explicit subsidies which raises the question of whether such firms are private or still controlled by 
the government. The privatized mills are presently providing the sector with redundant, un-needed milling capacity, 
although they are also providing employment for over 9,000 workers.  Rice milling is an example of how privatization 
and liberalization can be successful from the perspective of the overall economy, even though the performance and 
value of the former state enterprise might be suffering (Carana, 2002). The rice mill sector remains highly competitive, 
and is apparently not particularly profitable. The profitable companies have other operations, particularly macaroni and 
animal feed plants. Sharkeya, for example, has a cattle feed mixing business in addition to its rice mills. All of the ESA 
rice mills are clearly operating below their installed capacity. Hence this defies our hypothesis that soft budget 
constraints allow more competition since in the case of rice mills the benefit of soft budget constraint were curtailed by 
heavy government’s intervention. 
 
The situation is different in the flour sector where partial liberalization of the Egyptian flour market during the mid 
1990s has created fierce competition and over-capacity in the sub-sector for the 72% white bread. However, despite 
privatization of 3 of the government’s 7 Law 203 flour milling companies in 1996, the market for the 82% dark bread 
remains largely unchanged. It is still heavily subsidized and regulated by the state. 
 
 
8) Electronics and Home Appliances 
Egypt’s economic reform and privatization policies of the 1990s broke the monopoly of the two state owned companies 
involved in assembling televisions (El Nasr Television and Telemisr). Growth in the industry accelerated in the early to 
mid-1990s and the private sector soon established itself as the dominant force in the television sub-sector. Competition 
amongst Egyptian firms, which have been engaged in production/assembling and importing televisions under license 
from the major multinational television producers, spread rapidly during the 1990s. At present the market is dynamic 
and the selection of products available to the consumer is diverse in both brand name and quality. There are presently 
10 private sector firms in the industry, one privatized, and several that are either still state owned under Law 203 or 
joint venture companies (hence classified as private, though not necessarily completely private). The composition of 
the market for televisions is shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Egypt’s Leading TV brands and their Producers 
 
TV Brand Origin Produced Producer/Agency Ownership 
Goldstar Korea Locally Int’l Electronics Co./El Nasr Co. Private/State-Owned 
NEC Japan Locally Telemisr Com. Privatized 
Toshiba Japan Locally Int’l Electronics Co./El Nasr Co. Private 
 
Goldi Egypt Locally Int’l Electronics Co./El Nasr Co. Private 
 
Grundig Germany Locally Int’l Electronic Co./El Nasr Co. Private 
 
Philips Netherlands Locally Int’l Electronics Co./El Nasr Co. Private 
Daewoo Korea Locally Banha Electronics Industies Co. State-Owned 
 
Samsung Korea Locally Arab Organization Industries (AOI) State-Owned 
 
Samsung Korea Locally El Tholathia Co. Private 
Prince Egypt Locally Int’l Electronics Co./El Nasr Co. Private 
 
New Star Egypt Locally Int’l Electronics Co./El Nasr Co. Private 
LG (Goldstar) Korea Locally Telemisr Co./IGI Co. Private/State-Owned 
Sony Japan Imported n.a. Private 
Panasonic Japan Imported Baghdad Co. Private 
Sharp Japan Imported Egyico Private 
Source: Carana, 2002 
 
The privatization of Telemisr was undertaken in two separate transactions, during 1996 and 1999. The company has 
performed poorly since its privatization and has run up substantial losses since it experienced a complete ownership 
and senior management over-haul in 1999-2000. Given the new technology developments that emerged in the 
television sector during the 1990s, the disappointing performance resulting from the privatization of Telemisr has little 
impact on the quality and availability of goods and services available to the consumer. 
 
In the case of other durable goods as washing machines and refrigerators, the industry has become highly competitive 
as a result of sector liberalization policies of the 1990s. Prior to early 1990s, the state held a 100% monopoly in the 
production and assembling of washing machines and refrigerators, through one major public enterprise, Ideal. There 
was no private sector competition either from imports or from domestic producers. With the advent of sector 
liberalization policies, Ideal’s market share began to decline for both washing machines and refrigerators. The market 
itself started to become more vibrant however, as new private sector competitors started introducing the Egyptian 
consumer to some new products and services. Major industry multinationals such as Zanussi of Italy, and Turkey’s 
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Arcelik started operating under license in the Egyptian market. Ideal was privatized and bought out by the Olympic 
Group Financial Investment Company in late 1997. The Olympic Group has absorbed Ideal into its own corporate 
strategies, downsized the operation of some of Ideal’s less productive assets and opened new production facilities. The 
market for both washing machines and refrigerators is now highly competitive and Ideal has been recovering the 
market share that it lost prior to privatization.  
 
In the refrigerator market, Ideal remains the dominant player in the market for low cost refrigerators (85% market 
share), and a leading player in the market for refrigerators as a whole (40% market share). Ideal now also provides a 
whole range of new, after sales services to the customer and its products are marketed as packages of delivery, 
technical support, insurance and refunds, as is common with producers in market economies. While the price of a 
washing machine or a new refrigerator has increased in Egypt since the time when Ideal operated under the public 
sector, the market has been transformed since that time and the consumer now benefits from an entirely different 
product (Carana, 2002). 
 
In this market, the liberalization of the market did not bring in substantial benefits as long as the firms remained 
performing with hard budget constraints. Once, such constraints were relaxed and they started to enjoy full autonomy 
in management and financial transactions, their performance started to improve. Hence, it is important to point out that 
trade liberalization or opening up is necessary but not a sufficient condition for an industry to be more competitive. 
Sufficient conditions include enactment of an efficient competition law and enjoying autonomy in undertaking financial 
decisions (i.e. enjoying soft budgets).  
 
Services and Public Utilities: 
1) Telecommunications  
Modernization, expansion and liberalization of Egypt’s telecommunications services and infrastructure have become a 
national development priority. Among such liberalization moves is the enactment of Law 19 of 1998. Law 19 of 1998 
stopped Telecom Egypt’s monopoly and transformed it into a joint-stock company. Efforts by Telecom Egypt to find  a 
strategic investor, to take a stake of up to 20%, have so far made little progress. The law established and a regulatory 
body (TRA) to essentially balance the relationship between service providers and consumers. Nevertheless, the TRA is 
not completely independent since its board of directors is headed by the Minister of Communications and Information 
Technology. 
 
In the field of cellular phones, the government-owned Egyptian Company for Mobile Services [ECMS] introduced the 
first Global Services for Mobile Communications [GSM] cellular network in Egypt in 1997. Eighteen months later, in 
May 1998, the government took the bold decision to privatize ECMS as well offer two new, competing licenses. Egypt 
now has two successful, fully private cellular operators, similarly with payphone and satellite operators. A third 
operator was expected to come to the market in November 2002 after the expiration of the four-year duopoly allowed 
by the licenses granted the two existing operators. This third entrant is expected to be a consortium of Telecom Egypt 
and a yet-to-be-selected international cellular (GSM) operator, which is still did not materialize. In addition there are 
dozens of private, innovative Internet Service Provider’s (ISPs) 
(http://www.internationalreports.net/middleeast/egypt/2001/telecomsector.html). However, a deal between Telecom 
Egypt and the two cellular phone operators was reached with the TRA where the introduction of a third operator was 
postponed without a definite date and Telecom Egypt bough 25% of the share in one of the existing cellular phones 
operators. In 2006 a third operator was granted a license to operate on a new technology starting 2007. 
 
 
2) Banking Sector 
In 2006 there has been 36 banks operating in the market compared to 61 banks that used to operate in 2001 in Egypt: 
28 commercial banks including the four state-owned commercial banks, the National Bank of Egypt, the Bank of 
Alexandria, the Banque du Caire and the Banque Misr; 31 investment and business banks; and three specialized banks, 
one industrial bank, one real estate bank and one agricultural bank (the Principal Bank for Development and 
Agricultural Credit). In terms of ownership, there are seven public commercial and specialized banks, 35 private and 
joint-venture banks and 20 offshore banks. 
 
The 61 banks operate via a network of 2,223 banking units throughout the country. Commercial banks are the most 
important subsector, holding about 78% of total assets of the banking industry.  The four state-owned commercial 
banks dominate the sector, accounting for nearly 57% of total assets, and holding 70% of deposits and 59% of loans 
(Ghoneim, 2003 database for World Bank). Officially the level of non-performing debt in the banking system stood at 
around 16% in mid-2002 which is considered high by international levels. Unofficial estimates put non-performing 
loans at anywhere from 15-25%. The biggest problems are concentrated in the large government-owned banks, at least 
partly in response to the bad debt problem.  However, the private-sector commercial banks have gradually increased 
their market presence and by 2000 accounted for 18.9% of credit services compared with 7.6% in 1995. The dominance 
of the public sector is even greater if the National Investment Bank (NIB) is included. The NIB holds the long-term 
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resources mobilized by the social security system of US$4.5bn at end of fiscal 2001, and possesses roughly 25% of 
total bank deposits. Banking practices are conservative and services extended are often basic, although there has been a 
considerable expansion of retail services in recent years as the corporate sector has remained in recession (Economic 
Intelligence Unit, 2002). 
 
In 2003 a new banking law was approved. The new law introduced several provisions related to prudent regulation (e.g. 
higher level of capital requirements). In fact, only a minority of domestic banks currently appears to meet the domestic 
bank requirement by any measurement which implies that the majority of Egypt's 58 private banks eventually will be 
forced to close, merge or otherwise consolidate. This might have a negative impact of competition if regulations that 
prevent the preference of the large four public banks and their privatization did not take place. However, as seen by 
some experts, there is no fear that such a decision will lead to monopoly as the consolidated and merged banks will be 
likely the small ones which need such type of action to be able to meet the fierce competition from foreign and 
dominant public banks (interview with Faika El Rifaei, Ahram Weekly, 2001). 
 
The banking privatization program has been stalled by state reluctance to relinquish control. Public-sector banks are 
important tools of government policy. They offer unprofitable banking services to remote areas, finance agricultural 
crops, are major partners in the large national infrastructure projects and are the most significant buyers of T-bills and 
bonds. Moreover, it is only recently that the government has begun to comprehensively tackle the problem of the large 
portion of non-performing loans in the state banking sector. Moreover, while Law 155 of 1998 enables banking 
privatization to take place, there is no state body specifically responsible for its implementation and therefore the 
process can be interminably delayed by bureaucratic stalling. Nonetheless, a phased reduction of holdings by public-
sector banks in their joint ventures with foreign partners has gradually taken place, while a number of international 
banks, including Société Générale, HSBC and Barclays, have acquired controlling majority stakes in their Egyptian 
joint-venture banks (Carana, 2002). In 2005 the governor of the Central Bank announced that the Bank of Alexandria, 
one of the four public banks will be privatized soon, whereas a major acquisition of the Bank du Caire by Ahly Bank 
was announced in 2005. The aim of such acquisition so as other policies adopted in the sector, as raising the capital 
adequacy ratio to 10% (higher than Basel II requirements) was decreasing the number of banks in Egypt targeting 36 
banks instead of the 61. 
 
As a prelude to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the government revitalized its long-moribund stock 
exchanges in Cairo and Alexandria through Law 95 of 1992. The legislation reorganized the sector, provided incentives 
to investors and granted the Capital Markets Authority wide regulatory powers.  
 
3) Insurance 
Egypt’s highly underdeveloped insurance market is dominated by four public sector insurance companies (one of 
which is a reinsurance company), which hold a market share of around 75%, although 13 other companies also exist 
(six of them are foreign). Annual premiums account for just 1.1% of GDP. The domestic insurance market was closed 
to foreign companies until May 1995, although they had been able to operate as minority partners in Egypt’s eight free 
zones. However, Law 156 of 1998 removed the 49% cap on foreign holdings in domestic insurers, abolished the 
nationality stipulation for general managers and allowed the privatization of public-sector insurers, although investors 
taking a stake of more than 10% need approval from the somewhat conservative Egyptian Insurance Supervisory 
Authority (EISA). The market remains closed to foreign insurance intermediaries, but some liberalization of the sector 
in recent years has led to the entry of a number of major international insurers, including the UK.s Legal & General and 
Royal Sun Alliance and the American International Group (AIG, which bought Pharoanic Insurance in early 2001). 
Valuation of the four public-sector insurance companies was completed by mid-2001, but no decision has yet been 
made on their privatization (Carana, 2002).  
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Section Four: Conclusion and Main Lessons Learned 
The size of the private sector has been on an increasing trend since the start of 1974 Open Door Policy. There has been 
an increase in size in absolute as well as in relative terms. The large size of the government controlled sector has 
rendered a relatively small increase in the size of the private sector (after taking in account all government controlled 
sectors and not only public and public enterprise sectors) The process of privatization brought by the ERSAP has 
reinforced increasing the size of the private sector and it started to increase in absolute and relative size when compared 
with the public sector. In relative terms, and since the start of the privatization process the size of the private sector 
increased on average from 61.2% of GDP in 1991/1992 to 76.3% in 2001/2002. 
 
However, the increase in the relative size of the private sector was not necessarily translated in a) enhanced competition 
and, b) increase in private activity undertaking. This has been mainly either due to one or a number of the following 
factors: less openness or limited trade liberalization, absence of competition law, or hard budget constraints due to 
interference of the government. 
 
Regarding enhanced competition, we observed from the sectoral case studies, that a private monopoly in many cases 
have just replaced a public monopoly. In other cases, the inefficiency that used to prevail in the era of public sector 
domination was replaced by an era of mergers and acquisitions that led in many cases to high concentration ratios and 
anti-competitive behavior. 
 
The “announced” or “published” increased size of the private sector was not always met by a real increase in the 
private activities’ undertaking. In many cases, the privatization was done on paper, but the government kept controlling 
the actions of the private firms. This was the case in many ESAs privatized firms in specific sectors (e.g. rice mills). 
Such situation occurred either when firms were facing hard budget constraints or the products they produced played 
some role of strategic importance. This proves our hypothesis that hard budget constraints of firms affect negatively the 
status of competition.  On the other hand, we observed real private sector engagement when an anchor investor, in most 
of the cases it was a foreigner, took over. Hence, we are confident to conclude that FDI helped to enhance to role of the 
private sector vigorously when an anchor investor took over and less aggressively when it was allowed via franchising. 
Again this emphasizes our hypothesis that when budget constraints are relaxed (that is probably the case in anchor 
investor situation) the status of competition improves and flexibility in the structure of the market (in the sense of more 
players are available).  
 
To sum up, it is worth mentioning that the size of the private sector has increased both in relative and absolute terms. 
There are some drawbacks of the “theoretical” expected benefits of increased participation of the private sector. The 
main drawbacks are represented in the absence of a competition policy which led in many cases to the inability to 
prevent anticompetitive behavior and the continued intervention of the government in the privatized firms’ 
management.  
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PART II: 
OVERVIEW OF SELECTED POLICIES AFFECTING 
MARKETS WHERE FIRMS OPERATE 
 
Introduction 
There are a large number of policies, rules and regulations that affect the performance of 
the private sector and the degree of competition in different markets. This part of the 
study attempts to pinpoint the major policies, rules and regulations that affect the 
performance of the private sector and the degree of competition in the Egyptian economy. 
Given the difficulty of the task of identifying all such policies and rules and regulations, 
we concentrate on the major regulations and policies that from our point of view can 
affect the performance of the private sector and the status of competition. We follow the 
definition of competition policy that experts in the field have agreed upon, namely: 
“Competition policy in this context is defined in the broad sense as consisting of two 
parts— One which is commonly referred to as antitrust or competition law and the other, 
which comprises micro industrial policies such as tariffs and non tariff policies, foreign 
direct investment , unnecessary government intervention in the market place and 
economic regulation designed to prevent anti-competitive business practices by firms. 
Both parts of the policy impact on economic agents in the market place.” (Khemani, and 
Dutz, 1995, for a similar definition see Hoekman and Marvoidis, 2002).This definition is 
in line with the Global Economic Prospects criteria for variables that affect the status of 
competition which identified imports, foreign direct investment, administrative barriers, 
state monopolies, and private barriers as the main criteria that affect competition (World 
Bank, 2003) 
 
In Section Five, following this introduction we focus on the main rules and regulations 
that affect the performance of the private sector and inter-firm rivalry and this include the 
Competition Law and its different provisions, Consumer Protection Law, the Investment 
Law(s), the Privatization Law, the Trade Law, and finally the Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) Law. In this section we shed light as well on the Labour Law. 
Section Six is devoted to policies where we focus on trade policy, being the most 
important policy affecting competition. We mention the different aspects of monetary and 
fiscal policies that affect the performance of the private sector. Section Seven is devoted 
to the discretionary power allocated to the government and its different quasi 
governmental bodies whether in terms of polices and/or regulations that affect the 
performance of the private sector. The section deals also with the role of regulatory 
bodies in regulating the telecommunications and electricity sectors. In all the sections we 
combine our descriptive institutional analysis with quantifiable data whenever available 
in a comparative static manner (whenever the data allow) to trace the changes that 
occurred over time. Section Eight concludes and provides a snapshot of the lessons 
learned. The difference between the Public Sector and the Public Sector Enterprise is 
highlighted in appendix C. 
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Section Five: Major Rules and Regulations Affecting the 
Performance of the Private Sector and the Status of 
Competition in the Egyptian Economy: 
 
Having identified the main rules and regulations to analyse we start by the anti-
monopolistic provisions already existing in the Egyptian Criminal Law. We then move to 
analyze the main theme of the Competition Law. Investment Laws then follow. We then 
discuss impact of the Privatization Law, the Companies Law, and finally, the Small 
Enterprises Law on the performance of the private sector and the status of competition.  
 
Competition Related Laws: Existing Anti-monopolistic Provisions, the New Competition 
Law, and the Consumer Protection Law: 
 
The Criminal Law contains articles that deal with monopoly and anticompetitive 
behavior, e.g. articles 345 and 346. There was even a legal case in 1910 against 
monopolistic behavior of an owner of four mills (Mohieldin, 1997). However by time 
such law was ineffective due to lack of enforcement and changing economic conditions. 
 
The Government of Egypt (GOE) started to think about having a comprehensive 
competition law in 1995. By 1997 the first draft was ready, nevertheless several 
impediments deterred it from entering the Parliament. By 2004 the draft No. 17 was still 
discussed. Finally, in January 2005 was the Egyptian competition law introduced with the 
title “Law of Protecting Competition and Preventing Anticompetitive Practices”. Several 
interpretations have been mentioned as reasons behind the delay of enacting such law. 
Some experts have argued that the main reason behind such delay is the government itself 
due to the large size of the public sector and its reluctance to affect it by a competition 
law (Moheildin, 1997). Others have argued that in addition to the government’s 
reluctance, there is as well the business community reluctance for enacting such law and 
given their power in affecting policy makers, it is difficult to expect that such law will 
appear soon (Ghoneim, 2002a). The adopted version of the law follows to a large extent 
the model law of UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 2003). It specifies the anticompetitive behaviors 
and the abuse of dominant position as the main issues considered to be illegal. 
Anticompetitive behavior includes the conventional measures of fixing prices, 
manipulation of prices, restraints on distribution, geographical market sharing. The 
dominant position is specified by a threshold of 25% (down from 35% and 30% in earlier 
drafts) which constitutes a major problem for business community which view it to be 
very low threshold. The law adds to the 25% threshold, the ability to influence the prices 
or the amount of products available in the market without the competitors having the 
same ability.  The law includes only financial fines but no imprisonment. Moreover, the 
law specifies the establishment of the Competition Authority to be in charge of 
implementing the law. The Authority is independent, nevertheless, it still follows the 
Prime Minister, where the former drafts have shifted the Authority affiliation between 
falling under the auspices of the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade, and Minister 
of Supply and Internal Trade. However, in practice the Prime Minister has delegated the 
Minister of Trade and Industry to be in charge of the law. Other provisions of the law are 
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traditional and the law adopts a mixture of per se and rule of reason approach, though the 
per se is the more dominant approach adopted. The Authority is responsible for cases’ 
investigation, data collection, policy advocacy, and undertaking the necessary market 
research. The law applies to both public and private sector and excludes all public 
utilities. Moreover, it gives a discretionary power to the Prime Minister to decide upon 
activities that fall in the private domain and undertake anti-competitive behavior to be 
excluded from falling under this law if they generate benefits higher than the harm they 
cause. In addition, the law allows the Prime Minister and the Cabinet with discretionary 
power to fixing of prices by the Cabinet for “basic” goods. This is considered a major 
drawback of the law, since it gives room for non-transparency. Another major drawback 
of the law is the absence of an ultimate objective of the law (whether it is economic 
development, economic efficiency, or consumer protection). The law lacks identifying a 
clear relationship between the Authority and the regulatory bodies, so as well the 
relationship between competition and intellectual property rights. It does not deal with 
mergers and acquisitions. At this stage it is very difficult to assess the appropriateness of 
the law, since the Competition Authority has started to function only in April 2006 and 
investigation has been carried in only a handful of cases which does not allow to test the 
effectiveness of the law in reality.  
 
The impact of the law on the performance of the private sector is expected to be limited 
due to the absence of the other pillars of a competition policy (see Ghoneim, 2002a). For 
example, the trade policy continues to be restrictive and non-transparent, though have 
been further liberalized by end of 2004 where the simple average tariff has been lowered 
from 14% to 9% (though the WTO states that it has reached 20%, see WTO, 2005) and 
number of tariff bands has been narrowed down from 27 to 6 (see below).  
 
A new law for consumer protection was approved in 2006, and hence its assessment is 
rather difficult especially that the Authority responsible has not yet started to function. 
The lack of human capacity in this field when combined with absence of data is not 
expected to result in a positive outcome. Besides, as has been shown in the first part of 
the study, the Egyptian markets are characterized by high level of concentration, hence 
specifying the 25% as a threshold for dominant position is considered low. The same 
expected humble impact of the law on the performance of the private sector is likely to be 





Egypt had three main investment laws starting from the Opening Door Policy adopted by 
GOE since 1974. The need for changing the law arose each time either due to the 
incompatibility of the law provisions with the changes happening in the domestic 
environment and/or the changes happening in external environment which required a 
similar change in the Egyptian legislation to adapt to such world wide changes.  
 
Law 43 of 1974 
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The core Investment Law which was set mainly to attract Arab Investment was Law 43 
of 1974 amended by Law 32 of 1977. There were several main provisions of this law that 
intended to enhance the private investment in different sectors (manufacturing and non 
manufacturing1). The main basic features included; the establishment of the General 
Authority for Investment (GAFI) to be the responsible governmental body aiming at 
enhancing private investment in Egypt; the establishment of the free zones  (public and 
private) where firms operating in such zones are exempted from all kind of taxes for 
specific time periods; the provision of extra tax exemptions for firms operating in specific 
activities and/or geographical areas and; the equalization of tax treatment among 
domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, there were other restrictions. For example,  
Law No. 43/1974 provided the basic legislative right for the GOE to authorize, on a 
selective basis, technology transfer through joint ventures. Thereafter technology was one 
of the main factors taken into account when evaluating applications for investment 
projects.  
 
Whether the law was successful in attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
especially from the Arabs can be shown by tracing the following data as shown in Figure 
1. where there has been a massive increase in FDI inflows due to the open up of the 
Egyptian economy and the investments directed to the oil sector. The law represented an 
important signal for the outside world as well as domestic private investors that the era of 
nationalization is over2 and that there is a new era aiming toward more engagement of the 
private sector in the different activities. Hence, even if we disregard the results of the law 
in enhancing the role of the private investment (domestic and foreign), the signal it gave 
regarding the commitment of the GOE in ending the nationalization was clear and 
                                                 
1 The activities included:  
Industrialization, mining, energy, tourism, transportation and other fields. 
animal production, water resources, and the reclamation and cultivation of barren and desert land. 
Projects for housing and for urban development, by which is meant investment in the subdivision of land 
into parcels and the construction of new buildings together with the provision of public utilities connected 
therewith; 
Investment companies which aim at utilizing funds in the fields enumerated in this law. 
Investment banks and merchant banks and reinsurance companies whose activities shall be confined to 
transactions effected in freely convertible foreign currencies.  The aforementioned banks and companies 
are entitled to directly undertake financing and investment operations, whether they are in projects in the 
free zones or for local, joint or foreign projects established within the Arabic Republic of Egypt.  They may 
also finance Egyptian foreign trade transactions. 
Banks engaging in local currency transactions, so long as they are in the form of joint ventures in which 
local Egyptian capital constitutes at least 51% of the total;   
Construction activities in regions outside the agricultural area and the perimeters of existing cities: 
Construction contracting activities undertaken by Joint Stock Companies in which there is a minimum 
Egyptian capital participation of 50%. 
Technical consulting activities in the form of joint stock companies in partnership with foreign 
international consulting firms provided that they are related to any project within the fields of activity 
mentioned herein and that their activities are approved as an integral part of the project by the Authority’s 
Board of Directors on a case-by-case basis. 
 
2 Article 7 of law 32/1977 states that : “ Projects may not be nationalized nor confiscated. The assets of  such projects cannot be seized, blocked, confiscated nor 
sequestrated  except by judicial procedures . 
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effective, regardless of its impact in increasing the level of private sector participation in 
the different economic activities. The law introduced some flexibility in the labour 
regulations where according to its articles and provisions3 it exempted firms established 
under this law from certain rigid labour regulations, hence trying to introduce an element 
of flexibility which could have positive impact on entering the market and have spillover 
effects on competition as well. 
                                                 
3 Article 10 of law 32/1977 states that : “ projects enjoying the provision of this law shall not be subject to law No. 78 of 1973 in connection with the conditions and 
procedures for electing labor representatives to the board of directors of public sector organizations, joint stock companies, and private associations and 
establishments.    
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment Inflow  in Egypt 1970-2004  







































Source: UNCTAD online 
database, 2006 
 
Law 230 of 1989 
Law 230 of 1989 came into effect to ensure that the changes carried out by the former 
Investment Laws with regards to enhancement of the role of the private sector’s 
participation is rather emphasized, however the emphasis is no more on the Arab 
investors but rather on all foreign investors as well as domestic investors. In fact, it can 
be argued that the law was initiated to emphasize to domestic as well as foreign investors 
the persistent interest of the GOE in the private sector taking the lead especially after the 
humble outcome brought by the former law in terms of enhancing the role of private 
sector and increasing the level of private investment. It included additional provisions 
that aim at encouraging private sector. The most important provisions aiming toward 
such objective included the elimination of price controls and profit restrictions4.  
 
                                                 
4 Article 9 of law 230/1989 states that: “the products of the project are not subject to the compulsory pricing and profit limitations. It is impermissible to impose any 
charges, financial obligations or the like or the projects, prejudicing the principle of equality between them, and the private sector projects which work in the same 
activity, and those which are established outside the scope of this law. This equality shall be realized gradually in the main manner organized by the executive 
regulations.  
The cabinet council in cases of necessity may exclude certain fundamental products from the provisions of the first paragraph of this article while seeking guidance in 
its economical cost. 
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Law 8 of 1997 
The Law 8 of 19975 represented part of the package of the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) adopted by Egypt since 1991. It confirmed the 
commitment of the GOE toward adopting a free market policy and giving the private 
sector the lead by emphasizing that firms and projects registered under this law (Articles 
8 and 9) cannot be nationalized, confiscated or sequestrated. It included several 
provisions that aimed toward a) more generous tax breaks, b) widening of sectors covered 
by Law to benefit from tax incentives6, c) introducing the factor of special geographical 
incentives where the government provided additional benefits if investors decided to 
invest there, and d) emphasized the national treatment of foreign investors (for a full 
discussion and analysis of this Law see UNCTAD, 1999, though the document is more of 
a call for promoting investment in Egypt rather than a real assessment of the law and its 
different provisions) and provided a more generous treatment of firms located in free 
zones7. The main additional advantages of this law compared to the previous investment 
                                                 
5 In fact the basic law governing the establishment and operation of companies in Egypt is the Companies Law No. 159 of 1981. It sets out the rules and procedures 
for incorporation in Egypt and regulates taxes, fees and employment rules. Foreign companies may incorporate under the Companies Law, but there are some articles 
that limit foreign ownership. However, with the enactment of the Investment law and its more generous tax treatment a large number of the private domestic firms as 
well as majority of foreign companies have chosen to register under Investment Law No. 8. Moreover, Egypt allows 100 per cent foreign ownership in investment 
fields specified under Investment Law No 8. Businessmen investing in any other sector not covered by this law will operate under Companies Law 159. Under the 
Companies Law, corporations must initially publicly offer shares of at least 49 per cent of the company to Egyptians for one month, and only if there are no 
subscriptions by Egyptians, may foreigners purchase the majority of shares- Ultimately, under Law 159, companies may also have 100 per cent foreign ownership. 
The Companies Law also sets minimum capitalization requirements for joint stock companies. In addition, Under Companies Law 159, the majority of directors must 
be Egyptian and employees must be represented on the board. Investment Law No. 8 does not establish any requirement on the minimum percentage of Egyptian 
employees. Companies incorporated under Investment Law No. 8 regardless of the level of foreign ownership, have the right to possess and own buildings and land 
as necessary for exercising and expanding their business which is not necessarily the case if the firm is registered under other laws and regulation.  (UNCTAD, 
1999). 
6 The activities covered are the following: land reclamation; fishing, poultry and animal production; industry and mining; tourism - hotels, motels, villages, tourist 
transportation -; maritime transportation; 
refrigerated transportation and related services, air transportation and related services, housing; real estate development; oil production and related services; hospitals 
and medical centers that offer 10 per cent of their services free of charge; water pumping stations, electricity, roads and communications; venture capital; computer 
software production; projects financed by the Social Fund for Development; leasing; risk capital and guarantees for subscription in securities. With the executive 
decree of August 1997, petroleum refining and cinema production were added to the fields of activity for investment and in 2003 another executive decree added the 
activity of marketing and publicizing for areas development and for attracting investors in the fields of land reclamation and cultivation, tourist and industrial 
development, and inland Nile and dry ports. Such activity was further subdivided into 9 sub activities.  
7 Privileges, incentives, exemptions and guarantees include the following: 
1. Freedom of selecting the investment activity. 2. Unrestricted nationality of capital; the investment law 
provides for the unrestricted participation of Egyptian, Arab, and foreign capital in the establishment of 
projects in free zones. 3. Unlimited capital; the law sets no limitations on the size of capital invested in a 
project, enabling project founders to determine optimal project size according to desired capacity and 
output. 4. Freedom of legal formation; (individual project – partnership – joint stock company – branch of 
foreign company,…) 5. Freedom of repatriation of profits and invested capital. 6. Freedom of importation 
from domestic or foreign markets, and such imports are exempted from import regulations applicable 
within the country. 7. Freedom of operation on behalf of other projects in order to utilize excess capacity 
available within industrial projects. 8. Freedom of pricing of goods and profit ceiling. 9. Providing foreign 
investors with residence and work permits. 10. Capital assets are exempted from custom duties and all 
import procedures: all articles, supplies, machinery and necessary means of transport (except passenger 
cars). 11. Imports and exports are exempted from custom duties, sales taxes, other taxes and duties and all 
import procedures prevailing in Egypt. 12. Free zone projects and dividends earned not subject to 
provisions of tax and duty laws prevailing in Egypt throughout the lifetime of the project. 13. Exemption 
from custom duties on domestic components in case of exporting goods to domestic and local markets. 14. 
Trade in transit goods with a fixed destination is exempted form the annual duty on the value of goods 
entering and leaving the free zone. 15. Exemption of imports from local market from sales tax. 
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laws are the following: Investments are approved automatically for projects in one or 
more than one area. The following categories still require prior approval from interested 
ministries before an investor contacts GAFI: all military products and related industries; 
tobacco and tobacco products ; any investment in the Sinai; Opening up of the fields of 
activity which were previously restricted to foreign investors and these include 
infrastructure (electricity, water, transport), financial leasing, oil and gas services; and  
that the products of the firms established under this law are not subject to the compulsory 
pricing and profit limitations. 
 
Law 8 of 1997, despite its generous offers for private investors failed to attract the private 
investment (domestic and foreign) as expected. Several red tape measures and 
bureaucratic obstacles were mentioned by investors when it came to implementation of 
the law concerning the dispute settlement mechanism, and the non extension of 
exemption to a number of service activities (see Al Ahram newspaper, several issues) 
This required a further action by the government. This has been translated in the 
amendments of the law enacted in year 2003 and the enactment of a Law for Special 
Economic Zones in 2002. 
 
Amendments to law 8 of 1997 have been introduced to overcome some of the loopholes 
of the law and to be in line with the changes occurring in the business environment both 
domestically and worldwide. The amendments aim mainly at accelerating the dispute 
resolution process, reducing transaction costs faced by the investor through the 
establishment of One Stop Shop, and consolidating the decisions related to investment 
under the authority of GAFI, rather than being scattered among different governmental 
agencies and governorates. It also aims at streamlining the lengthy procedures that the 
investor has to undertake to establish his enterprise regarding the authority he deals with 
(confined now to the GAFI) and regarding time (where it has been scaled down). 
Moreover, it is now allowed for firms registered under Law 8 of 1997 to have their 
capital issued in terms of foreign currency. The implications of such amendments on 
enhancing the role of the private sector, inter-firm rivalry and the status of competition 
are expected to be positive, however not to a large extent. The reasons for such judgment 
are that the law was not able to overcome all the bureaucratic and red tape measures 
affecting negatively the business environment regarding the engagement of the 
governorates in a number of issues related to investment. Nevertheless, there is still a 
positive spillovers expected to arise from reducing the needed time of registration, which 
creates competition by reducing the transaction costs of establishing a business.   Such 
amendments to the Law 8 have been introduced in 2004 by adding a separate chapter 
which adopted the idea of one stop shop to b created in GAFI with the main aim of 
reducing the time needed for procedures.  
 
Law for Special Economic Zones (Law No. 83 of 2002) 
This law was designed to combine the virtues of free zones and investment law. Projects 
registered under this law are considered to be inland projects8 and their products acquire 
                                                 
8 According Article 2 of the law, the definition of a special economic zone is “a geographical district established outside the boundaries of cities. Special agricultural, industrial and services projects are established in 
such geographical districts and have the ability to compete with their comparators in the world market. It can be the case that such zones have their special port (air or sea or land port) and it 
has its own custom, tax administration undertaken by a certain specified authority 
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the Egyptian origin (versus the case of the free zones where the projects working in such 
zones are considered off land projects) and at the same time avoid the cons of the 
investment law 8 of 1997 in terms of bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, the projects 
registered under this law enjoy a special tax treatment that is characterized by being 
simple, harmonized and enjoys low tax rates. The impact of the law on the performance 
of the private sector cannot be assessed as very limited time has elapsed to investigate its 
impact (the executive decree is still not issued).  
 
The impact of investment laws on the performance of the private sector has been positive, 
though limited. Despite the fact that there has been problems in the implementation of 
such laws due to bureaucratic and red tape measures, the laws themselves aimed at 
enhancing the role of the private sector and provided private enterprises with a number of 
facilities that aim at encouraging private sector participation. The direct impact of such 
laws on investment cannot be easily determined, however, its indirect effect on 
competition and inter-firm rivalry is not clear. One would have expected that such laws 
enhance competition by enlarging the size of the private sector and providing different 
incentives for increasing its role. But this has not been always the case. For example, one 
provision of Law 8 of 1997 provides extra tax incentives for firms with capital above 200 
million L.E. in the field of film production. This has been challenged to be against the 
constitution since it invokes discrimination among the firms regarding their financial 
treatment. Moreover, it encourages the establishment of large firms either through merger 
and acquisitions or other forms which could have a negative impact on competition and 
inter-firm rivalry (see Ghoneim, 2005). Hence the impact of investment law(s) on 
enhancing competition and inter-firm rivalry cannot be determined easily due to the 
existence of a number of provisions which discriminate among firms according to their 
size, the procedures and treatment which differs by geographical locations and activities, 
and finally the problems related to enforcement of the laws which might have a larger 
negative impact on new and /or small firms when compared to large and/or incumbent 
firms. 
 
The Privatization Law 
The Privatization Program started with the passage of Law 203 in June 1991, further 
corporatizing public enterprises, with shares held on behalf of the government by 27 
holding companies (down to 17, then 16 and finally 10) to which the public sector 
enterprises were allocated on the basis of specialization or industry sub-sector. 314 
companies were to be privatized while 85 were excluded from the first phase (Carana, 
2002). By issuing Law 203 of 1991, public sector enterprises were rendered as 
independent economic entities, and a framework for their management was established 
comparable to that of the private sector. The holding companies were responsible for 
approving the business plans of the public enterprises, assessing their restructuring needs, 
and initiating the plans for their privatization. This included the gradual elimination of 
ties between the goals of public sector companies as profit oriented businesses, and the 
state budget's objectives at the macro-level, as well as those of other governmental 
bodies. Moreover, excess labor can no longer be assigned to companies, and selling 
prices for products—except pharmaceuticals—and purchase prices for raw materials are 
no longer dictated by the government authorities. In addition, a Public Enterprise Office 
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(PEO) was established in November 1991 and then constituted a part of Ministry of 
Public Enterprises (MPE)9. Furthermore, the Capital Market Law 95 of 1992 was in turn 
issued to regulate the stock market and introduce a framework for trading. This was 
followed by setting government guidelines for privatization which were published in 
1993 and updated in 1996. Different methods of privatization were put in place which 
differed among sectors (no specific sectors were excluded with the exception of strategic 
industries) so as well within the sectors themselves. The different methods included: 
Majority Interest Privatization Schemes which involved selling, on average, a substantial 
portion—about 78 percent—of the government's stake in the enterprises, well above the 
minimum of 51 percent, to assure investors about the government's seriousness in this 
area and Minority Interest Privatization Schemes which involved an average divestiture 
by the government amounting to about 34 percent (that were listed in Table 10 of the part 
I of the study). 
 
In 1993, the PEO published an action plan entitled “General Procedures and Guidelines 
for the Government Program of Privatization, Restructuring and Reward System” which 
can be considered the only formal document that reflects the government’s objectives and 
commitment. There have been several bodies included to regulate the privatization 
process. They included: 
The Quattro Committee (QC) is comprised of the PEO, Capital Markets Authority, the 
Central Auditing Committee and the Cairo Stock Exchange. The QC’s responsibilities 
concerning initial public offerings (IPOs) include suggesting and approving privatization 
strategies, reviewing technical valuations, evaluating market values of companies, and 
suggesting fair prices for IPOs. 
The Holding Companies (HCs) were created in 1991. The ownership and management 
of 314 PEs were transferred from the various Ministries to 17 HCs and then down to 10. 
The portfolio of these HCs were designed to eliminate sector monopolies, introduce 
competition, and ensure that each HC had an array of enterprises with differing 
profitability and sales potential. HCs are primarily responsible for organizing the sale of 
their constituent PEs (known as affiliated companies) 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) established in 1979 is a government 
organization, which reports to the Minister of Economy. Pursuant to the Capital Markets 
Law No. 95 of 1992, the CMA was given sole control over supervising, reforming, and 
modernizing the Cairo Stock Exchange. The CMA is charged with market development, 
supervision of trading, broker licensing and general market surveillance. 
The Share Pricing Committee (SPC) is comprised of the CMA and the Cairo Stock 
Exchange. It is the sole authority to review and approve the share price offered in the IPO 
process. 
The Central Auditing Authority (CAA) is an independent government body reporting 
directly to the People’s Assembly, which audits the performance and evaluation of 
companies that are at least 25% publicly held. Furthermore, it reviews valuation studies 
undertaken by HCs and QC’s (Khatab, 1999). 
                                                 
9 The Ministry of Public Enterprises (MPEs) established in October 1993 is responsible for all reform aspects of public enterprises including privatization, 
restructuring, labor and legal issues. The Public Enterprise Office (PEO) is an independent body created to assist the Minister of Public Enterprises. Its main 
responsibilities are to act as a coordinator for the privatization and restructuring programs, and to initiate and monitor plans for the privatization program. Although, 
the PEO has no executive authority, it is a central driving force and a link between the government and the Holding Companies. 
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Currently, neither the HCs nor the PEO office are directly empowered to approve the sale 
of an affiliated company, nor can they insist upon adherence to standardized sale 
procedures. This dispersion and diffusion of responsibilities and accountabilities among 
the various government organizations creates in many instances confusion and hindrances 
to the privatization process. Prospective investors find difficulty in getting reliable and 
current information of companies to be privatized. 
 
Also, other Ministries are responsible for undertaking their reform programs. For 
instance, the Ministries of Transport, Telecommunications, Power, etc. are directly 
responsible in undertaking their own respective privatization programs. The public sector 
enterprises under the ownership and control of these Ministries are outside the legal 
framework and process of the MPE (Khatab, 1999). In fact regulatory bodies have been 
established in the case of telecommunications and electricity in the early 1990s to 
regulate the sector after several privatization initiatives have taken place in both sectors 
in 1998 either through BOOT operation or through conventional privatization methods 
mentioned in the first part of the study (UNCTAD, 1999). 
 
Implementation started slowly, but privatization activity accelerated in 1996 when assets 
worth over $800 million were privatized in addition to $1 billion of unutilized fixed 
assets, local governorates' assets, joint venture companies and other miscellaneous 
activities. In 1998, the IMF has ranked Egypt among the top four emerging markets in 
terms of the pace of privatization. Egypt's privatization rate of about 1.5 percent of GDP 
per year is bettered only by Hungary, Malaysia and the Czech Republic (IMF, 1998). 
Different methods of privatization were used in different sectors such as tourism, 
manufacturing, textiles, and housing. However, as stated in Part I, privatization 
experienced a slow down starting 1998 due to bad economic conditions and recession. 
Starting July 2004, the privatization started to accelerate with the change of the 
government. 
 
The studies conducted to investigate the impact of the privatization program on the 
performance of the private sector have showed that there have been positive significant 
achievements on variable indicators including the financial performance of the privatized 
firms, restructuring of firms, and the lay off of labor. The impact differed significantly 
from one method adopted to the other and among different sectors. The main conclusion 
was that majority interest privatization showed the best results whenever the management 
factor was changed. On the other hand, the minority interest privatization showed humble 
results due to the continued influence of the governmental management. Also in cases of 
majority interest privatization where the state still played an active role without real 
effective change in management (e.g. through its residual shares or close relationship 
with ESA’s that have not finished paying for their shares) the good results were rather 
absent to a large extent (see Carana, 2002). The impact of privatization on competition 
and inter-firm rivalry differed significantly from one sector to another (see three case 
studies in Part IV of the study). In some sectors as cement privatization led to collusion 
among firms and high concentration, whereas in other sectors as home appliances 
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privatization enhanced competition and inter-firm rivalry. Impact of privatization on 
competition and inter-firm rivalry showed mixed results. 
 
Regarding the impact of privatization on labor layoff, the existing studies point towards 
evidence that the impact was mild and not significant. The size of the overall public 
sector labor force as a percentage of Egypt’s total work force (which has grown 
numerically during the 1990s and is presently estimated to be around 20-22 million) has 
more or less remained constant, around 37%. However, the size of the labor force of the 
Law 203 portfolio has decreased by more than half during the decade of Egypt’s 
economic reform. In 2001 the number had decreased some 453,000 employees since 
1991, whereas at the same time, the Egyptian economy was creating almost an equivalent 
amount of jobs during the period 1991-2001. The evidence shows that most of the 
reduction in employment is taking place prior to privatization as part of the restructuring. 
Pre-privatization employment levels have been maintained at many privatized firms, and 
in a number of cases new job opportunities have been created. No specific studies were 
conducted to study the impact of the privatization program on the status of competition. 
However as it can be seen from the data it can be concluded that the privatization 
program increased the size of the private sector in absolute terms, whether measured by 
investments as shown in Table 1 or ownership status (Carana, 2002), nevertheless as a 
percentage of GDP, the government and government controlled activities’ share remained 
constant since the portfolio of privatized firms was small when compared to the size of 
the governmental controlled activities, in addition to the fact that that the majority 
privatized firms where included under the category of private sector despite that this fact 
does not reflect reality in many instances where the government remained in control and 
owned shares in the capital of such privatized firms (see Part I of the study).  
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Table 1: Private Investment for Economic Plan 
    Values in LE million 
Year 1990/91 1995/96 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 
Agriculture 959 2412 4921 5309 5848 3183 














Construction 206 521 1010 1250 1330 1420 
Total Commodity Sector 5898 12089 16601 20581 22180 17379 
Transportation & Suez Canal 960 2751 2700 4500 4930 5371 
Trade & Finance & Insurance 285 630 753 792 700 701 
Tourism 729 1269 1598 2500 2500 1800 
Total Production Services 1974 4650 5051 7792 8130 7872 
Housing & Real Estate 2363 3500 8297 8438 8273 6007 
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 .. 
Education Services 33 155 560 700 800 735 
Health Services 49 119 300 830 700 707 
Other Services 79 187 100 128 100 88 
Total Social Services 2524 3961 9257 10096 9873 7537 
Grand Total 10396 20700 30909 38469 40183 32788 
Source: Ministry of Planning (2005) unpublished data. 
 
Moreover, there are other explanations for the limited impact of privatization on 
expanding the relative role of the private sector. As stated in IMF, 1998 that the overall 
contribution of the public sector in GDP has remained virtually unchanged in the last 
decade. The relative stability of the public sector share can be analyzed through de-
composition into a privatization effect and a composition effect. According to this type of 
explanation, the privatization effect relates to the change in the contribution of the private 
sector within each sector of activity. In this regard, the private sector's role has been 
increasing in virtually every sector except petroleum, with relatively large increases in 
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participation in industry, mining, construction, trade, and finance. Nevertheless and 
despite the increasing privatization of economic activity, owing to the composition effect, 
the overall output of the private sector in the economy has not posted proportionate gains. 
This is mainly because output growth has been skewed toward sectors where the public 
sector has a higher-than-average share of activity and away from sectors where public 
sector activity is low. The composition effect is most pronounced in relation to agri-
culture, which is almost entirely in the hands of the private sector, where output has 
declined from 20 percent to 16 percent of GDP. By contrast, in the Petroleum Sector, 
where the public sector is increasingly dominant, the share of output has increased from 
3% in 1987/88 to 5.3% in 2000/2001(CAPMAS, 2002). Moreover, the composition effect 
has worked in favor of raising the aggregate share of the private sector in both 
government and social services sectors whose weight in GDP has declined modestly (see 
Khatab, 1999, IMF, 1998). 
 
Regarding the status of competition and inter-firm rivalry, we can observe that 
privatization’s impact on competition cannot be determined. On the one hand, the number 
of mergers and acquisitions have been on a rising trend since 1996 as shown in Table 2 
On the other hand, the number of registered firms in the different activities increased on 
yearly basis so as well the number of firms existing from the market (see Table 3).  














Table 3:  Number of Enterprises and Exit Cases (1990-2002) 







Investment Law  
8/1997 
Under the 
Companies Law  











Year Mergers Acquisitions 
1996 7 1 
1997 3 6 
1998 1 3 
1999 1 44 
2000 1 29 
2001 0 17 
2002 0 14 
2003 0 14 
2004 0 9 
2005 0 37 
2006 0 40 
Source: Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange, Monthly Bulletin, 
different issues  
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1434 956 45 11 1338 56% 
1: including companies and individual cases 
2:Companies registered in Industrial Registrar 
Source: MOFT, Monthly Bulletin, various issues &  General 
Organization of Industrialization                                         
 
As shown from the table above, the industrial sector enterprises remained almost constant 
as a share of total enterprises where the percentage of new industrial projects registered 
out of total enterprises (industrial and non industrial remained declined from 30% in 1996 
to 26% in 2002, with a drop of 16% in 1998. We can interpret from this data that 
percentage of industrial projects did not increase due to the lack of laws and policies that 
aimed to enhance investment and competition which is an expected result as industrial 
activities were not given a special treatment, despite the lower tax burden on 
manufacturing activities when compared to services as shown below. 
 
Moreover, as the first part of the study has shown, the status of competition differed from 
one sector to the other. In general, where privatization took place and the government 
remained in control of management the degree of competition did not change much. This 
is in contrast with the case where the privatization led to change in the management and 
the private sector took charge of it, we find that the degree of competition was enhanced 
to a large extent. This is in line with the main theme of the study which asserts that 
liberalization and reform acts did not necessarily increase the state of competition. 
Moreover, such interpretation of the results emphasizes our hypothesis that acting under a 
hard budget lessens the degree of competition, which is the case with government 
controlled firms, where as a shield of acquiring additional losses and facing efficient 
firms, the only way to survive is to lessen competition in order to achieve abnormal 
profits arising from a monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure that enable them to 
survive the inefficient economic performance.  
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With the cabinet change in July, 2004 the portfolio of privatization was transferred to a 
newly created Ministry entitled Ministry of Investment. One of the main aims of the 
establishment of this ministry was accelerating the process of privatization (see Part I for 
further details). In fact the Minister of Investment has raised the slogan of “Managing the 
Public Assets” instead of privatization motto. The pace of privatization has increased 
significantly as has been discussed in Part I, however this was not translated by any 
means to higher degree of competition. 
 
Labor Law (Law 12 of 2003) 
The Labor law (Law 12 of 2003) provides comprehensive guidelines for the recruitment, 
hiring, compensation, and termination of employees in Egypt. It provides increased 
flexibility for firms in the hiring/firing process, a key concern of domestic and foreign 
investors. It also outlines a number of reporting, management, and workplace safety 
requirements that employers must meet. It establishes a limited right of employees to 
strike, as well as rules and guidelines governing mediation, arbitration, and collective 
bargaining between employees and employers. Non-discrimination clauses are included 
and the employment and training of women and eligible children is regulated by the law 
in accordance with labor-related International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. 
The law also creates a national council to discuss and establish a national minimum wage 
policy. The labor law came into effect on July 7, 2003, and hence studying the impact of 
such law on the performance of the private sector and the status of competition is early to 
identify, at least from a practical point of view. However, from a theoretical point of 
view, the main objective of the law is to overcome the rigidity in hiring and firing labor 
and hence to expand the role of the private sector. This in turn should enhance the status 
of competition in the Egyptian economy. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the 
rigidity of the labor market did not present a major obstacle from the business community 
as there were always other means to overcome them (See for e.g. World Bank, 1994; 
Galal, 1996; Fawzy, 1998 and; Ghoneim, 2000 for the major impediments affecting the 
performance of the private sector in Egypt). In the studies mentioned above which 
depended on filed survey the hiring and firing procedures of labor did not present a major 
impediment. Table 4 identifies that hiring and firing of labor never represented a major 
obstacle for the private sector. 
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Table 4: Ranking of the Constraints to Growth of the Business Environment in the Preceding 
Studies* 












Level of taxes 1 NS NS 
Taxes Administration 2 2 1 
Cost of finance 3 NS 5 
Demand 4 6 6 
Bureaucratic Procedures 5 NS NS 
High costs and/ or access to inputs 6 4 7 
Availability of skilled technicians 7 NS 3 
Competent workers 8 NS 3 
Access to credit 9 3 5 
labor regulations 10 5 3 
Policy uncertainty 11 1 4 
Property Regulations 12 NS 4 
Infrastructure weakness 13 NS 2 
Size relations/Govt. 14 NS NS 
The degree of severity is ranked where 1 identifies the most severe constraint and 14 is the least 
constraint.  Caution should be taken when comparing the results as the studies differed in 
naming or lumping some constraints together.  The three studies have emphasized that the 
severity of constraints differed when the size of the firms and the fields of activity are taken in 
consideration. What is presented in the table is the average of the results obtained. 
NS: not studied. 
Source: Ghoneim (2002b) 
 
Small Enterprises Law (Law 141/2004) 
The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) contribute extensively to the GDP in Egypt. 
Some estimates have put the figure of SMEs to represent more than 99% of the 
enterprises in the Egyptian economy (World Bank, 1994, Mobarak, 2001). Some other 
studies have estimated SMEs in the manufacturing sector represent more than 96% 
(Sisken, 1996, Ghoneim, 2002c). Given the great importance of the contribution of SMEs 
to the Egyptian economy, and taking in consideration the high transaction costs that 
overwhelm their activities, the GOE decided to have a special law for small enterprises 
which has been enacted in December 2003 (the definition adopted for small enterprises is 
having capital of less than or equal to one million Egyptian pound and employing 
maximum 50 employees and have been registered in the Commercial Registration). The 
main theme of the law is to provide small enterprises with special treatment regarding tax 
treatment, public procurement, land provision. The main objective is to lessen their 
transaction costs, and hence enhance their contribution in the GDP. 
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The implications of the law on the performance of the private sector, inter-firm rivalry, 
and the competition status are very early to judge from a practical point of view. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that from theoretical point of view and if the law was 
correctly implemented without facing bureaucratic measures that it will have positive 
implications on the performance of the private sector and the degree of competition in the 
Egyptian market. Some might argue that the law creates discrimination between firms 
according to their sizes, however this situation is not likely to materialize for two main 
reasons: 1) the large size of small enterprises in the Egyptian economy according to the 
criteria of the law, which in some cases of other countries may incorporate medium 
enterprises as well; 2) the large amount of transaction costs of doing business which 
might hinder small enterprises from undertaking any activity. Hence, this law, if properly 
implemented might help to level the paying field among small, medium and large 
enterprises to a certain extent. 
 
However, the business community continues to cite a number of obstacles that affect their 
performance and the status of competition. For example, the process of business licensing 
is cumbersome and costly where it represented around 61% of the GNI per capita in 2003 
which increased to 68.8% in 2006 (see Table 5 for further details), state monopolies are 
still dominating in some sectors which impact negatively competition, public sector red 
tape measures and bureaucracy that increase their transaction costs, difficulties in legal 
system enforcement of contracts and delays of their cases in the Egyptian courts which 
impact their decisions of investment, inability to repatriate capital which limit the 
investments from abroad and instability and uncertainty of economic policies. Table 5 
shows that there has been a significant improvement regarding the number of steps and 




Table 5: - Procedures to establish a business in Egypt  
Starting a Business Indicator  2003 2006 
Number of procedures 13 10 
Duration (days) 43 19 
Cost (% of GNI per capita) 61.2 68.8 
Min. Capital (% of GNI per capita) 788.6 694.7 
Starting a Business detailed indicators 
 2003 2006 









Check company name 
2 0.23 
Obtain a certificate 
from the Commercial 
Registry that the 
name of the company 
is not similar to any 
existing company  
2 0.17
Obtain a model of the 
company’s contract  
1 4.63 
Obtain a certificate 
from an authorized 
bank indicating the 
depositing of the full 
amount of company's 
capital 
1 0.00
Obtain a certificate from 
an authorized bank  
9 0 
Visit the Companies 
Department to dictate 
the amendments to 
computerized model 
of statutes to the 
Incorporation Unit 
(IU) at the Legal 




Contract revision  
1 7.65 
Submit documents to 
the Incorporation 
Follow-up Unit (IFU) 
at the Department of 
Companies and 
receive the invoice  
1 769.95
Authorize company 
documents by the 1 78.13 
Pay invoice issued by 








contract at the Public 
Notary Office 












Obtain a permit to 
practice activities  1 29.40 
Open a tax file - get a 
tax card (Tax 
Authority) 
7 4.34
Register with the 
Commercial Registry  3 20.07 
Register for sales tax 
at the Sales Tax 
Department 
1 0.00
Publish the Articles of 
Incorporation in the 
Official Journal 5 463.71 
Register employees 
with the National 
Authority of Social 
Insurance  
3 0.00
Open a tax file  7 5.79   
Register for sales tax  7 0    
Register employees with 
the National Authority of 
Social Insurance 
3 0    
Totals: 13 procedures 43 $899.84 Total: 10 Procedures 19 $858.29 
Source: Doing Business database 2004, 2007 
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Section Six: Policies that Affect Performance of the Private 
Sector and Status of Competition 
1) Trade Policy 
In respect of its comparative position of Egypt with its comparators, tariff rates are high and variable in 
Egypt (see Table 6). A series of tariff reduction took place over the period 1980-1998 as elaborated in 
Table 7. The case has been clearly stated in the Trade Policy Review of Egypt in 1999 which stated “As a 
result of the Uruguay Round, Egypt bound over 98% of its tariffs, higher than the developing country 
average of 73%.  While the majority of Egypt's bindings remain well above applied rates, the current 
applied rate on around 12% of all tariff lines exceeds bindings, sometimes by as much as 55 percentage 
points.  In addition, around 2% of tariff lines are above their initial Uruguay Round bound levels.” So as 
Egypt has experienced a progressive tariff reduction, the simple average tariff (excluding alcoholic 
beverages) fell from 31% to 21% in the seven years to 1998 and further to 9% after the latest tariff 
reduction undertaken in 2004 as announced by the GOE. The WTO acknowledged the positive 
developments but as stated in its 2005 Trade Policy Review views the process is still incomplete “As a 
result, the average applied MFN tariff has fallen from 26.8% in 1998 to 20%.  Nevertheless, Egypt's tariff 
system remains complex, with numerous exemptions, and concessions.  Peaks, of up to 3,000%, apply to 
alcoholic beverages and spirits.  For 19 tariff lines, the applied tariff exceeds, sometimes substantially, the 
corresponding bound rate”.  Tariff escalation has declined, although it remains high in several sectors, 
including textiles and clothing, wood and wooden furniture and basic metals.  Tariff dispersion has 
increased but mainly because selected items, such as alcoholic beverages, automobiles, and textiles, remain 
exempt from the present ceiling tariff rate of 40% (El-Mikawy and Ghoneim, 2003).  It is worth noting that 
the tariff reductions undertaken in 2004 have reduced nominal tariffs significantly (9.10% weighted 
average tariff rate) but left the effective rate of protection relatively high however less than the one that 
prevailed before. Moreover, with the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, the decrease in tariff rates was not 
felt by producers and consumers. 
 













Maghreb     
Algeria 7 23.7 13.5 2.0 
Morocco 8 34.0 15.0 4.7 
Tunisia 8 35.9 10.1 2.8 
     
Mashreq     
Egypt 3 8 30.2 15.1 2.8 
Jordan 6 16.0 5.3 4.7 
Lebanon 7 21.0 21.4 7.5 
Syria 10 35.0 7.2 2.0 
West Bank and Gaza 4 4 8.8 9.1 7.1 
Source: Nashashibi (2002)     
1 IMF restrictiveness rating, with 10 being the most restrictive 
2 Includes other duties and import surcharges. And observations are for the most recent year 
available 
3 Custom duties on imports divided by the value of imports 







Table 7: Developments in Tariff Rates in Egypt 


















1986 160      
1991 100      
1993 80 Short list of 
exceptions 
    
1994 70 Short list of 
exceptions 
    
1995 Not available Not available 38.6 165 72.8 1.2 
1996-
1997 
55, then 50 Short list of 
exceptions 
    
1998 40 Short list of 
exceptions 
26.8 127 52 9.5 
2005 40 Short list of 
exceptions 
20 148 26  
 Source: WTO (1999), WTO (2005) 
 
In terms of non tariff barriers (NTBs), serious reforms in this regard have been 
undertaken. Removal of NTBs on imports included: abolishing the import licensing 
system, decreasing the number of tariff exemptions allowed, and removing import bans. 
Letters of credit suspensions, prior approvals by specified authorities, servicing facilities 
requirements, public sector monopolies, and prior import deposits were removed or 
considerably liberalized. On the whole, these reforms were successful in turning 
quantitative restrictions to price measures, hence allowing the price mechanism a larger 
room to play its role. 
 
The NTBs affecting exports, including the approval of the government for certain 
commodities, and other forms of red-tape measures as the monopoly of the public sector 
in the domestic procurement of certain foreign products for exporting, etc. were also 
removed.  
 
The only remaining non-tariff measure - to distinguish it from NTBs - is quality control 
which affects imports and exports. A list of products covering 1,550 tariff lines (25 
percent of all tariff lines) was made subject to mandatory quality control requirements. In 
2002, the list announced by the Ministry of Foreign Trade included 1351 tariff lines. A 
number of ministries and agencies are involved in setting these standards and the main 
bulk of such standards are related to food and agricultural products with the ultimate aim 
of ensuring health and safety measures. However, the system suffers from non- 
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transparency and redundancy which impose on traders large economic costs. The 
problems of enforcement of standards which act as NTBs include the following: 
confusing quality with safety, multiplicity of centers of authority, and lack of 
transparency. All such issues result in high compliance costs making selling on the 
domestic market more profitable for domestic producers than exporting (Kheir-El-Din, 
2000).  
 
A Presidential Decree was issued in 1999 (Decree 106/1999) to alleviate the cumbersome 
custom and quality control procedures on traders. The decree aimed at consolidating all 
the activities of the concerned quality control agencies and institutions in one stage 
undertaken by the General Organization on Exports and Imports Control (GOEIC). The 
decree announced, as well, the adoption of a “White List”10 of exporters and importers 
that have developed a good reputation in adhering to quality and standard rules and that 
are exempted from the cumbersome procedures of GOEIC and other import and export 
inspection agencies. These exporters and importers are only subject to random checking 
(an exception is food imports). However, the decree is not likely to bring substantial 
positive effect: First, the decree opted for a ‘positive list approach’, where only exporters 
and importers that have developed good reputation are allowed to benefit from this 
special treatment. Had the approach been a “negative list approach” where all exporters 
and importers would benefit from random checking till they prove not worthy this 
treatment, the decree would have had substantial positive effects. Second, by exempting 
certain exporters and importers from cumbersome procedures of customs clearance and 
quality control, the government is discriminating against other traders. Those privileged 
traders are probably dominant figures in the export/import business. Those big traders 
have been used to circumvent the awkward procedures and thus such regulations do not 
affect the trade activity per se, though it might still reduce their profits if they were not on 
the “White List”. Other non-dominant traders and/or potential ones have to face these 
clumsy procedures, which in turn reduce their incentives to trade and hence lead to a 
diversion to selling in the domestic market instead (Ghoneim, 2000). Hence as the 
policies aim towards a better business environment and enhancement of the role of the 
private sector, certain decisions and polices (e.g. the White List) affect negatively the 
status of competition by discriminating among the players in the market. 
 
Egyptian ports suffer from delays in customs clearance, inefficiency in handling transit 
issues, etc. The average sea clearance time in Egyptian ports is estimated at 10 days 
compared to 30 minutes in Belgium, 1 day in Greece and 2 days in the United Arab 
Emirates (Zarrouk, 2000, Wilson et. al, 2002). Other studies have reported longer time 
periods to clear certain types of goods (US Embassy, 2002a). This has significantly 
increased trade related transaction costs in Egypt which when combined with high costs 
of port services (handling of a container and other related services in Egypt cost at least 
30  percent  more than in  other ports in Southern  Mediterranean countries explain the 
magnitude of trade related problems that Egypt suffers on its borders (World Bank, 
1995). Thus, while freight costs from Egypt to Europe, are lower than for other countries, 
the transportation costs of loading and stevedoring are higher, making the total 
transportation cost in Egypt the highest compared to other countries in the Mediterranean 
                                                 
10 This list is issued by the Minister of Finance and updated regularly with additional new names being introduced and others removed. 
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region. Consequently, Egypt's proximity to Europe does not count for much, given these 
inefficiencies especially that transport costs account for 10 percent of the cost of 
imported inputs, and hence reduce the ability of Egyptian export industries to compete 
internationally (Benham, 1997). The Prime Minister announced in June 2003 that 
privatization of management in four ports will take place over the coming three years to 
overcome cumbersome procedures and reduce transaction costs. This initiative has been 
undertaken after the good performance of the privatized Ain El- Sokhna Port (El Ahram 
Newspaper, 26/6/2003).  Nevertheless there other NTBs continues to evolve over time. 
For example, the GOE has implemented some measures which raised concern among 
investors. In the last few years several ministerial decrees were issued that aim at 
restricting imports where for example that decree that requires that all consumer goods be 
imported directly from the country of origin and another two decrees that stipulated that 
automobiles must be imported in the year of their manufacture. Thus it can be safely 
argued that the general trend in Egyptian trade policy has been to move away from 
quantitative restrictions, but Egypt has increasingly moved de-restricted imports onto a 
list of articles requiring quality control inspection.  Since the previous Review, this list 
has been expanded from 69 items to 182 at present.  The items include mainly foodstuffs, 
electronic products and consumer goods.  Egyptian standards show a low incidence of 
conformity with international standards; on average, less than 20% of  standards issued 
annually since 1992 conform to international standards.  Since 2002, the GOE started in 
collaboration with the Industry Modernization Program (a project financed by EU) to  
harmonize its standards with international ones. More than 3000 standards in the areas of 
engineering and food sectors were expected to be fully harmonized by end of 2005. 
 
In a nutshell, it can be argued that the trade policy adopted in Egypt has aimed at 
shielding the domestic industries from competition of imports. The positive 
developments that have taken place have replaced the quantitative restrictions with price 
measures which have been reduced lately. Moreover, several ministerial decrees have 
been issued to restrict imports and hence shield domestic industries from competition 
from abroad. As regards procedures and polices undertaken to enhance the private sector, 
the policies were geared to that aim, but high transaction costs arising from red tape 
measures and bureaucratic procedures prevented reaching this zeal. Import transaction 
costs in Egypt are high due to inefficient bureaucracy. These include cumbersome 
drawback and rebate schemes, expensive port and air cargo services, cumbersome import 
clearances, and a restrictive quality-control system. Such inefficient bureaucracy in the 
view of many traders inhibited imports and, by discouraging foreign investment and the 
import of intermediate goods, ultimately had a serious negative effect on non-oil exports. 
 
In terms of using antidumping as a NTB, Egypt is not of the countries that have heavily 
depended on this tool to prevent competition. Egypt has enacted its Law concerning 
antidumping in 1998 and established a special body for undertaking investigations in the 
same year. As Tables 8 and 9 show the number of cases initiated by the Egyptian 
producers so as well the measures adopted by the antidumping authority have been 
relatively low when compared to other developing countries as India or Brazil. This 












Table 8: Antidumping Initiations by Reporting Member in the period between 1998 and 2004 





Brazil 18 16 11 17 8 4 6 80 
India 27 65 41 79 81 46 4 343 
Egypt 14 5 1 7 3 1 0 31 
Source: World Trade Organization Website (http://www.wto.org) 
 
Table 9: Antidumping Measures By Reporting Member in the period between 1998 and 2004 
Reporting 





Brazil 14 5 9 13 4 2 2 45 
India 22 22 57 38 64 53 6 202 
Egypt 5 13 0 0 7 4 1 25 
Source: World Trade Organization Website (http://www.wto.org) 
 
 
In terms of joining Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), Egypt has been very active in 
the last decade in joining RTAs with both developed and developing countries as shown 
in Table 10.  However, there is a lack of vision of how to benefit from such RTAs and 
there is a great concern of their consistency (Kheir El-Din and Ghoneim, 2006). 
 
The strategy behind being engaged in such a large number of regional trade agreements is 
far from being clear, as the core hindrances to market access of Egyptian exports are 
mainly supply constraints and hence opening up to the outside world without addressing 
a priori these bottlenecks is likely to increase the trade deficit in the short and medium 
terms without achieving tangible benefits from improved market access. This has been 
the case with the COMESA where Egypt, since its adherence, has suffered from 
continued increases in trade deficit. In 1997, Egypt’s trade deficit with the COMESA was 
$ 102 million, it increased to $ 155 million in 2000 (www.comesa.int). In 2001, 2002, 
and 2003 the trade deficit continued where it reached $ 235 million in 2002 and declined 
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to $ 57 million in 2003 (calculated from WITS database). However, since that date Egypt 
has recorded a surplus in its trade balance with COMESA. 
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Table 10: Membership of Egypt in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
Year Name of Agreement 
1998 (entry into force), 2005 (fully 
implemented) 
GAFTA (free trade area to be reached by 
2007 accelerated to 2005) 
1998 (entry into force) COMESA (free trade area already taking 
place, aim to reach a customs union by 
2004) 
2002 (signature and ratification), 2004 
(entry into force) 
EU-Med Partnership Agreement (free trade 
area to be reached after 12 years from entry 
into force of the agreement, with one 
exception) 
2001 (Initiated), 2004 (signed), 2006 (entry 
into force) 
Aghadir Declaration (free trade area with 
similar rules of origin to be reached soon) 
1999 (signing and entry into force) TIFA (agreement to enhance trade and 
investment) 
Potential under negotiations or discussion* Free trade area with EFTA, Turkey (signed 
2006), South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Australia, India, Tanzania, and Sri Lanka, 
EMUWA, Japan. 
In the 1990s  A number of bilateral preferential trade 
agreements with Arab countries including 
Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, 
Jordan, and Iraq 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade (2006), Aggregated Foreign Trade Report 
* This is based on what has been mentioned in the newspaper as stated by officials. 
 
As a consequence, looking over the period between the mid-1980s and 1996, it is clear 
that Egypt had not maximized the potential benefits from the liberalization of the trade 
regime and, consequently, in some respects was becoming less integrated in the world 
economy. In a nutshell, we can emphasize the trade policy characteristics in the following 
points: 
 
Trade is hampered in Egypt because state-owned transport facilitates and customs, 
bureaucracy and red-tape stifles cross-border transport ---the average freight costs in 
Egypt is 12% of transaction value, or three times as large as it is in other countries with 
similar geography ( Turkey) and twice as large as countries located at great distances 
from major markets (Chile). 
 
Trade is also depressed because the private sector faces widespread regulatory and 
administrative bottlenecks including costs of conformity assessment, transshipment 
regulation, and informal payments to custom officials. 
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Beyond the incidence of these transaction costs, the trade regime of Egypt is highly of a 
protectionist nature. Tariffs are high and non-tariff barriers are widespread, and despite 
reforms to reduce these barriers, Egypt has fallen behind its competitors in the region. 
The average rate of effective protection remains high despite the reductions in tariffs that 
took place in 2004. 
 
The business environment also constitutes a major bottleneck, with investors citing 
among other factors business licensing , state monopolies , prohibited imports, 
employment of nationals, public sector corruption, difficulties in legal system 
enforcement of contracts, inability to repatriate capital, political instability, and 
unpredictability and reliability of policies as some of the common factors deterring 
investment in intra-regional trade. (For similar arguments but describing the trade regime 
in the Arab countries see Dasgupta and Iqbal, 2003) 
 
 
To summarize, in terms of the impact of trade policy on the performance of the private 
sector, status of competition, and inter-firm rivalry, it is very difficult to arise at a clear 
cut answer as there were several serious attempts to liberalize and at the same time there 
were several retreats (see El-Mikawy and Ghoneim, 2003). As the available anecdotes 
show trade policy is used by the government for achieving aims like income distribution. 
The case of removing the ban on ready made garments reveals clearly this issue. For 
example, under the Multi-Fiber-Agreement Egypt had a waiver to ban ready made 
garments till end of year 2001. In January 2002, Egypt should have applied its tariffs in 
line with its schedule of commitments in the WTO. However, Egypt applied instead 
specific tariffs which were considered to be high in comparison with its ad valorem 
equivalent. Based on the pressure from the US and the EU, Egypt had to comply by 
changing its legislation in August 2003 where it said it will apply the tariff rate whether 
specific or ad valorem, whichever is lower on imports originating from WTO members.  
 
The use of other non conventional trade policies which can affect competition and inter-
firm rivalry was highly evident in some regards whereas other traditional tools were not 
utilized. For example the number of cases of antidumping that Egypt has raised remain 
low by international and developing countries standards. On the other hand issuing 
decrees that limit imports of automobiles to their year of manufacturing or specifying that 
commodities have to be imported from the countries of origin limit imports and hence 
limit competition. The performance of the private sector cannot be easily assessed from 
such type of trade policy. For example, as table 11 shows the effective rate of protection 
has remained stable or rather increased over time which shielded the private as well as 
public sector reform competition from abroad but its impact on the performance cannot 
be easily identified as the empirical literature has shown mixed results regarding this 
issue (e.g., Harrison and Hanson, 1999 showed in the case of Morocco that sectors with 
higher effective rate of protection have expanded their exports significantly after 
Morocco has initiated its trade reform in the 1980s). However, the boarder measures 
affected negatively the performance of the private sector as it raised its transaction costs 
to a high extent. 
 
2) Financial and Monetary Policies 
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The cases where the financial and monetary policies have a direct impact on the 
performance of the private sector and the status of competition are limited if we are 
discussing the direct impact. Nevertheless, we focus here on two major policies that have 
affected the performance of the private sector and the state of competition. The first 
policy we focus upon is the exchange rate policy. In 1991, Egypt has undertaken a major 
reform, devalued the currency by 25% in nominal terms, unified the multiple exchange 
rate regimes and pegged the Egyptian pound to the US dollar. The consequences of such 
a decision were remarkable. Stability in the exchange rate occurred, and private sector 
made use of the stable environment (World Bank, 1999), nevertheless the government 
continued with such policy which led to overvaluation of the Egyptian pound and serious 
decisions which led to more than 40% devaluation happened between the 2000 and 2003 
(Kheir-El-Din and Ghoneim, 2006). The negative impact of overvaluation on the 
performance of the private sector meant that there was more preference for capital 
extensive techniques since capital became more cheap, however it should have intensified 
the competition coming from imports if there were no high tariff rates, which was not the 
case as Egypt continued to have high tariff rates in the 1990s (as shown in part related to 
trade policy).  
 
The other channel through which financial and monetary policy might affect the 
performance of the private sector and the status of competition is the tax treatment. The 
Egyptian system of business taxation is relatively a complicated system. It involves direct 
taxes such as income and property taxes, as well as indirect taxes including customs 
duties, sales taxes, stamp duties and surcharges. Special exemptions are provided under 
the tax schemes in the existing investment laws and regulations to enhance investment. 
The tax administration system is considered difficult and cumbersome11 (see Kheir El 
Din, et., al, 2003).  
 
The main features of business (corporate and non-corporate) income taxation in Egypt 
can be summarized as follows:  
 
Profit Tax Rates:  
They are relatively high and are non uniform (see Table12.). Tax rates vary according to 
the nature of the activity. The rate ranges from an upper bound of 40% for corporate 
firms (Joint stock companies, limited liabilities, and partnership limited by shares) 
engaged in services to 32% for corporate firms engaged in manufacturing and exporting 
activities. The profits of non corporate firms (sole proprietorships and limited and general 
partnerships) are subject to personal and income taxes ranging between 20 and 40%, 
which depends on income bracket where shares of partners in taxable profits (known as 
profits from commercial and industrial activities) are included in their unified income tax 
base and are subjected to progressive tax rates (Kheir El Din, et., al, 2003). In 2006 a new 
law was passed that decreased the corporate tax to 20% on all activities. Moreover, for 
non-corporate undertakings in the manufacturing and exporting activities, the first LE. 
8,000 of profit is taxed at the statutory rate, while 80 percent (industrial) and 70 percent 
(exporting) of remaining profits are subject to the statutory rate. . Both corporate and 
                                                 
11 As mentioned in Kheir El Din, et., al (2003) there are about 250,000 pending tax cases in Egyptian courts which illustrates the cumbersome nature of the tax 
administration in Egypt. 
 30
non-corporate projects are subject to an additional 2 percent development duty on profits 
exceeding LE.18,000. In 2005, a new comprehensive tax law was enacted aiming among 
its other expansionary effects at reducing the corporate tax to 20% among industrial and 
services activities. The law was effective starting June 2005. 
 
The government derives most of its revenue from indirect taxes (representing 55% of 
total tax revenue) whereas corporate and non-corporate taxes provided only about 38% of 




Table 11.  Effective Protection in the Egyptian Manufacturing Sector 
   (percent) 
 1991/92 IO tables 1998/99 IO tables 
  1994 1998 2002 1998 2002 
Food processing 8.1 7.4 7.4 5.8 1.5 
Cotton ginning and pressing -8.9 -6.2 -5.9 -11.1 -11.5 
Spinning and weaving 50.3 44.9 48.2 36.2 38.4 
Garments 82.8 44.3 826.0   
Garments and footwear    43.9 674.1 
Leather products excl. shoes 60.9 38.7 50.8 33.2 43.6 
Shoes 94.4 50.4 51.8   
Wood, wood products, excl. 
furniture 6.1 5.8 9.4   
Furniture 99.0 55.1 53.8   
Wood products including 
furniture    9.1 12.0 
Paper and printing 17.1 16.2 16.0 15.2 15.0 
Chemicals and products, excl. 
petroleum 9.6 9.5 9.7 9.2 6.9 
Rubber, plastic and products 49.6 37.0 38.1 30.1 31.0 
Porcelain, china, pottery 62.0 39.0 38.9   
Glass and products 40.0 28.9 29.2   
Mineral products, n.e.i. 20.5 17.6 19.0 20.9 19.6 
Iron, steel, other base metals 22.1 16.6 16.8 15.4 12.0 
Machinery and appliances 19.2 14.2 14.3 14.4 11.1 
Transportation equipment 54.8 46.7 46.6 45.4 44.6 
Unweighted manufacturing 
average* 37.8 26.4 27.8 18.6 18.6 
Dispersion* 31.4 18.5 19.2 15.5 17.4 
Source: Refaat, Amal (2003). 







Table 12: Corporate Tax Rate in Egypt and other Countries before the tax reform in 2005 
 
Country Corporate tax rate 
Egypt  32&40 (down to 
20% in 2005) 
Turkey 33 
Morocco  35 
Tunisia  35 
Israel 36 







Hong Kong 16 
Korea 31 




Real estate tax is calculated for nonresidential buildings and land. The basic tax rate of 10 
percent is applied on the net rental value, which is 80 percent of gross rental value12 (20 
percent of the gross rental value is deducted for maintenance and expenses). Besides the 
basic tax rate, there is a complementary tax called guards tax set at the rate a 20 percent 




It is levied on the sales of goods and services. Both domestic and imported goods are 
taxed (the sales tax is applied on the value of imports including customs duties). The 
sales tax rate varies by commodity and type of service. 
 
Tax Incentives:  
According to the Investment Incentives and Guarantees Law (Law No.8 for 1997) and its 
amendments introduced in 2004, companies falling under this law, regardless of their 
legal form, are exempted from income taxes for a period of 5 up to 20 years starting from 
the first year of activity. These exemptions are provided based on geographical location. 
In 2005, the Minister of Finance announced that exemptions will be eliminated.  
                                                 




The impact of the tax system on the size of the private sector has been negative. The 
private sector has been complaining on the bad tax administration and have always put it 
on the top of the agenda of the major obstacles affecting its performance (World Bank 
1994; Galal, 1996; Fawzy, 1998; Ghoneim, 2002b). Hence it can be safely argued that the 
tax administration is a major obstacle affecting the performance of the private sector and 
having a conducive business environment. The tax level, is as well a major obstacle 
where it has been shown in Table 25 that it is high by international standards and the 
business community have considered it as one of the major obstacles as well (see Table 
18.). 
 
Regarding the impact of the tax system on the status of competition and inter-firm 
rivalry, it is worth mentioning that bad tax administration affect the status of competition 
in negative term. There are two channels through which this negative impact can hinder 
having a healthy competitive status and impede inter-firm rivalry. The first channel is the 
bad administration reflected in the huge size of the pending cases in the court. The bad 
administration and pending cases are translated in businesses having trouble and can stop 
their activities until such cases are resolved. Since the tax administration is bad for large 
as well as small firms, it simply means that by definition large firms are able to service 
with tax administration problems much longer than can the small firms. This means that 
many firms either get out of the market, although they could have been there if they had 
no tax problems,  which is translated in less competition. Moreover, with cumbersome 
tax procedures, firms try to circumvent. The degree of ability of circumventing tax laws 
is determined by both size and experience of the firm. This is translated in unfair 
competition since there is no level playing field for all firms regarding their tax treatment. 
The other channel through which the tax system affects negatively competition is the way 
the sales tax is calculated on imported goods. The sales tax is calculated on the value of 
the good after including the customs value. This creates unfair competition since the 
domestic goods are not subject to customs. Hence, this crates unfair competition where 
the extent of the unfairness increases with the height of tariffs imposed. 
 
Finally the financial and monetary policies can affect negatively the performance of the 
private sector if there exists high interest rate spread. 
 
The high interest rate spread meant negative impact on competition since it made 
borrowing from banks more costly for domestic producers who had no access to external 
market funds. This affected negatively the performance of the private sector, however to 
a limited extent as it only constituted one element of several other obstacles (mainly red 
tape measures) which hindered the development of the private sector.  Moreover the 
interest rate spread has decreased significantly since year 1993 as shown in Figure2. 
 
In general the restrictive fiscal policy represented in high tax rates and bad tax 
administration affect the competition negatively through their negative impact creating a 
hard budget for firms which in turn negatively affect their ability to compete as they have 
to follow strict budget constraints. A comprehensive income tax reform was initiated in 
2005 aiming mainly at reducing transaction costs resulting from bad administration and 
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lowering the tax rate. Such an initiative is likely to have a positive impact on the status of 
competition and enhance inter-firm rivalry. 
 





























































Section Seven: The Discretionary Power of GOE, 
Regulatory Bodies, and other Quasi Governmental Bodies in 
Affecting the Performance of the Private Sector and State of 
Competition: 
 
In this section we concentrate on the role of local governments (governorates) in 
affecting the performance of the private sector and status of competition and the role of 
regulator bodies.  
 
Role of Governorates: 
According to the law concerned with the local governments. The Governor, who 
represents the central government within his governorate, has the authority to: 
 
i) assign or rent lands and other assets owned by the government to public sector 
companies without any charges or with minimal ones.  This authority of the local 
government gives the public sector an advantage as the private sector does not get the 
same treatment. 
 
ii) impose local fees and duties; however, according to a Prime Ministerial decree, 
governorates are not allowed to impose new charges or duties (KPMG 2000 in Kheir El 
Din, et. al, 2003). 
 
This authority of the local government gives the public sector an advantage as the private 
sector does not get the same treatment. Moreover, investors suffer from excessive 
surcharges and rental collected by the governorates. This affects negatively the 
competition both between the public and private sector as well as between different 
governorates. Moreover, the tax exemptions and breaks allowed under the investment 
law(s) for special geographical areas do not allow having a level playing field between 
different geographical areas which can have a negative impact on competition. The 
amendments to the Investment Law 8 of 1997 introduced in 2004 which were introduced 
to streamline the procedures and reduce the number of steps that the investor faces 
stumbled against the overlapping of jurisdictionary power allowed for both the General 
Authority of Investment and the governorates. Such obstacles are likely to affect 
negatively the investment and business environment and hence are not expected to 
enhance the status of competition. 
 
Role of Regulatory Bodies: 
In Egypt there are two regulatory bodies, one in the field of electricity and the other in the 
field of telecommunications. Below we identify some of the main features of each of 
them while pinpointing whether they have a role in enhancing competition and increasing 







The body responsible for regulating the electricity sector is called The Egyptian Electric Utility and 
Consumer Protection Regulatory Agency (EEUCPRA). In order to regulate, supervise, and control 
all matters related to the electric power activities and to introduce competition, a 
presidential decree 339/2000 allowed to reorganize the Egyptian Electric Utility and 
Consumer Protection Regulatory Agency as a legal entity affiliated to the Minister of 
Electricity.  
 
It is important to note that; one of the aims of the Regulator is to ensure that the costs of 
providing good quality of electricity confirm the realization of a fair return to the Electric 
Utility sector to secure the continuity and availability of supply to satisfy the demand of 
the various aspects of usage. But the Regulator in the Egyptian case failed to apply a 
quasi-optimal pricing (Rate-of Return or Price-Cap Regulation) that should be revised 
every 3-5 years because of its inability to pressure for changing electricity prices which 
have been frozen since 1992 (for economic, social, and political reasons) and its relative 
weakness to lobby for passing a bill asking for such a demand due to lack of supporters. 
The EEUCPRA does not regulate every sector in electricity as still some activities fall 
outside its jurisdiction and follow the government. This puts EEUCPRA in an awkward 
position due to inability to control some parts of a vertically integrated industry that 
follow the directions of the government. Moreover, the independence of EEUCPRA is 
questionable, as although it is supposed to be an independent body it is headed by the 
Minister of Electricity who has the discretionary power to alter the decisions of 
EEUCPRA following the intentions of the government, regardless the main mandate of 
EEUCPRA. However, such point of view is challenged in the case of EEUCPRA and the 
body regulating the telecommunications sector as some view that for a body to gain 
power it has to follow a certain ministry. 
 
In brief, the role of the EEUCPRA can be summarized into:  
 
- Regulates and supervises all electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. 
- Ensures availability of supply to users at the most equitable prices and considers 
environmental issues. 
- Considers interests of customers, producers, transmitters, and distributors. 
- Prepares for fair competition in the field of electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution. 
- Prevents any monopoly within the electricity market. 
(see Ragab, 2003 and El Garf, 2000)  
 
Telecommunications:  
The Regulatory Body for organizing the telecommunications sector is called the Egyptian 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA). 
 
Until 1998, the Arab Republic of Egypt National Telecommunications Organization 
(ARENTO); subsequently changed to Telecom Egypt (TE) was exclusively responsible 
for providing all telecommunications services in Egypt. ARENTO acted as both Operator 
 36
and Regulator. Law 19 of 1998 transformed Telecom Egypt from a state-owned 
organization to a joint stock company, and separated the regulatory function from the 
company and established the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA). 
Presidential Decree no. 101 of 1998 drew-up TRA mission, strategies and 
responsibilities, which included the following: 
 
TRA strategies and responsibilities:  
 
- Provides a transparent regulatory framework for advanced and adequate 
telecommunication services across Egypt at affordable prices. 
- Promotes and encourages fair competition for the benefit of the end-user. 
- Encourages investment in the telecommunication sector on a non-monopoly basis. 
- Protects the public interest and user interest. 
- Ensures optimal utilization of scarce resources such as the frequency spectrum. 
- Putting satisfaction of consumers as a main objective 
- Monitors  quality insurance of the telecommunications services 
(http://www.tra.gov.eg/pdfs/TRA-bros.pdf ) 
 
The TRA suffers from the same problem of lack of complete independence as its board of 
directors is headed by the Minister of Communications and Information and hence its 
decisions are largely either politically driven or lack objectiveness as Telecom Egypt is 
still government dominated and hence the TRA has no influential impact on its decisions. 
 
Section Eight: Conclusion and Lessons Learned 
Egypt has tried to enhance the role of the private sector by initiating a number of laws 
and regulations. The issues of enhancing competition and inter-firm rivalry were never 
spelt out as major issues by the government (with the exception of the newly enacted 
competition law), however in many cases the laws designed to enhance the role of the 
private sector aimed at well to enhance the status of competition. In many cases the 
enforcement of laws and regulations remained weak to a large extent, hence their impact 
on improving the business climate was humble and their effect on enhancing competition 
was modest.  
 
Policies designed to enhance competition and inter-firm rivalry were rather very few or 
absent. All of the reviewed polices pointed out that the policies implemented did not 
favor better competition status. In many cases the policies adopted were either designed 
to protect certain industries or affected negatively the performance of the private sector 
due to inefficiencies in the implementation and enforcement procedures. In this regard, 
the main culprit is the protectionist trade policy that represented the key policy for 
enhancing competition. Even when reform of trade policy was introduced, it remained 
non transparent and suffered from a number of backslides which preserved the 
anticompetitive nature of many markets. However, with the change of the cabinet in July 
2004 several positive signals were pointed out. The cabinet raised the motto of “reform” 
and since this cabinet has been in place several liberal policies have been adopted in the 
trade area. Moreover, several regulatory improvements have taken place where 
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appointment of figures acquainted with the business environment in key positions as 
General Authority for Investment has taken place. Such reforms are likely to enhance the 
role of the private sector in the economy, however its impact on competition cannot be 
determined. 
 
The discretionary power of governorates in undertaking decision or implementing 
policies affecting the status of private sector and the status of competition is kept to a 
minimum. However, the discrimination in the treatment of public and private sector in 
terms of allocating land free of charge and the overlapping of jurisdiction power among 
the General Authority for Investment and the governorates are major obstacles that affect 
negatively the competition between private and public sectors. 
 
The role played by regulatory bodies in monitoring competition and private sector 
behavior remains limited to a large extent due to lack of complete independence and 
political pressures. It is confident to say that such regulatory bodies were not allowed due 
to the several reasons, among which is the introduction of their concepts and roles, 
political pressures, to perform their role effectively. 
 
In a nutshell, it can be safely argued that the major missing laws and policies needed to 
enhance competition were the absence of a competition law and the restrictive trade 
policy, a situation which has changed in 2004. Other laws and policies were not designed 
to enhance competition, though they had the intention of enhancing the role of the private 
sector in the economy. In other words, they focused on increasing the role of the private 
sector by providing several incentives, however, the aspects of competition and inter-firm 
rivalry remained missing in their design. Hence, the success achieved by laws and 
policies in enhancing competition remained limited to a large extent, first due to the 
dominance of the public sector which was followed by monopolistic and oligopolistic 
market structures dominated by private sector which deterred a competitive environment. 
Moreover, our hypothesis of the protectionist trade policy did not help to enhance the role 
competition in the economy is proved where we find that it has been used as a tool to 
support the hard budgets of the public sectors and non efficient private sector. The net 
result was using trade policy as a tool to achieve social and political objectives including 
redistribution of income for certain social segments (government officials working in the 
public sector) and supporting the interest of certain private lobbies (which either enjoyed 
abnormal profits from such a protected market or wanted to avoid hard budgets). The net 
result was a humble impact on enhancing competition. 
 
The cabinet that was appointed in 2004 adopted liberal policies especially in the fields of 
trade and finance. The impact of such policies is likely to be positive on the status of 
competition and inter-firm rivalry, however not enough time have elapsed to be able to 
evaluate the impact of such policies, though the available evidence up till now show that 
such polices were able to increase private sector participation but not to enhance 




PART III:  
BENCHMARKING THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE 
REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR WITH 
DEVELOPING ECONOMY PEERS: THE CASE OF EGYPT 
 
Introduction:  
In this part of the study we review the latest World Bank Doing Business, 2004, 2005, 
and 2006 indicators for Egypt compared with five countries included in the study. We 
then move to specific national indicators that provide us with an overview of the status of 
competition in the Egyptian economy. 
 
This part is divided into three sections following this introduction. Section Nine provides 
cross country comparison for the World Bank Doing Business indicators. Section Ten 
provides an overview of the status of competition in the different manufacturing sectors 
of the Egyptian economy. Section Eleven concludes. Our main focus is investigating the 
status of competition and inter-firm rivalry. 
 
With regards to indicators used in Section Nine, we are convinced that such indicators are 
not the best indicators that can be used to assess the Egyptian economy in terms of 
policies, procedures, and institutions, however, due to the lack of data that allow us to 
undertake such cross country comparison we had to depend on our second best data 
sources where all countries can be compared using the same methodology. In Section 
Ten, in many case data paucity did not allow us to use the first best variables and 
indicators, and we had to depend on proxy indicators and variables.  
 
Data used are collected from the annual industrial statistics yearbook published by the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) which is the official 
source of data in Egypt. One of the drawbacks characterizing this data is how CAPMAS 
handles data on public sector during the privatization program. Once the privatization 
process started, data on privatized firms are classified as private firms even if the firm is 
not privatized completely. This may affect the values of some indicators as a result of 
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Section Nine: Cross Country Comparison Using Doing 
Business Indicators: 
Table 1 states the procedures needed to start a new business. As shown in the table, Egypt 
compared relatively well regarding the number of procedures with Argentina, and Brazil 
in 2003. It lagged behind India, South Africa, and, Mexico. The same applies for other 
indicators of duration and minimum capital as percentage of Gross National Income per 
capita where the position of Egypt is relatively in the middle when compared with the set 
of comparator countries used. The situation changed dramatically in 2006 where Egypt 
was among the best performers among the set of countries compared regarding all the 
aforementioned indicators. The worst indicator for Egypt is the cost of starting a new 
business when taken as a percentage of the Gross National Income per capita. It reached 
61.2% in 2003 and 68.8% in 2006 which is relatively very high if compared to other 
countries whether developing or developed. The situation did not change significantly 
between 2003 and 2006. The reforms undertaken by the government starting mid 2004 
have improved the status of the business environment in Egypt whether in terms of 
reducing the number of procedures required to start a business, or in terms of financial 




Table 1: Starting a Business: 
Source: World Bank (2004) and (2007) 
 






Egypt South Africa India Brazil Mexico Argentina 
Number of procedures 13 9 10 15 7 15
Duration (days) 43 38 88 152 51 68
Cost (% of GNI per 
capita) 
61.2 8.7 49.8 11.6 18.8 8.0
Min. Capital (% of GNI 
per capita) 




Africa India Brazil Mexico Argentina 
Number of procedures 10 9 11 17 8 15
Duration (days) 19 35 35 152 27 32
Cost (% of GNI per 
capita) 
68.8 6.9 73.7 9.9 14.2 12.1
Min. Capital (% of GNI 
per capita) 
694.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 5.6
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On average Egypt compares relatively in the middle to other countries. It is in a better 
position compared to Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina and worse than South Africa, and 
India. The worst indicator for Egypt as shown in the Table is the one concerning 
conditions of employment index. In 2004, Doing Business changed the indicators used, 
so we were not able to trace the development in Egypt over time, however the indicators 
used in 2006 show that Egypt compares relatively bad when compared to other countries 
implying a higher level of regulation regarding labor issues. 
 
Table 2: Labor Hiring and Firing Regulations: 
Source: World Bank (2004) and (2007) 
 
Table 3 identifies the number of procedures, costs and duration of enforcing contracts. As 
shown from the Table in 2003 Egypt compared well to all other countries where there 
existed only one country in a better position, namely Brazil. The worst indicator in the 
procedural complexity index for Egypt was the one related to cost as percentage of GNI. 
The situation in 2006 changed dramatically, not only for Egypt, but for other countries as 
well where in some countries the indicators worsened significantly while in others it 
improved which might be a result in the change of methodology adopted by the World 
Bank. As for Egypt, it compared relatively bad with other countries in terms of number of 
procedures. This is not the case with the other two indicators where it ranked in the 
middle whether regarding the indicator related to days or the cost as percentage of GNI. 
 
Table 3:  
Enforcing Contracts  (2003, 2006) – covers formality of procedures and time to resolve a dispute 
Indicator Egypt South India Brazil  Mexico Argentina 
Indicator (Doing Business, 2003) Egypt South Africa India Brazil Mexico Argentina
Flexibility of Hiring Index 33 42 33 78 81 71
Conditions of Employment Index 83 36 75 89 81 81
Flexibility of Firing Index 61 30 45 68 70 46
Employment Laws Index 59 36 51 78 77 66
Indicator (Doing Business, 2006) Egypt South Africa India Brazil Mexico Argentina
Difficulty of Hiring Index 0 44 33 67 33 44
Rigidity of Hours Index  60 40 20 60 40 60
Difficulty of Firing Index  100 40 70 0 40 20
Rigidity of Employment Index 53 41 41 42 38 41
Hiring cost (% of salary) 26.0 2.4 16.8 37.3 23.9 23.0
Firing costs (weeks of wages) 186.3 24.0 55.9 36.8 74.3 138.7
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Africa 
Number of procedures 19 26 22 16 47 32
Duration (days) 202 207 365 380 325 300
Cost (% GNI per capita) 30.7 16.7 95.0 2.4 10.0 8.5
Procedural Complexity Index 50 56 50 48 62 80
Enforcing Contracts (2006) – covers 
formality of procedures and time to 
resolve a dispute  Indicator 
Egypt South Africa India Brazil  Mexico Argentina 
Number of procedures 55 26 56 42 37 33
Duration (days) 1,010 600 1,420 616 415 520
Cost (% of debt) 18.4 11.5 35.7 15.5 20.0 15.0
Source: World Bank (2004) and (2007) 
 
Table 4 identifies the procedures, costs, and duration of closing a business. As shown 
from the table Egypt compares well when compared to India, and Brazil. However, it 
compares relatively bad when compared to the other three countries. The indicators used 
by the World Bank differed in 2003 when compared to 2006, however for the indicators 
that have been used in the two years there has been no significant improvement over 
time. 
Table 4: Closing a Business: 
Indicator (2003) Egypt South Africa India Brazil  Mexico Argentina
Actual time (in years) 4.3 2.0 11.3 10.0 2.0 2.8
Actual cost (% of estate) 18 18 8 8.0 18 18
Goals of Insolvency Index 39 53 21 24 61 43
Court Powers Index 67 67 33 67 67 67
Indicator (2006) Egypt South Africa India Brazil  Mexico Argentina
Actual time (in years) 4.2 2.0 10.0 4.0 1.8 2.8
Actual cost (% of estate) 22.0 18.0 9.0 12.0 18.0 12.0
Recovery Rate 16.6 34.4 13.0 12.1 63.2 36.2
Source: World Bank (2004) and (2007) 
 
 
An overview of the 4 tables shows us that Egypt is in a middle position when compared 
to other countries in the table. In some cases Egypt is in the same or a better rank than 
other countries and sometimes lags behind them.  However, it should be noted that such 
indicators are based on very restrictive assumptions to allow comparability across 
countries (for such assumptions see World Bank, 2004 and 2007). A general conclusion 
from such comparisons is that the lack of competition and inter-firm rivalry in Egypt 
should not be attributed to institutional aspects as those mentioned in the tables. As 
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revealed from the tables, Egypt compares relatively well with other countries which 
probably enjoy a higher level of competition and inter-firm rivalry. Hence, claiming the 
faults on such institutional aspects will be unfair as bureaucratic and red tape measures 
apply in other countries as well as in Egypt to the same extent. 
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Section Ten: National Sectoral Indicators: 
In this section we follow the indicators provided in the proposal of the project. Most of 
the indicators were not published and the author had to calculate them. In many cases the 
exact indicators identified in the proposal could not be measured due to lack of data. 
Hence proxy indicators and/or variables were used. 
 
Indicator One: Concentration Ratio: 
There were no data available that allow us to calculate the three firm-level concentration 
ratio or the five firm-level concentration ratio.  Figure 7 shows that the pattern of 
concentration in large firms was high in the public sector in 1990/1991 and by time it was 
heavily reduced especially in the case of 500+ workers’ firms. The case of the private 
sector did not change much over the 1990s and remained relatively stable with a very 
high concentration among the set of the large firms (500+ workers).  
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To overcome the deficiency of data, we assumed that firms with the largest number of 
labor (more than 500) are the largest firms. We then divided the production of the largest 
firms by the total production of the sector, while differentiating between public and 
private. In general the concentration ratio increased in total manufacturing especially for 
the public sector, whereas it increased for the private sector between 1990 and 1995 and 
decreased slightly in 1999. As for specific sectors we find that the food and beverage 
sector (ISIC 31) and the textiles, garments and leather sector (ISIC 32) followed the same 
trend, where the number of public firms decreased and the number or private firms 
increased (an expected outcome of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP) and the privatization process). However, the concentration ratio 
increased in the case of ISIC 31 and ISIC 32 for the public sector along the four years 
1990, 1995,1999, and 2004 (it slightly declined in 1999 for ISIC 32). In the case of the 
private sector, the trend showed an increase in concentration in the period 1990 to 1995 
and declined in 1999 for both ISIC 31 and ISIC 32. Other tends were identified in other 
sectors as shown in Table 5, nevertheless, the major observation is that concentration 
ratio increased in the private sector between 1990 and 1995 and decreased afterwards, 
showing a positive sign of competition. In general the concentration ratio remained low 
in the private sector, with the exception of ISIC 37 (basic metal products), however the 
concentration started to decrease as well in 1999. ISIC 33 (wood and furniture) 
experienced a significant increase in the concentration ratio. This is versus the trend in 
the public sector where concentration ratio increased between 1990 and 1995, between 
and 1995 and 1999, and relatively stabilized between 1999 and 2004 in almost all the 
sectors.  
 
Table 5: Concentration Ratio of Firms Employing More Than 500 Workers 
Number of Firms % Share of Total Output Year ISIC Code Definition Public Private Public Private 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 71 21 48.4 19.5 
32 Textile, garments & leather 58 24 96.1 39.3 
33 Wood & furniture 1 1 18.8 6.3 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 6 10 79.9 34.4 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 47 16 93.8 25.0 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 19 10 90.1 34.1 
37 Basic metal products 14 2 98.0 81.8 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 71 11 87.9 29.3 




Total Total Manufacturing 287 96 81.0 33.4 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 54 38 52.0 37.4 
32 Textile, garments & leather 53 48 96.6 50.6 
33 Wood & furniture 1 1 24.2 18.8 19
95
 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 7 14 93.6 23.2 
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Number of Firms % Share of Total Output ISIC Year Definition Code Public Private Public Private 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 54 11 94.2 21.7 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 19 17 98.0 62.1 
37 Basic metal products 19 6 99.8 80.2 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 55 35 91.1 48.8 
39 Other manufacture 0 1 0.0 11.4 
Total Total Manufacturing 262 171 85.2 43.3 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 36 46 68.0 28.5 
32 Textile, garments & leather 43 57 94.5 48.7 
33 Wood & furniture 3 3 71.7 38.3 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 4 17 82.3 36.4 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 39 22 96.3 40.4 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 7 28 97.3 57.8 
37 Basic metal products 14 10 97.2 50.8 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 28 40 85.3 57.0 




Total Total Manufacturing 174 224 89.1 42.9 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 29 51 70.2 40.6 
32 Textile, garments & leather 37 69 89.8 59.2 
33 Wood & furniture 2 3 71.0 23.2 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 3 13 80.3 33.6 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 36 33 94.8 44.5 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 8 20 96.5 60.8 
37 Basic metal products 11 7 99.7 81.7 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 24 51 85.0 55.6 




Total Total Manufacturing 150 247 89.7 52.6 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Number of Establishments versus Production in 
Manufacturing Sector (1990/91 & 2003/2004)      
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Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues. 
 
 
   

























The previous graph shows the area between the straight line, which represents equally 
distributed production among different firms in the economy, and curves, which 
represents the actual distribution of the production in the Egyptian economy. The two 
curves corresponding to private and public sectors indicate that the public sector is in 
general less concentrated than the private sector where the curve of the private sector is 
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concentrated during 90’s as a result of privatizing the large public firms (see Appendix D 
for details on different activities). Hence, it is worth noting that privatization does not 
necessarily imply more competition and enhanced inter-firm rivalry. We cannot deduct 
the final result of privatization on enhancing competition and inter-firm rivalry from just 
the calculation of the concentration ratios as it might be the case that there exist more 
inter-firm rivalry even among few number of firms that in a market characterized by 
having a large number of firms but few that enjoy dominating position. Moreover, the 
analysis become more difficult as there exist several firms that are labeled “private” 
where in reality the government controls their actions to a large extent hence 
manipulating the status of competition and inter-firm rivalry.  
 
 
Second Indicator: Mean-Price Cost Margin 
We were not able to calculate this ratio. Instead we calculated the gross profit margin 
which is in fact the gross profit (revenues minus costs of goods sold) divided by 
revenues. There was a general trend of improvement in the case of the performance of the 
private sector, using the gross profit margin as an indicator, relatively to the performance 
of the public sector after privatization took place. We can interpret from the data as 
shown in Table 6a and 6b that the performance of the private sector improved 
significantly in sectors which experienced privatization with enhancing the role of the 
private sector (i.e. depending on the type of privatization as in the textiles and ready 
made garments and the metals and machinery sectors). This is compared with equal 
performance for private and public sectors in sectors where privatization did not lead to 
enhanced competition or control remained in hands of government as it is the case with 
food and beverage sector. On average, there was no upward or downward trend for the 
gross profit margin, with the exception of the ISIC 37 (basic metal products) which 
showed an upward trend all over the period studied although it is the industry with the 
highest concentration.  
 
 
Table 6: Gross Profit Margin (Public & Private)  
a) Public 
ISIC 
Code Definition 90-91 94-95 99-2000 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 10.5% 11.4% 11.9%
32 Textile, garments & leather 15.6% 9.5% -16.8%
33 Wood & furniture -11.1% 9.0% 5.1%
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 21.0% 27.8% 8.6%
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 23.3% 23.3% 21.0%
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36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 21.6% 27.6% 20.8%
37 Basic metal products 14.9% 12.9% -6.5%
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 15.8% 12.2% 1.4%
39 Other manufacture 26.8% -28.2% N.A.




Code Definition 1990 1994 1998 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 14.4% 11.3% 12.1%
32 Textile, garments & leather 24.5% 16.5% 18.7%
33 Wood & furniture 20.4% 14.9% 16.0%
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 15.0% 18.5% 14.4%
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 18.7% 18.1% 24.4%
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 27.4% 36.6% 21.4%
37 Basic metal products 11.5% 15.4% 15.8%
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 22.4% 19.6% 21.8%
39 Other manufacture 20.9% 19.7% 24.9%
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues. 
 
 
Indicator Three: The Rate of Return on Assets: 
We calculated a proxy for this indicator where we used the rate of return on investment 
(ROI)1 for both public and private sector as shown in table 7a and 7b. As revealed in the 







1 The concept "Return On Investment" provides a mean to measure the profit obtained from an investment. It measures the profits 
generated from the total investments of a firm. 
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table we can identify that the trend for the public sector has been that the rate of return 
improved between 1990/91 and 1994/95 for almost all manufacturing sectors and then 
deteriorated afterwards between 1994/95 and 1999/2000 for public and the same trend 
took place in the private sector. In general the private sector experienced deterioration in 
this indicator which can be explained as a result of the privatization process and the 
increased investments undertaken as a matter of restructuring which decreased the rate of 
return on investments. This is verified by ISIC 33 (wood and furniture) case where the 
concentration ratio increased significantly and huge amount of investments were pumped 
in and hence the ROI decreased. This is versus the case of ISIC 35 (chemicals and 
products, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastics) where Table 31 shows increased number 
of large firms in the market and high dynamicity, nevertheless the ROI remained 
relatively high and do not show large variations around the mean. On the whole, the 
private sector has outperformed the public sector, where is s clear that most values of 
ROI for the public sector are declining, going into negative figures or even reaching 
higher negative numbers contrary to the private sector. The increase or decrease of ROI 
cannot lead us to any indication on the status of competition and inter-firm rivalry. 
 
Table 7: Return on Investment: 
a) Public 
ISIC 
Code Definition 90-91 94-95 99-2000 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 5.19% 5.58% 4.49%
32 Textile, garments & leather 2.71% -6.42% -15.61%
33 Wood & furniture -16.06% 29.72% -2.68%
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 2.63% 7.19% -0.08%
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 3.14% 3.99% 4.10%
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal -0.60% 3.61% -4.00%
37 Basic metal products 1.67% -0.26% -0.80%
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment -0.63% -3.23% -6.41%
39 Other manufacture 2.22% -19.25% n.a.
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues. 
b) Private 
ISIC 
Code Definition 1990 1994 1998 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco -0.04% 0.58% 1.49%
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32 Textile, garments & leather 3.90% 1.87% 1.87%
33 Wood & furniture -3.28% 2.71% -0.18%
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 5.01% 3.55% 1.74%
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 4.27% 4.24% 8.79%
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal -1.37% 10.33% 1.71%
37 Basic metal products 1.25% 5.12% 2.38%
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 7.35% 6.58% 3.66%
39 Other manufacture 5.71% 4.22% 8.95%
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues. 
 
Indicator Four: Mean Rate of Growth of Value Added 
This indicator was calculated for the private sector as shown in Table 8. Almost all 
sectors experienced a decrease in the mean rate of growth of value added with the 
exception of basic metal products sector (ISIC 37). This is rather a disappointing result as 
it shows that on average the level of domestic value added in the manufacturing sector is 
decreasing substantially.  
 
Table 8: Mean Rate of Growth of Value Added 
Annual Average Growth Rate (%) ISIC 
Code Definition 1990 – 1995 1995 – 2000 2001-2004 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 32.7 18.0 2.1 
32 Textile, garments & leather 38.2 5.4 11.7 
33 Wood & furniture 39.6 16.5 -13.4 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 75.8 -6.7 -10.4 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 33.7 40.4 -1.8 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 43.1 20.6 4.8 
37 Basic metal products 25.2 5.3 29.0 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 59.8 3.8 6.9 
39 Other manufacture 57.2 81.7 0.0 
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Annual Average Growth Rate (%) ISIC Definition 1990 – 1995 Code 1995 – 2000 2001-2004 
Total Total Manufacturing 52.2 13.2 4.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues.  
 
High value added growth rates can be due to handling data on the partially privatized 
firms as we discussed before.  
 
 
Indicator Five: The Gross Entry and Exit of Firms 
As shown in the second part of the study we were able to identify the number of 
registered firms in the period (1990-2002) and the cases of exist represented by 
bankruptcy and court judgment as shown in Table 3, Part II. In general starting from 
1992 there was an increase in the number of firms registered (which means that the 
number of enterprises which entered the market surpassed the number of enterprises 
which exist from the market) which implies higher degree of competition and inter-firm 
rivalry. The simultaneous increase in the number of bankruptcy cases and court judgment 
reveals that the market was more dynamic where despite the increase in the figures of 
those two indicators, the net result was an increase in the number of enterprises registered 
implying an increase in the number of enterprises which entered the market.  
 
However, it should be noted that there are thirty types of exist from the market besides 
bankruptcy and court judgment as shown in Table 9 which explains the gap between the 
total number of bankruptcy and court judgment cases and the total number of registered. 
 
Table 9: Types of Exist from the Market 
1) Non-renewal 12) Not Related activity 23) Improbability  
2) Death 13) Unregistered 24) Travel abroad 
3) Abandon trade 14) Court Judgment 25) Administrative investigations  
4) No identified physical place for 
undertaking activity 
15) Diminutive capital 26)Cancellation by governor 
decree
5) No identified physical place for 
undertaking activity and court 
decision 
16) Merger 27) Cancellation by presidential 
decree 
6) Deletion order 17) Relocation 28) Cancellation by 
nationalization  
7) Firm dissolution 18) Branch annulment 29) Due to auditors` report  
8) Firm liquidation 19) Detention 30) Another record on the same 
registration  
9) license annulment 20) Bankruptcy 31) Basic simple activity  
10) license give away 21) Detention upon court 
injunction  
32) Nationalization 
11) Duplication 22) Change of legal form   
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Source: IDSC, unpublished data 
 
Indicator Six: The number and value of mergers and acquisitions 
There are two sources that publish the number and value of mergers and acquisitions. The 
first is the national source in Table 10. The number of mergers and acquisitions increased 
significantly in 1999, 2000, 2005 and 2006.  
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Table 10: Number of Mergers and Acquisitions (1996– 2006)  
 Year Mergers Acquisitions 
1996 7 1 
1997 3 6 
1998 1 3 
1999 1 44 
2000 1 29 
2001 0 17 
2002 0 14 
2003 0 14 
2004 0 9 
2005 0 37 
2006 0 40 
Source: Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange, Monthly Bulletin, 
different issues  
 
 
Table 11 shows the value of cross border mergers and acquisitions as reported by the 
World Investment Report. Compared to other countries in the Table, the value of cross 
border mergers and acquisitions that took place in Egypt are far less than similar cases 
that took place in comparator countries as Morocco and Tunisia especially in year 2001. 
In general the increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions implies that there is less 
competition as it leads to higher concentration, however this is not necessarily true as it 
could be the case that small firms were merged and competition is enhanced as a result of 
a strategy to survive in the market. 
 
Table 11: Cross-border merger and acquisition overview, 1995-2003  
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Egypt    
Sales 10 171 102 48 738 528 660 335 2200 254 1326
Purchases - - - - 7 213 - - 3 61 14423
Morocco    
Sales - 40 578 5 123 - 2211 47 1624 25 1579
Purchases - 8 - - 10 - 72 - - - -
South Africa    
Sales 640 1106 2664 1932 1902 1171 11916 2933 1563 1935 7001
Purchases 593 1522 2766 2514 5715 6393 2594 1947 568 2320 528
Africa    
Sales 840 1805 4346 2607 3090 3199 15524 4684 6427 4595 10509
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Purchases 645 2148 2800 2678 5762 6659 3041 1999 1067 2718 15505
Developing countries    
Sales 16493 35727 66999 82668 74003 70610 85813 44532 40166 54700 100633
Purchases 13372 29646 35210 21717 63406 48496 55719 27585 31060 39809 83150
World    
Sales 186593 227023 304848 531648 766044 1143816 593960 369789 296988 380598 716302
Purchases 186593 227023 304848 531648 766044 1143816 593960 369789 296988 380598 716302
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006   
 
 
Most of the merges and acquisitions are concentrated in banking and investment (the 
table in Appendix E shows the mergers and acquisitions by sector) and in construction, 
especially in cement. The highest value of a merger or acquisition operation up to 2002 
was; L.E. 216000 million, which was the acquisition value of Egyptian French Industrial 
Company (SIFE) by Jacob De Lafon. The lowest value was the acquisition value of El Kinanah 
Brokerage by El Rajhi Enterprises which scored LE. 0.75 million.  
 
 
Indicator Seven: Distribution of Firms “The Missing Middle” 
Table 12 shows the distribution of firms using the criteria of the number of labor in each 
firm whereas Table 13 shows the percentage of the medium size firms in relation to the 
total manufacturing, which is on average not decreasing implying that Egypt is not 
suffering from the missing middle syndrome. The highest percentage of medium firms is 
in the chemicals products sector (ISIC 35) as well as in the metal products sector (ISIC 
38). 
 
Table 12: Distribution of Number of Firms by Size in the Manufacturing Private 
Sector 
Firm Size 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Micro 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 
Small 88.1 84.3 83.6 80.8 
Medium 5.4 6.3 6.0 7.6 
Large 6.5 9.3 10.2 10.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Micro : number of employees is less than 10 
Small : number of employees ranges from 10 up to 49 
Medium : number of employees ranges from 50 up to 99 
Large : number of employees is more than 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues.  
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Table 13:  Percentage Share of Medium Size Firms according to Manufacturing 
Sub-activities 
ISIC 
Code Definition 1990 1995 1999 2004 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.6 
32 Textile, garments & leather 8.4 8.2 9.5 11.3 
33 Wood & furniture 9.2 14.1 8.7 8.9 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 11.7 9.9 10.2 13.7 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 13.2 18.5 13.3 16.7 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 6.7 6.3 6.5 16.2 
37 Basic metal products 10.9 10.3 7.5 13.0 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 8.6 10.1 12.6 11.5 
39 Other manufacture 6.1 6.3 5.0 11.8 
Total Total Manufacturing 5.4 6.3 6.0 7.6 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues.  
 
Indicator Eight: Percentage of Consumption Supplied by Imports: 
Table 14 shows the percentage of consumption supplied by imports whereas table 15 
identifies the import structure of each sector. Table 14 shows that the percentage of 
imports to consumption ranges from a low percent of 25.4 and 25.5 in ISIC sectors 31 
and 36 to a high percentage of 76.9 in ISIC sector 33. It should be noted that such 
percentages represent the total imports and are not confined to imports directed to final or 
end use as there is no classification that exist in Egypt that can disaggregate data in this 
manner. Hence, the only observation from the table that can be confirmed is  
the relatively high percentage of imports to consumption. In general the percentage 
increased over time implying higher degree of competition. 
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Table 14: Percentage of Imports to Consumption (%) 
ISIC 
Code Definition 1990 1995 1999 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 21.9 21.8 25.5 
32 Textile, garments & leather 8.6 12.7 19.7 
33 Wood & furniture 86.8 81.2 76.9 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 39.9 39.0 33.3 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 24.3 23.3 63.1 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 8.7 9.5 25.4 
37 Basic metal products 29.2 36.7 40.6 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 48.9 49.0 63.2 
39 Other manufacture 50.7 71.5 48.0 
Source: Authors’ Calculation based on: 
             UNIDO Demand-Supply Database, 2002. 
              CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, 2000.
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Table 15: Import Structure of Each Sector  
Value (million US$) Structure (%) ISIC 
Code Definition 1990 1995 2000 2003 1990 1995 2000 2003 
31 Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 1492 1425 1377 1001 20.1 15.1 13.0 14.3 
32 Textile, garments & leather 252 311 251 235 3.4 3.3 2.4 3.4 
33 Wood & furniture 487 612 609 477 6.6 6.5 5.7 6.8 
34 Paper & products, printing & publication 344 583 351 245 4.6 6.2 3.3 3.5 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastics 1514 1923 2737 1791 20.4 20.4 25.8 25.5 
36 Mining products, non-metal products, except petroleum & coal 115 175 255 120 1.6 1.9 2.4 1.7 
37 Basic metal products 708 958 680 540 9.6 10.2 6.4 7.7 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 2463 3388 4302 2571 33.2 35.9 40.5 36.6 
39 Other manufacture 32 55 65 42 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 
3 Total Manufacture 7408 9429 10628 7023 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 





Indicator Nine: Percentage of Exports to Output 
Table 16 shows the percentage of exports to output in each sector and for both public and 
private sector. The percentage differed from one sector to the other, but was high in the 
case of textiles and ready made garments sector especially for the public sector which can 
be easily explained as a result of including cotton as a manufactured product. In the case 
of basic metals sector, it showed good performance, using the indicator of ratio of exports 
to output, despite that it suffers from high concentration.  
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Table 16: Percentage of Exports to Output 
 
89/90 94/95 99/2000 2003/2004 ISIC 
Code Exports / Output Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total 
31 Food products, Beverages & 
Tobacco 0.89% 0.01% 0.6% 2.13% 3.46% 2.6% 2.85% 1.34% 1.8% 2.9% 10.5% 8.2% 
32 Textile, garments & leather 
21.97% 0.02% 15.3% 30.66% 13.84% 22% 24.91% 7.50% 11.5% 25.6% 35.4% 33.1%
33 Wood & furniture 
1.13% 0.00% 0.4% 0.98% 0.41% 0.5% 0.12% 0.01% 0.019% 0.0% 3.0% 2.7% 
34 Paper & products, printing & 
publication 0.01% 0.00% 0.004% 1.28% 0.61% 0.8% 0.10% 0.01% 0.01% 0.1% 6.4% 5.8% 
35 Chemical & products, petroleum, 
coal, rubber & plastics 0.53% 0.00% 0.4% 1.59% 3.42% 1.9% 1.71% 3.13% 2.2% 3.7% 19.9% 11.6%
36 Mining products, non-metal 
products, except petroleum & coal 0.40% 4.60% 1.8% 0.78% 9.47% 5.8% 1.27% 0.34% 0.5% 24.3% 14.0% 15.0%
37 Basic metal products 
20.54% 0.00% 14.5% 22.27% 11.40% 20% 36.12% 13.28% 19.4% 30.3% 25.8% 27.2%
38 Metal products, machinery & 
equipment 2.66% 0.00% 1.8% 0.77% 1.67% 1.3% 1.68% 0.30% 0.5% 3.6% 5.6% 5.4% 
39 Other manufacture 
0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 17.64% 17.1% N.A. N.A. N.A. NA 18.6% 18.6%
Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues. 
 
 
Section Eleven: Conclusion and Lessons Learned: 
The above indicators identified several main points. Comparing Egypt with other 
countries, Egypt does not seem to be lagging behind on average. It is highly comparable 
with countries as Jordan and Morocco, and in many cases the indicators are highly 
similar to those of other advanced countries like South Korea. 
 
As for the national indicators, it seems that the structure of the market is still dominated 
by the public sector though privatization has significantly decreased such dominance. The 
performance of the private sector in general improved in the period 1995 to 2000 
onwards when compared to the period 1990 to 1995 with the exception of the percentage 
of exports to output. There is no consistency across the board whether between the 
performance of different sectors or among the different indicators used. However, as 
regard to competition, it could be safely argued that most of the indicators on average 
point out that the degree of competition increased. However, increased competition was 
not necessarily correlated with better performance of the private sector using the different 
indicators shown. The most obvious example of a highly non competitive industry is the 
basic metal sector which performed well using different indicators although it remained 
relatively highly concentrated and suffered from the missing middle syndrome. In other 
words, economic efficiency is not necessarily correlated with higher degree of 
competition following the available data. We might be mistaken due to the inconsistency 
of data and the concordance difficulties. We were not able to determine a conclusive 
relationship between the size of establishments (in terms of labor) and the economic 
performance. Enhancing private sector was not translated to more competition and better 
economic performance. We saw an increase in the size of private sector as a result of 
privatization, which was accompanied by an increase in the concentration ratio and 
declining value added growth rate. The conclusion that we reached is that competition 
induced by policies and regulations have a positive impact on the business environment 
which is not necessarily reflected in the indicators used in this part of the study if 
confined to national indicators, either due to inconsistency of data or insufficient time 
that might have elapsed to show positive impact, or finally due to entanglement of other 
variables as macroeconomic conditions that are not discussed in this study. However, if 
we confine ourselves to the comparison of Egypt with other countries, we find that Egypt 
is doing relatively well as the indicators showed at Part I of the study.  
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IV. Industry studies of the effects of competition policy enforcement 
 
This part of the study should have dealt with competition policy enforcement, 
however due to absence of a competition authority’s published cases as it has started 
to function only in April 2006, we had to substitute this part by discussing three case 
studies where anti-competitive behavior was evident. The cases differ from each other 
and provide useful insights on the government’s intervention in each case, the impact 
of trade policy and, budget constraints. We focus on the status of competition and 
inter-firm rivalry. In the steel case, we have the model of a dominant position of one 
firm which as discussed below seems to have undertaken anticompetitive behavior. In 
the case of cement, a cartel was formed, whereas in the case of film industry a 
dominant player has controlled the market for a while which was followed by an 
oligopoly. The government reacted differently in the three cases. We discuss in each 
case study a number of criteria including the description of the product, its substitutes 
if any in consumption, the cost structure, industry structure, location of production, 
distribution mechanism, entry and exit to the market, technological change, buyers’ 
industry structure, the conspiracy, effects on consumers, effects on producers and 
finally, summary of industry trends post conviction. The information are not always 
available on all the criteria aforementioned. We depended mainly on reports, 
newspaper clips or articles, and existing studies undertaken as the main sources for 



















Case Study of Steel Industry (Rebar) in Egypt 
1. Description of Product 
The steel industry is an integrated industry with three stages of production. The rebar 
is the final product that is produced from the three stages of production. 
 
2. Substitutes in Consumption 
There are no substitutes to the rebar in the construction sector. Imports of the rebar 
steel are highly similar to the domestically produced one, though with a better quality 
and higher prices. 
 
3. Cost Structure 
The rebar manufacturing represents 20-40% of the value added whereas the billet 
manufacturing constitutes 60-80%. This implies that producers of billet are the ones 
who incur larger effects with world price changes than the ones that produce rebar 
only. The investment costs of the rolling firms (producing rebar only) is much lower 
per ton of rebar output than that of the integrated facilities and their margins of risk 
should be correspondingly lower. 
 
4. Industry Structure 
The steel industry in Egypt was subject to total government ownership for almost 
three decades until the mid-1990s. In the mid-nineties, the private sector started 
investing in the industry through the establishment of green field projects and the 
acquisition of state-owned companies. During the 3-year period 1998-2001, 7 new 
companies entered the market followed by another 2 new companies in year 2002. In 
2004, 95% of the current installed capacity was in the hands of the private sector. 
 
There are 19 producers of steel (rebar) in Egypt. The industry has high concentration 
with the largest three firms accounting for 80% of the market (see Table 1.). In Egypt 
most of the firms focus only on the last stage (rebar production). There are only three 
firms that have integrated facilities which include Alexandria National Iron and Steel 
(ANSDK), the largest company in the sector, Al Ezz Steel Rebars (ESR), the second 
largest and the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company, which is relatively a small 
producer. The remainder of the capacity consists of rolling mills that import billets (a 
semi finished product) for the manufacture of rebar. Egypt’s two largest rebar 
producers, ANSDK and ESR, merged in 1999 to form EZDK. ESR owns a 20% stake 
in ANSDK. Both companies market their production under a single brand which 
accounts for more than 70% of local market share (distributed in equal shares between 
ANSDK and ESR). Since 2002, EZDK started to lose market share as a result of the 
entry of new firms (e.g. Arcosteel), the resumption of production at other firms (e.g. 
Egyptian Metal Co. (Hatem), and the addition of new capacity to existing firms (e.g. 
Beshay Group and Al Attal National Steel Rolling Mill). The dominance of EZDK 
reduced heavily competition and inter-firm rivalry in the steel market. In fact it 
created a leadership model type of oligopoly where one firm leads the market and 
other follows.  
 
Table 1: Market Share of Steel Companies, Rebar 
  (Percent) 
Company 1991 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
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Al Watanya Al Baraka Co. 5 6 - - - - - - 
Al Ezz Steel  - 2.00 7.42 8.14 5.56 3.60 3.31 2.97 
Al Ezz Steel Rebars - - 20.32 26.29 24.28 23.44 22.10 21.62 
Total Ezz - 2.00 27.74 34.43 29.84 27.04 25.42 24.59 
Alex. National Iron & Steel Co. (ANSDK) 54.85 57.48 42.34 38.02 38.48 42.58 46.57 52.57 
EZDK 54.85 59.49 70.08 72.45 68.32 69.62 71.99 77.16 
International Steel Rolling Mills - - 6.81 9.40 8.53 3.95 1.90 - 
Egyptian /American for Steel Rolling  - - - - 1.53 9.69 8.04 4.01 
Total Beshay - - 6.81 9.40 10.05 13.64 9.94 4.01 
Kouta Steel Group 19.75 17.16 8.91 4.73 3.80 2.48 2.16 2.17 
Al Attal National Steel Rolling Mill - - - - 1.27 2.91 3.17 3.55 
Egyptian Metals Co.(Hatem) 5.49 4.77 1.98 0.28 1.27 0.43 0.14 - 
Egyptian Iron & Steel Co. 3.07 2.67 1.39 1.20 1.44 0.86 0.89 1.13 
National Metal Industries Co. 0.93 0.81 0.42 0.13 - - - - 
Delta Steel Mills 5.05 4.39 2.28 2.81 3.00 1.61 1.64 1.80 
Egyptian Copper Works Co. 1.87 1.62 0.84 0.69 0.17 - - - 
Misr Iron & Steel Co. - - 0.59 1.04 1.01 0.72 0.78 0.73 
Al Menoufeya Steel Co. - - 1.14 1.33 1.21 0.72 0.61 0.46 
Suez Co. For Steel Trading (Al Koumy) - - 2.03 1.14 1.04 0.58 0.81 1.31 
Al Said For Steel 2.74 2.38 1.24 0.85 1.32 0.72 0.86 0.80 
Ayyad For Metal Rolling - - 0.89 1.10 1.18 1.21 1.64 1.53 
Al Arabi Plant For Metals (Sharkawi) - - 0.82 0.41 - - - - 
Al Temsah Steel Plant 1.32 1.14 0.59 0.69 0.52 0.37 0.35 0.37 
Sarhan Steel - - - 1.33 2.51 1.07 0.86 1.04 
Arcosteel  - - - 0.41 1.90 2.28 1.24 1.22 
Al Attayya For Steel - - - - - 0.43 0.78 0.34 
National Port Said For Steel - - - - - 0.35 1.79 2.05 
El Maghrbel - - - - - - 0.35 0.34 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Unpublished data 
 
5. Location of Production 
There is no specific location for production of the rebar. Firms are spread all over the 
country, however concentrated in the so called industrial areas. 
 
6. Distribution Mechanism 
The firms in this industry have the ability to distribute their products domestically 
without major bottlenecks. This is not the case with exportation which is limited to a 
number of firms that are able to cope with the standards and quality needed in the 
importing markets. 
 
Despite the squeezing of profit margins of rebar producers due to the over supply in 
2000 and 2001, they were unable to export this over supply as a result of the low 
global prices which did not provide a hospitable environment for exporting. In 2001, 
local rebar prices were approximately US $236 whilst export prices averaged US 
$200. Moreover, exports do not constitute a large share of total production where they 
account for only 13% of total production and exporting is confined to two producers 
only, ANSDK and ESR.  
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At some points in the price cycle, it was rational for local producers to export rather 
than to cut production, not only to lower average costs but also to source foreign 
currency, which had become rationed at official exchange rates. The foreign currency 
shortage caused some producers to enter into a "vicious circle"; where in order to 
export producers needed foreign exchange for production, and in order to obtain 
dollars for production, they needed to export. In addition, Egyptian exports of rebar 
are limited for two main reasons. First, a very limited number of domestic mills are 
capable of producing material of a high enough quality for the export market, and 
second, even for those who can export, prevailing prices in potential export market 
fall slightly below domestic prices. Hence firms preferred to cut down their 
production rather than exporting to overcome the over supply problem. 
 
The export outlook darkened for most countries as a result of the imposition of a tariff 
ranging between 15% and 30% on rebar and flat steel imports by the US in March 
2002. The EU reacted by issuing a similar decree with tariffs ranging between 14.9% 
and 26.0%. This had a combined effect on local exporters, as 80% to 90% of Egyptian 
steel exports end up in either the US or the EU. Egypt obtained an exclusion from US 
tariffs (as did Israel and Jordan). However, US imposed an import quota for Egypt 
that was subject to periodic revision. Egypt was exempted from EU tariffs on rebar 
but not on flat steel. Overall, the effect on Egyptian producers was positive as they 
benefited from higher export prices to the US. Rebar export prices rose to US $260 
per ton in 2002, from US $200 per ton in 2001. However, Egyptian exporters 
benefited from higher prices only on the volumes set by the quotas which were 
confined to the two natural exporters ANDSK and ESR and other new exporters who 
were trying to upgrade the quality of their products. As a result exports percentage of 
total production rose slightly to more than 15% in 2003. 
 
Regarding the Egyptian rebar trade balance, it remained positive where exports 
exceeded imports, due to the persistent increase in the production capacity of the 
firms in Egypt since mid 1990s and the difficulties encountered in importing. Hence, 
even when the government relaxed the imports restrictions to press the prices down, 
importing of rebar did not surge. Among the main reasons are that steel is one of the 
products where its importation require full cover of the letter of credit (reaching 
100%) which causes difficulties in its importation, and the distribution channels are 
highly constrained. 
 
7. Entry or Exit 
Despite the high concentration in the steel rebar market which has been increasing 
over time due to the dominance of EZDK the market experienced entry of new firms 
even in 2001 and 2002. The entrance of the new firms led to the dominant player’s 
decline in its market share. Exit has also been experienced by a number of firms in the 
market. However the easy entry and exist to the market did not lead to enhanced 
competition and inter firm rivalry as the dominancy of the leading company 
continued. 
 
8. Technological Change 
The steel industry is not a high tech industry. However upgraded machines are needed 
to satisfy the quality required in the importing markets. In fact, lack of technological 
upgrading has prevented many firms from enjoying the ability to export. 
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9. Buyers' Industry Structure 
There are no specific characteristic of the buyers’ industry structure where the whole 
construction industry (which includes firms, individuals, and the government) deals 
with the steel market either directly or through distributors. 
 
The steel rebar industry did not suffer price fluctuations or sharp increases before 
1999. The price fluctuations started since 1999 onwards. As described above, starting 
2000 declining demand and rising supply resulted in a large gap which prevented 
producers from raising prices due to the existence of over supply. This was 
exacerbated by a decline in the price of rebar imports in 2001, especially from the 
former Soviet countries and the Far East. Furthermore, there was pressure both from 
the government and the public to prevent price rises subsequent to the devaluation of 
December 2001.  
 
In 2002 the Egyptian rebar market was still facing problems. Much of the decline in 
demand stemmed from the huge decline in public sector construction projects which 
have resulted in the fortunes of the construction industry becoming increasingly 
dependant upon private sector activity. Unfortunately, this meant that the construction 
activity and hence rebar demand has become more sensitive to the price of building 
materials. This explains the large decline in rebar sales in early 2002, when the 
increased costs of production for the rebar producers, resulted in sizeable price 
increases. Buyers were unwilling to pay such prices and consequently withdrew from 
the market. 
 
However, in mid 2002, local producers could no longer support the weak pricing 
environment, where a rise in importing costs could not be passed on to customers 
(especially after devaluation), and raised prices by approximately 35% from L.E.1100 
to L.E.1500 per ton from June to July 2002. ESR/ANSDK led this price rise (see 
Table 2.). They were helped by a rise in international steel prices. However, 
competitive pressure and public opposition pushed prices back down.   
 
Table 2: Steel Rebars Prices during the Period 1999-2004 (L.E per Ton) 
Year  EZDK Others 
Average Price (Annual)  1,109 1,021 
Max 1,240 1,119 1999 
Min 1,025 942 
Average Price (Annual) 1,175 1,015 
Max 1,188 1,034 2000 
Min 1,150 994 
Average Price (Annual) 1,184 1,090 
Max 1,214 1,132 2001 
Min 1,164 1,066 
Average Price (Annual) 1,425 1,366 
Max 1,623 1,581 2002 
Min 1,247 1,172 
Average Price (Annual) 2,073 2,075 
Max 2,542 2,742 2003 
Min 1,551 1,584 
Average Price (Annual) 2,991 2,942 2004 
Max 3,198 3,250 
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Min 2,685 2,727 
Source: Unpublished Data. 
 
Helped by a weakening of the exchange rate on the parallel market towards the end of 
2002, steel prices began to rise again. With the devaluation of late January 2003, rebar 
prices rose significantly and reached L.E. 2,030 per ton in April 2003, up from L.E. 
1275 in April 2002 per ton a year earlier, a rise of more than 50%.  
 
In 2004 prices jumped to L.E. 2605 per ton, which although high remains lower than 
comparable countries in the region. For example the price in Saudi Arabia was L.E. 
3148 per ton, L.E. 4185 in UAE and L.E. 3550 in Kuwait, L.E. 3404 in Jordan, and 
L.E. 3456 in Syria. 
 
Besides the devaluation which led to such sharp increases in the prices of rebar, the 
high profit margin of distributors was among the main culprits for this increase in 
prices. However, there were several other exogenous factors that led to this sharp 
increase in prices. Among such reasons are the following: 1) increase in price of 
inputs (mainly billet) worldwide; 2) high demand of China ; 3) increase in price of 
transport after Iraq war; 4) increase in demand by countries working in reconstruction 
of Iraq; 5) flourishing of construction and economic activity in some Arab countries 
which increased demand on steel; 6) increased inventory by some traders who used to 
have large inventories of steel during Iraq war to sell it after the end of the war with 
high prices. 
 
In 2004, local prices seem to have stabilized at around the US $ 450 level or L.E. 
2,900 with slight fluctuations after the sharp increase it reached mid 2004 where it 
approached L.E. 3250 per ton (approx. 450US $). 
 
10. The Conspiracy 
ANSDK was established in 1982. In 2005 it had a market share of 37% and has been 
the largest steel producer in Egypt. It is also the largest player in the Egyptian steel 
rebar market. The principal shareholders include a number of Egyptian public sector 
organizations, the general public, a Japanese consortium and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). ESR owns 20 % of its shares whereas ANSDK employees share 
holder owns another 11.8% and the Government and state owned entities own 45% of 
the shares. In 1999, ESR (founded in 1994 and controlled effectively by Ahmed Ezz 
who owns 73% of its shares) acquired 20% of ANSDK and its management control 
(renamed Ezz Dekhila EZDK). Ahmed Ezz, the founder of ESR, manages both 
companies, implying that he controls more than 65% of the market. In addition, ESR 
has also invested 30.6% in a start-up, Al Ezz Flat Steel (EFS), also controlled by 
Ahmed Ezz. This implies that Ahmed Ezz is in a dominant position of controlling the 
decisions in the steel market in general and in the rebar market in specific1, specially 
that if we take into account that ANSDK and ESR are two of the only three firms in 
Egypt that have integrated facilities for production of both billet and rebar. ESR and 
ANSDK have combined their brands for marketing purposes under a new brand 
'EZDK'. The acquisition of ESR of ANSDK created negative sentiment in the market 
towards the new entity and antitrust issues were raised for the first time.  
 
                                                 
1 It is possible that Mr. Ezz controls a further 18% held by a Luxembourg offshore company. 
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During July 2002, some local firms have attempted to kick demand. Beshay Group 
initiated a series of price cuts seen in August 2002. Within two weeks the firm 
implemented two separate L.E. 80/tonne declines. This was greeted by a sharp price 
cut by EZDK, which Beshay, as well as other firms could not match. As argued by 
some commentators a deal was reached between Ezz and the other firms to stop such 
price war. The result has been that prices have begun to rise again, but remained 
below levels seen at the beginning of August. 
 
It was argued by rebar producers that Ezz was behind initiating the antidumping cases 
against the imported billet which reached four cases in the period 1998-2003 (see 
below) and relatively increased in frequency after the merge of EZDK. According to 
the rebar producers, the only beneficiary from such dumping is EZDK and that public 
interest has not been taken in consideration. Ezz argued back that he is among the 
largest importers of billet and that he has suffered from the rise in price due to the 
imposition of antidumping duties.  
 
Besides, the speculation about this legal anticompetitive behavior through initiating 
these series of antidumping duties, Ezz undertook several legal measures that 
increased his domination of the market. His political muscles (being a member of the 
ruling party, a parliament member, and the head of the planning and budget 
committee in the parliament) in addition to the soft budget constraint he enjoys due to 
his dominance of the market allowed him to initiate several measures that could kick 
other competitors out of the market. Moreover, and because of his soft budget 
constraint, he was able to undertake several measures during recession, which cannot 
be maintained by other firms, to increase his market share. For example, EZDK 
reintroduced credit sales. In an attempt to stimulate demand, EZDK once again 
accepted credit sales in August, 2002. Whilst a positive move for the market as a 
whole, it has meant that dumping of EZDK material has resumed. Moreover, EZDK 
linked compensation offer to contract quantities. In an environment where prices are 
expected to fall, buyers often delay their purchases. In order to eliminate such 
practice, EZDK offered a compensation package whereby if prices are cut; the 
company will refund the difference on 50% of the previous month’s purchases. Such 
initiatives introduced by EZDK allowed the company to increase its market share by 
over 1% to reach 67%. In contrast, Beshay group’s sales as a proportion of apparent 
consumption fell again to around 12%. However, and despite less production in 2002 
than 2001, Beshay and another firm have commissioned new lines. 
 
In 2004, it was argued that the Ezz was behind the skyrocketing of prices of rebar. 
The government had to interfere by asking the General Authority for Auditing2 to 
write a report on the reasons behind the sharp increase in prices of rebar. Surprisingly 
during the investigations and writing of the report3, EZDK reduced its pries to reach 
L.E. 2750 for one ton after including taxes where it was L.E. 3250 before the General 
Authority for Auditing issued its report. This sudden decrease in prices show the 
monopolistic attitude of Ezz firms as the prices worldwide did not decrease with the 
same percentage in addition to the fact that the firms that are vertically integrated are 
not affected negatively by world price changes as others that are not. However, and 
                                                 
2 This Authority is an independent body that monitors all PUBLIC firms’ auditing files to report any 
corruption incidents. 
3 The report is confidential and is not allowed to be circulated. It was allowed only for some members 
of the parliament to review it. 
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despite such decrease in prices, it still did not reach the fair price where the real cost 
of producing one ton in 2003 reached L.E. 1719 (as confirmed by some producers) 
which when added to it financial costs of L.E.123 for each ton show that prices are 
still overvalued. 
 
A final signal of prevailing anticompetitive behavior was the reduction of the prices 
of rebar by L.E. 150 per ton after the removal of the antidumping duties in 2004, 
which confirms that Ezz has misused his dominant position in raising prices (see 
Table 3.). 
Table 3: Steel Rebar Prices after Stopping Antidumping Duties (L.E. per Ton) 
Month EZDK Others 
January 2,685 2,727 
February 2,832 2,890 
March 3,124 3,250 
April 3,198 3,222 
May 2,901 2,755 
June 2,695 2,768 
July 2,695 2,917 
August 3,175 2,962 
September 3,184 2,974 
October 3,184 2,983 
November 3,184 2,996 
December 3,037 2,860 
Average 2004 2,991 2,942 
Source: Unpublished Data. 
 
 
Contrary to the argument mentioned above that integrated firms are able to absorb 
price shocks, some commentators argue the opposite. Because the manufacturing of 
rebar represents only a minor portion of the cost structure (see above), it is the 
producers of billet who incur larger effects with price fluctuations in the international 
market. Hence, in 2000 and 2001, the significant fall in international steel prices, 
including that for billet, led to an expansion in the margins of rolling firms (producing 
rebar only) relative to those at integrated producers. The price of inputs for the 
integrated producers did not drop as much as it did for the rolling mills which affected 
negatively their profitability in a more acute manner than affecting that of the firms 
producing rebar only. Indeed, this disparity has led to a debate in Egypt as to whether 
billet imports should be subject to extra duties to protect local billet producers. 
 
The lack of availability of foreign currency was another constraint facing all 
producers forcing them to reduce production further and raising average costs even 
more. However, by the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, after further 
weakening of the exchange rate, local steel prices began to rise. The poor 
environment faced by local producers since 2000 has caused some firms to close their 
operations (such as Ahleya for Metallurgies and the Arabic Company for 
Metallurgies). The contraction in demand for steel in Egypt from 2000 not only 
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coincided with an expansion in capacity but also with the devaluation of the L.E. The 
devaluation raised the L.E. cost of production for companies because 55% to 85% of 
their costs are foreign currency dominated. Some firms were operating at a capacity 
utilization rate of as low as 8%. Others, such as ANSDK, although keeping the 
utilization rate at 73% in 2000, had a severe cash crunch. In integrated facilities, the 
raw materials used in the manufacturing of billet are either scrap, such as that used at 
ESR, or oxide pellets (treated iron ore) used at ANSDK. Internationally, there has 
always been a time lag between fluctuations in rebar prices and fluctuations in raw 
material prices (scrap, oxide pellets and billets). This time lag is sometimes in favor of 
steel producers, depending on which steel product is leading the price move. For 
example if rebar prices rise before raw material prices, this is in favor of steel 
producers and vice versa. 
 
Differences in the price fluctuations of steel products are a function of the magnitude 
of price movements as well as the aforementioned time lags. Sometimes rebar prices 
experience a steeper rise compared to those for billet or scrap and vice versa. In 2002, 
rebar export prices rose by 19% to US $ 240 per ton, whilst billet prices rose by 12% 
to US $200 per ton and scrap prices rose by a huge 26% to US $130 per ton. 
Matching the international trend, local rebar prices also rose by 23% in 2002 to an 
equivalent of US $274 per ton. As a result, in 2002, integrated local rebar producers 
using scrap as raw material in manufacturing billet, were at a disadvantage to rolling 
mills importing billets directly. This meant that the margins of integrated producers 
such as ESR were hit harder than those of the rolling mills such as Beshay despite the 
former having a lower foreign currency exposure in its production cost base than the 
latter. 
 
On the other hand, integrated producers using oxide pellets as raw materials, such as 
ANSDK, suffered the least in 2002 as oxide pellet prices dropped 4.6% to US $ 41 
per ton. ANSDK was further helped by having the lowest level of foreign currency 
exposure in its cost base. It is worth noting that the price of oxide pellets is set 
annually and is not determined at the London Metal Exchange (LME) as is the case 
with other steel products. 
 
The price war is a reflection of the natural phenomenon of the excess of capacity over 
demand makes without intentions of anticompetitive behavior. New entrants and new 
lines have added to the downward pressure on prices. Once market share stabilizes 
among the different players, downward pressure on prices should decrease. The 
logical next step would be for an exit of high cost producers. High cost producers fall 
into two categories: Those private sector players with either small scale or inefficient 
facilities and state players with old-fashioned facilities and overstaffing. 
Uncompetitive private sector players will either engage in consolidation or exit the 
market. 
 
The contraction in demand for steel in Egypt (which is a function of the construction 
industry that has been heavily hit by the liquidity squeeze of 1999) coincided with an 
expansion in capacity and the devaluation of the L.E. The devaluation raised the L.E. 
cost of production for firms because 55% to 85% of their costs are dollar 
denominated. In 2002, the supply/demand imbalance meant that Egyptian steel 
producers were unable to raise their L.E. selling prices to fully respond to an increase 
in their costs. As a result, margins contracted severely. Furthermore, capacity 
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utilization plunged as a result of both capacity expansions and a decline in the demand 
for steel. The drop in capacity utilization further increased average costs. Some local 
producers reacted by extending credit to their customers so as to defend their market 
share and encourage sales in a weak demand environment. This resulted in a jump in 
receivables days on hand for some producers occurring concurrently with a rise in 
borrowing rates, causing a significant rise in interest expense. Other producers 
accumulated large amounts of inventory of finished products taking their working 
capital needs to unsustainably high levels. 
 
One line of argument is that the ESR/ANSDK deal saved the local market from a 
further plunge in prices. However, we would argue that with or without this deal, the 
largest producers would have reached a consensus to stabilize prices, as had always 
been the case before the merger.  
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11. Effect on Consumers and Producers 
Over the period 1995 to 1999, growth in consumption was sufficient to absorb the 
entrance of newly established private sector firms, where it reached a compounded 
annual growth rate of 18%. In fact the rebar consumption grew from 1.8 million tons in 
1991 to 4.2 million tons in 1999 due to a surge in construction activity and increased 
private sector participation in the economy. However, the drop in consumption from 2000 
(by 20% from 1999), and no growth rate in 2001 and a further decline by 5% in 2002, 
together with continued capacity increases, created a very large gap between supply and 
demand. In 2002, local consumption was equivalent to only 60% of installed capacity 
down from almost 100% in 1999. The rush by the private sector into this industry led it to 
over invest. Over 1995-99, growth in consumption was sufficient to absorb the entry of 
private sector firms. However, the drop in consumption which started in 2000 created a 
very large gap between supply and demand. This was exacerbated by further private 
sector investments in 2001, which had been planned in earlier years. In 2000, Egypt 
produced 3.4 million tons (14.5% of Middle East production). In 2001 and 2002, capacity 
reached 5.5 million tons in both years whereas consumption was a mere 3.3 and 3.1 
million tons in each year respectively. See Tables 4A and 4B for the evolution of 
production and consumption over the period 1995-1999.  
 
Table 4A: The Evolution of Production of Rebar by Producer (1991-2004) (In    
thousand tons) 
Company 1991 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Al Watanya Al Baraka Co. - - - - - - - - 
Al Ezz Steel  - 42 300 258 193 125 115 97 
Al Ezz Steel Rebars - - 821 833 843 813 767 707 
Total Ezz - 42 1,121 1,091 1,036 938 882 804 
Alex. National Iron & Steel Co. (ANSDK) 1,000 1,206 1,711 1,205 1,336 1,477 1,616 1,719 
EZDK 1,000 1,248 2,832 2,296 2,372 2,415 2,498 2,523 
International Steel Rolling Mills - - 275 298 - - 66 - 
Egyptian /American for Steel Rolling  - - - - - - 279 131 
Total Beshay - - 275 298 - - 345 131 
Kouta Steel Group 360 360 360 150 - - 75 71 
Al Attal National Steel Rolling Mill - - - - - - 110 116 
Egyptian Metals Co.(Hatem) 100 100 80 9 44 15 5 - 
Egyptian Iron & Steel Co. 56 56 56 38 - - 31 37 
National Metal Industries Co. 17 17 17 4 - - - - 
Delta Steel Mills 92 92 92 89 - - 57 59 
Egyptian Copper Works Co. 34 34 34 22 - - - - 
Misr Iron & Steel Co. - - 24 33 - - 27 24 
Al Menoufeya Steel Co. - - 46 42 - - 21 15 
Suez Co. for Steel Trading (Al Koumy) - - 82 36 - - 28 43 
Al Said for Steel 50 50 50 27 - - 30 26 
Ayyad for Metal Rolling - - 36 35 - - 57 50 
Al Arabi Plant For Metals (Sharkawi) - - 33 13 - - - - 
Al Temsah Steel Plant 24 24 24 22 - - 12 12 
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Sarhan Steel - - - 42 - - 30 34 
Arcosteel - - - 13 - - 43 40 
Al Attayya for Steel - - - - - - 27 11 
National Port Said for Steel - - - - - - 62 67 
El Maghrbel - - - - - - 12 11 
Total 1,733 1,981 4,041 3,169 2,416 2,430 3,470 3,270 
Source: Unpublished data 
 
 
Table 4B: The Evolution of Consumption of Rebar over the Period 1991-2004 (In      
thousand tons) 
 1991 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Company 1991 Qty Qty Qty Qty Qty Qty Qty 
Al Watanya Al Baraka Co. 90 117 - - - - - - 
Al Ezz Steel  - 42 301 216 231 120 118 97 
Al Ezz Steel Rebars - - 846 811 810 633 651 605 
Total Ezz - 42 1,147 1,027 1,041 753 769 702 
Alex. National Iron & Steel Co. (ANSDK) 942 986 1,375 1,231 1,215 1,278 1,345 1,310 
EZDK 942 1,028 2,522 2,258 2,256 2,031 2,114 2,012 
International Steel Rolling Mills - - 275 298 296 137 66 - 
Egyptian /American for Steel Rolling - - - - 53 336 259 131 
Total Beshay - - 275 298 349 473 325 131 
Kouta Steel Group 130 360 360 150 132 86 75 71 
Al Attal National Steel Rolling Mill - - - - 44 101 99 69 
Egyptian Metals Co.(Hatem) 100 100 80 9 42 15 5 - 
Egyptian Iron & Steel Co. 56 56 56 38 50 30 31 37 
National Metal Industries Co. 17 17 17 4 - - - - 
Delta Steel Mills 92 92 92 89 104 56 57 59 
Egyptian Copper Works Co. 34 34 34 22 6 - - - 
Misr Iron & Steel Co. - - 24 33 35 25 27 24 
Al Menoufeya Steel Co. - - 46 42 42 25 21 15 
Suez Co. For Steel Trading (Al Koumy) - - 82 36 36 20 28 43 
Al Said For Steel 50 50 50 27 46 25 30 26 
Ayyad For Metal Rolling - - 36 35 41 42 57 50 
Al Arabi Plant For Metals (Sharkawi) - - 33 13 - - - - 
Al Temsah Steel Plant 24 24 24 22 18 13 12 12 
Sarhan Steel - - - 42 87 37 30 34 
Arcosteel - - - 13 66 79 43 40 
Al Attayya For Steel - - - - - 15 27 11 
National Port Said For Steel - - - - - 12 62 55 
El Maghrbel - - - - - - 12 11 
Total 1,535 1,878 3,731 3,131 3,354 3,085 3,055 2,700 
Imports 219 437 426 85 36 32 - - 
Total Consumption 1,754 2,315 4,157 3,216 3,390 3,117 3,055 2,700 
Source: Unpublished data 
 
 
With local consumption in 2002 falling by 5% to 3.1 million tons as a result of the low 
level of construction activity and the overall recession, competition in 2002 and the 
following years was even fiercer than in 2001. Egypt's annual steel consumption was in 
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the range of 65 kg per capita in 2001 whilst GDP per capita was US $1500. This is 
significantly lower than for other countries with similar levels of GDP per capita and 
suggests some room for growth even if we assume that GDP per capita does not grow. In 
2004, several measures (see below) were undertaken to enhance consumption by relaxing 
restrictions on imports. However, such measures did not increase imports as they 
remained largely constrained. 
 
12. Summary of Industry Trends Post-Conviction 
The government has intervened on ad hoc basis due to the absence of a competition law. 
In many instances, it was perceived that the government actions were not strong enough 
to control the anticompetitive behavior.  
 
The government reactions varied from protecting the dominant position of the largest 
market controller to dismantling such protection. The intervention was always based on 
different grounds. For example, it was argued that the Egyptian government played a 
significant role in sheltering the local steel industry from the ravages of a depressed 
global pricing environment in 2000 and 2001. Hence, it imposed antidumping duties on 
imports of rebar, billet, and oxide pellets and scrap which were already subject to 
relatively high tariffs of 23%, 7%, and 4% respectively (including all government 
charges). In addition the government has implemented anti-dumping laws and duties of 
over 40% on imports from selected countries. An example of government action with 
regard to low steel prices can be seen in the way in which it dealt with rebar imports from 
Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Turkey and Russia in different years. Anti-dumping 
duties of between 22.6% and 61% were imposed on steel (rebar and billet) coming from 
Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Latvia. The antidumping cases 
raised by the Egyptian Antidumping Authority against steel products reached 4 cases out 
of a total of 18 general antidumping cases raised between 1998 and 2003 (22%) As a 
result, Egypt imported only 85,000 tons of rebar in 2000, 36,000 tons in 2001, and 32,000 
tons in 2002, a significant drop from the 440,000 tons imported in 1999.  
 
 
In 2004, the government’s position changed dramatically. First, it asked the General 
Authority for Auditing to write a report and investigate the reasons behind the surge in 
prices, which if would have chosen anticompetitive behavior could have led to serious 
repercussions on Mr. Ezz, however the report did not show that but it recommend the 
enactment of a competition law and reduction of tariffs and antidumping duties. Second, 
with the change of the government in July 2004, the Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Industry undertook an action by stopping the antidumping duties on rebar and billet in 
August 2004. He did not abolish antidumping duties but stopped them to ensure that if 
world market prices increased he can reassume the antidumping duties to protect the 
domestic industry. Another decision of reducing tariffs on steel from 20% to 5% 
preceded the decision of stopping antidumping duties. Some believe that this will help to 
enhance domestic competition however others believe that stopping antidumping duties 
will allow the large producers to increase domestic prices, especially the domestic costs 
of production increased  to reach a selling price of L.E. 3250 for one ton including taxes 
and profits of distributors whereas the imported price reached L.E. 3500. In addition 
obstacles to importation which include decision by Central Bank of Egypt of full 
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coverage of letter of credit and absence of dealers and importers in this field can lead to 
negative effects on the industry.  
 
The interventions of the government aimed at the beginning to shield the domestic 
producers from foreign competition. Government’s intervention changed in 2004 by 
trying to enhance competition. Inter firm rivalry should have been affected accordingly, 
but the impact was insignificant in both cases. 
 
The rebar case study points at the abuse of dominant position, rather than cartel and 
collusion. As the case study has revealed, whether there has been actual abuse of 
dominant position or not is debatable. The government’s intervention has been on ad hoc 
manner without clear view of whether it wants to protect certain segment of the steel 
industry or benefit the whole society even if at the expense of fair competition. 
 
What is evident is this case is that the two hypothesizes of hard budget constraint and 
trade policy play a role in affecting the competition status in a certain market. For 
example, during the price surge, the large firms were able to extend credit facilities (due 
to their enjoyment of soft budget constraints) to increase their sales where other firms 
failed to. Such behavior intensified the status of unfair competition. Moreover, the 
reduction of tariffs and stopping antidumping duties were seen as necessary, but not 
sufficient conditions to enact competition in this industry. The inability to bear the fruits 
of fierce competition from rebar imports was a result of other internal constrains 
embedded in the difficulty of importing which rendered the reduction in tariffs and 
stopping of antidumping duties useless to a great extent. The steel case study confirms 
the main theme of the study project which is enhancing private sector does not 
necessarily imply more intense competition. The steel industry case study that enhancing 
private sector without undertaking the necessary institutional arrangements can result in 
negative consequences. The delay in introducing such institutional arrangements (e.g. the 
competition law) could render many of the pro-competitive policies as liberal trade 




Case Study of the Egyptian Cement Industry Case 
1. Description of Product 
Cement in general is not a homogenous product and there exists several types of cement. 
However, for the sake of this case study we do not differentiate between different types 
of cement as it will not affect our analysis. Our focus is on the cement used in the 
construction process. 
 
2. Substitutes in Consumption 
There are no substitutes for the cement used for construction. However, the imported 
cement is a perfect substitute for the domestically produced one. 
 
3. Cost Structure 
In general, cement industry depends heavily on imports where the domestically utilized 
inputs for the production of one ton do not exceed 10% of the costs of production. 
 
4. Industry Structure 
The industry started in Egypt by establishment of Torah factory in 1927 (joint venture 
between Switzerland and Egypt) and Helwan in 1929 (joint venture between Denmark 
and Egypt). Alexandria Cement (joint capital between Torah and Helwan) was 
established in 1949, followed by National in 1956. In 1961 Torah, Helwan and 
Alexandria were nationalized. Afterwards the Government of Egypt (GOE) established a 
number of factories including Suez Cement in 1967, Assuit in 1985, Ameriyah in 1989, 
Beni Suef in 1992, Misria in 1996, and Misr Qena in 1997.  
 
In the early 1990s, the entire cement sector was state-owned. Today, approximately 70% 
of the Egyptian cement sector capacity is partially or wholly owned by multinational 
firms. Starting late 1990s, the private sector started entering the market and a number of 
private firms were established. This happened in two ways: either through the 
establishment of greenfield plants (Egyptian Company for Cement (ECC), Misr Beni 
Suef, Sinai, Qena) or the acquisition by private companies of franchises previously 
owned by the state4. In an attempt to champion the domestic state-owned players, the 
government actively pushed Suez Cement, itself majority state-owned at the time, to 
acquire a 66% stake in Torah Cement, in the face of a bid from ECC. Suez Cement 
funded the deal through the state owned National Bank of Egypt. In late 2001, Helwan 
Cement was sold to the Arab Swiss Engineering Company (ASEC). ASEC is 51% owned 
by Suez Cement, Torah, Helwan, Alexandria and National. 
 
Multinationals were attracted to Egypt by the large and growing market with healthy 
margins in the late 1990s. Low energy and labor costs were an advantage, besides the 
geographical position of Egypt. Those producers with relatively modern plants, such as 
Ameriyah and Suez Cement, managed to have very high profit margins in the late 1990s. 
                                                 
4 The privatization started by selling 42% of Misr for Cement to Holokom, in 1999 it sold 95% of Beni Suif 
Cement to Lafrage, and 96% of Assut Cement to CEMEX. In 2000, 88% of Alexandria for Cement was 
sold to Blue Circle, and 91% of Cement Amreya was sold to French company SIMPOR and 34% of Suez 
Cement to French Cimentiahi Group. 
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The economic slowdown led to a collapse in the growth of demand in 2000-02 and left 
producers stuck with excess cement capacity which was the time when multinationals 
started entering heavily in the market. 
 
In 1999 when the privatization process started, the housing bubble had already been burst 
and the real estate sector was suffering a severe slump, which was bound to have an 
effect on demand for cement. Furthermore, on the supply side, sizeable new capacity was 
expected to enter the market: By 1999, ECC had already started operations and was 
expecting to add an additional 3 million tons of new capacity over the following three 
years. With a planned total capacity of 7 million tons, ECC alone added capacity equals 
to almost 30% of the total existing market capacity of the time. Sinai Cement started 
operations in 2000, adding around 1.4 million tons. Qena and Misr Beni Suef were in the 
pre-operation stage and were expected to add a total of almost 3 million tons. 
 
In 1999, Suez Cement and Torah Cement were the market leaders. However, since 1999, 
they have lost market leadership to other producers, especially the two leading private 
sector companies; Assuit (Cemex) and ECC (Holokom /OCI) which were able to take 
market share away from government controlled firms through better management, 
innovative distribution and aggressive marketing techniques. Another important factor in 
the gain in market share of ECC and the loss of market share at Torah, Helwan and 
National was that ECC brought on stream very efficient methods of production at the 
same time as Torah, Helwan and National were operating inefficiently.  
 
The entry of the private sector represented a turning point in the market. Since that entry 
of the private sector in the market the share of government investments in this sector 
decreased from 33% of total investments in 1991 to 13% in 2001. It must be borne in 
mind that investments made at the time were a function of the availability of franchises. 
In other words, if the multinationals had not made the decision to invest in the Egyptian 
cement market at that time, it would have been difficult to predict when other franchises 
might be available for sale later, if at all or whether there would have been any left to buy 
given that other multinationals were keen buyers. The interest of multinationals to invest 
in the Egyptian market was a function of under supply and high profit margins. 
 
In 2004 the total number of firms in the cement market reached twelve companies. The 
multinationals were controlling and fully owning 40% of the total domestic market and 
the domestic private sector controlling (fully and partially) about 59%. Hence, the fully 
state owned firms were left with less than 1% of the market.  
 
The entry of private firms and especially multinationals enhanced competition and inter 
firm rivalry at the beginning, but afterwards such competition was reversed and some sort 
of cartel was formed hence minimizing competition and reducing inter firm rivalry. 
 
CEMEX wholly owns Assuit, and LAFRAGE owns Alexandria and Beni Suef, whereas 
ASIC controls the majority of shares in Portland. The Egyptian Company for Cement is 
the largest on the list of the domestic private firms followed by Sinai, and then South of 
Wadi and Kina where they control 59% of the market. The National Company for 
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Cement is the only firm owned by the government and its market share is 1%. Table 5. 
shows the privatization that happened since the mid 1990s in the cement market together 
with mergers and acquisitions whereas Table 6. shows the development of the market 
shares, exports and imports of cement in the period 1999 to 2002. 
 
Table 5: Privatizations, Mergers, and Acquisitions in the Cement Market (1999-
2006) 
Company  Acquirer Date  
Beni Suef Cement Lafarge – Titan 1999 
Alexandria Cement Blue Circle 1999 
Assuit Cement Cemex 1999 
Torah Cement Suez Cement 2000 
Ameriyah Cement Cimpor 2000 
Suez Cement Ciment Francais 2001 
Helwan Cement ASEC Cement 2001 
Blue Circle  Alexandria Cement 2004 
Ameriyah Cement Cimpor 2004 
Ciment Francais Ameriyah Cement 2005 
Beni Suef Cement Alexandria Cement 2005 
Ciment Francais Suez Cement 2005 
Orascom Construction Industries 
Egyptian Cement 
Company  2005 
Suez Cement ASEC for Cement 2005 
Suez Cement Ready Mix Birton (Egypt) 2006 
Suez Cement Ready Mix Birton 2006 
Source: EFG – Hermes (2004), Stock Market Exchange dataset. 
 
Table 6: Market Structure    






ECC 1531 5.6% 3459 13.1% 4824 18.0% 5476 20.4% 
Assuit Cement 3458 12.6% 3383 12.8% 3527 13.2% 4186 15.6% 
Suez Cement 3767 13.7% 3658 13.9% 3745 14.0% 3702 13.8% 
Torah Cement 3565 13.0% 3137 11.9% 2799 10.5% 2568 9.6% 
National Cement 2939 10.7% 2587 9.8% 2387 8.9% 2457 9.2% 
Ameriyah Cement 2500 9.1% 2600 9.9% 2488 9.3% 1882 7.0% 
Helwan Cement 3098 11.3% 2919 11.1% 2436 9.1% 1731 6.5% 
Beni Suef Cement 1278 4.6% 1336 5.1% 1466 5.5% 1432 5.3% 
Sinai Cement 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 917 3.4% 1240 4.6% 
Alexandria Cement 985 3.6% 981 3.7% 1088 4.1% 1215 4.5% 
Qena Cement 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 651 2.4% 
Misr Beni Suez 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Imports 4391  2296  1082  270  
Exports 0  0  0  1657  
Total Consumption 27512  26356  26759  26810  
Market Capacity 25300  27700  31300  33500  
O/W dry 21800  24200  27800  32700  
O/W wet 3500  3500  3500  800  
Market Gap (incl. wet) 2212  -1344  -4541  -6690  
Market Gap (excl. wet) 5712  2156  -1041  -5890  
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Source: Cement Council and EFG Hermes (2003) 
(Wet) refers to wet kilns currently operating, not those mothballed. 
 
5. Location of Production 
The cement industry is characterized by being regionally distributed where due to the 
nature of the product (being costly in terms of transport), production takes place near 
domestic markets or near ports. Table 7. shows the regional distribution of cement 
production in Egypt. 
 
Table 7: Main Sub Regional Markets 
Region Players 
Northern  Ameriyha and Alexandria Cement 
Central  Torah, Helwan, National, ECC, Suez 
Red Sea  Suez and ECC 
Southern  Qena, Assiut, Beni Suef, and Misr Beni Suef 
Sinai  Sinai Cement 
Sources: Cement Companies and EFG-Hermes 
 
 
6. Distribution Mechanism 
The distribution of the cement production has two channels, either domestically through 
dealers or for exporting. The dealers were accused of undertaking several anti-
competitive behaviors (see below) which resulted in the price increases in the domestic 
market. Moreover, the regional allocation of cement production led to several cheatings 
where firms were selling in regional markets in which they were not allowed to. 
 
If we focus on the international trade dimension of cement we find that Egypt’s status 
turned from being a net importer to being a net exporter in less than ten years. Such 
change resulted in affecting the distribution of cement on domestic basis. In 1993, Egypt 
was the second largest importer of cement all over the world. At that time, the price of 
one ton of cement was sold domestically at a price of L.E. 250 (which when converted to 
US $ using the exchange rate prevailing at that time was equal to 60US $). In 2003, the 
price of one ton sold domestically reached L.E. 270 (with the equivalent exchange rate of 
30 US $) which means that prices in terms of dollars were reduced by about 50%. 
Between 1993 and 2004 the price was down to L.E. 140 at the early 1990s (see Table 8. 
for the average prices between 1996 and 2001). Prices averaged plus or minus L.E. 148 in 
2001, declined in 2002 (ranged between L.E. 112 and L.E. 134) and rose up again in 
2003. The prices domestically are expected to continue rising where it increased by 22% 
between May 2003 and May 2004 from L.E. 180 for one ton to L.E. 220. In August 2004, 
the prices reached L.E. 300. 
 
The fluctuations in prices may appear as a result of simple supply-demand analysis. On 
the one hand, the slowing down in consumption which started in 1999 coincided with an 
increased number of new firms entering the market. This combination led to a rapid shift 
from supply deficiency to excess supply and hence lower prices and profit margins. On 
the other hand, the construction boom in the Gulf and the reconstruction of Iraq 
accompanied by the higher profit margins from exporting rather than selling domestically 
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are the main reasons behind the skyrocketing of prices in 2003 and 2004 where despite of 
excess capacity producers preferred exporting rather than selling in the domestic market. 
 
Table 8: The range of average product prices of three cement companies (Suez, 
Torah, Helwan) from 1996 to 2001: 
 
Year Average price 
1996  160.4 to 170.9 
1997  174.3 to 177.4 
1998  175.2 to 190.0 
1999  180.9 to 208.0 
2000  169.9 to 199.6 
2001  162.2 to 180.0 
Source: Cement Council (2002) 
 
 
Cement prices in Egypt are set at three different levels in the distribution chain: ex-
factory, wholesaler and retail. The ex-factory price includes the government sales tax and 
other taxes. End user prices are reached by adding transportation costs and margins for 
agents. Retail prices tend to vary widely, depending on market conditions and 
seasonality. During the period of strong demand (the summer months), retail prices can 
exceed wholesale prices by up to 25%-30%. Local prices of cement in Egypt increased 
dramatically over the period 1991-98 to reach a high of US $52 per ton in 1998. Since 
then, the rising trend has reversed and prices have declined, reaching an average level of 
US $33 per ton in 2002. In 2002, the cement market witnessed a very tough pricing 
environment. Ex-factory prices declined throughout 2002: They averaged L.E. 163 per 
ton in the first quarter of 2002, L.E.154 per ton in second quarter of 2002, L.E.166 in 
third quarter of 2002 and L.E.130 in fourth quarter of 2002. This resulted in a decline of 
profit margins for all producers. It is worth noting that the decline in margins at relatively 
efficient companies such as ECC was highly muted compared to the decline in margins of 
state-influenced or controlled cement producers such as Suez Cement and Torah Cement. 
During the first two months of 2003, ex-factory prices averaged approximately L.E. 120-
125 per ton. In March, cement prices jumped to L.E. 175-180 per ton. At current ex-
factory prices and exchange rates, local cement prices are higher than export prices. 
 
In March 2000 the average price of selling Cement ton in the world market ranged from 
US $ 39 per ton to US $ 110 per ton. The Egyptian price averaged US $ 35.5-55.7 per 
ton.  
 
Egyptian exports of cement are the highly competitive in the region where the price of 
exported ton is US $ 35.5 compared to US $ 40 in Oman, US $ 50 in Saudi Arabia, and 
US $ 60 in UAE and Iran. Egypt utilizes its comparative advantage and geographical 
location being near to several markets in Europe, and Africa. The largest importer is 
Spain, followed by Libya, and then Yemen, Algeria Sudan, Italy, Ghana, Senegal, 
Turkey, USA. In 2002, there was a sharp rise in exports reflecting over-capacity in the 
industry. The average export price of cement increased in 2003 compared to 2002 as a 
result of the outbreak of a cement shortage in the region, the rise in the international 
freight rate and the fact that producers became more adept at negotiating better prices for 
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their export deals. In addition, In L.E. terms, export prices surged relative to their levels 
in 2002 especially following the L.E. floatation of January 2003. As a result, export 
margins, which were lower than local margins in 2002, became almost equal to or higher 
than local margins in 2003. 
 
Egypt ranked the fifth in 2003 among the whole world in exporting cement following 
Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia and Japan where it replaced China. The exports are expected 
to be further positively affected by the adoption of a floating exchange regime which 
enhances the Egyptian exports’ competitiveness. Table 9. shows the change in the 
amount of cement exported by Egyptian firms between 2002 and 2003 whereas Table 10. 
shows the distribution of exporting shares of Egyptian firms . With the shift in the 
capacity/demand balance in 2000, companies started to sell the excess capacity abroad. 
Current excess capacity in the market is estimated at 6 million tons. This has led to 
exports to nearby markets enjoying a supply deficit. These include Sudan, Libya, Algeria, 
Tunisia and countries along the Red Sea coast. Export prices provide a floor to local 
prices, especially so once companies successfully manage to penetrate markets overseas. 
The Egyptian cement industry is well positioned to become an exporter into the 
Mediterranean basin and the Red Sea. It enjoys very low energy costs due to Egypt's 
reserves of natural gas. Cement companies buy gas at the price at which it sold to the 
multinational gas companies. The proximity of the cement plants to the gas fields means 
that the cement producers save on processing and transport costs.  
 
As long as Egypt's gas reserves last and processing and transport costs remain relatively 
low, Egypt's cement industry will benefit from a sustainable competitive advantage of 
low energy costs. 
 
It should be noted that, excluding ECC, cement companies have not yet realized their full 
potential as far as exports are concerned. Many are still in the early stages of penetrating 
foreign markets. 
 
Table 9: Egyptian Exports of Cement till November 2003 (in million tons) 
Company Jan 2002- Nov 2002 Jan 2003-Nov 2003 %  of change 
Torah 0.426 0.797 87.3% 
Helwan 0.08 1.11 1301% 
Suez 0.823 0.316 61.6% 
ECC 0.691 1.926 178.5% 
Sinai 0.176 0.369 109.8% 
Kawmiya 0.284 0.771 171.4% 
Siani for White Cement - 0.158 - 
Misr Qena 0.016 0.53 3213% 
Misr beniSuef - 0.198 - 
Assuit - 0.257 - 
Beni Suef (LAFRAGE) - 0.145 - 
Alexandria (LAFRAGE) - 0.145 - 
Ameryia (Sempor) - 0.023 - 
Total 2.49 6.746 170.3% 
Source: Cement Council and EFG Hermes (2003) 
 
Table 10: Breakdown of Exports Market Share (FY 2002) 
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ECC 42% 






Source: Cement Council 
 
 
7. Entry or Exit 
The cement industry as revealed above did not suffer from any problems regarding 
market entry by both private domestic firms and multinationals. The exit of firms 
(specially the public owned firms) was easy. The entry of firms was either due to 
greenfield investments or brownfield through mergers and acquisitions. After the market 
has become saturated and the number of mergers and acquisitions increased dramatically, 
it is very likely that entry into this market will be more difficult. However, easy entry and 
exist might have had a positive effect on competition and inter firm rivalry at the 
beginning. Nevertheless, entry and exist after the cartel has been formed and the market 
has had high degrees of concentration did not benefit from enhanced competition and 
inter firm rivalry as any new entrant had to join such cartel. 
 
8. Technological Change 
Technological change is not a crucial factor in the cement industry. In fact one of the 
main reasons that multinationals came to the Egyptian market, was the low level of 
environmental standards in Egypt which could enhance their profits as they would not 
have enjoyed such low levels of environmental standards in their own countries.  
 
9. Buyers' Industry Structure 
As mentioned above, the cement producers either sell domestically or export. Selling 
domestically normally takes place through dealers who were claimed to have played a 
major role in increasing the anticompetitive behavior prevailing in the market. 
 
10. The Conspiracy 
There has been some sort of geographical distribution of production as explained in Table 
7. where each firm had its own geographical area to sell in, without approaching other 
areas. As argued by some commentators, one of the main reasons that led to the huge 
drop in prices in 2002 was that multinationals sold their excess production in other 
regions than those specified to them at lower prices than in their own region. Such 
behavior negatively affected cement producers and especially the state owned and small 
private non multinational firms which were not able to compete by lowering their prices. 
 
A pricing agreement was concluded by the end of 2002 where representatives of almost 
all local cement producers met and set a price range for cement of between L.E.167 and 
L.E. 176 a ton. Cement producers admit their agreement constitutes a short-term solution. 
As argued by some cement producers the root causes of the price decline need to be 
addressed which is ensuring that no price wars take place. Such agreements are usually 
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concluded at times of price wars and are often broken later on. There was another 
informal agreement among cement producers in 2003 to stop the price war and agree on a 
certain price.  
 
The multinationals formed a cartel and controlled both quantities produced and prices. In 
beginning of 2004 Helwan for Cement which was overtaken by multinationals stopped its 
production to raise prices and instead of producing 11 thousand tons on daily basis it 
reduced it to 5.3 thousand tons.  
 
Some analysts blame the multinationals arguing that they are behind such price wars 
where they aim to lower prices to an extent even below costs to get other wholly 
domestic private firms out of the market. They argue that wholly domestic private firms 
are usually small and cannot undertake the burden of having losses for along time. 
Moreover, they cannot easily export their access capacity as they lack the strategy and 
human capital needed for such mission. The end result is incurring severe losses to the 
state owned firm and other private domestic firms to either get them out of the market or 
follow the policies imposed on them by multinationals.  
 
Moreover, price fluctuations affected negatively several related industries and traders. 
For example, from the repercussion of such fluctuations in prices what happens in 
government procurement which is governed by Law 89 of 1998 where the bid is reached 
after 3 months from its submission, hence contractors when they submit a price, after 
three months they can find huge increases in the prices which can cause them losses. This 
resulted in contractors not entering the government procurement bids to avoid such 
losses, and hence this had negative repercussions on the employment in this sector. 
 
Some arguments of some insiders see that the cement industry does not suffer from any 
kind of anti-competitive behavior. They view price fluctuations as a result of the non 
normal conditions when privatization started, which led to enhancement of technology 
and increase in production. Combined with weak experience in exporting activities, there 
was a domestic price war which led to this non normal reduction of prices. The domestic 
inputs do not represent more than 10% of the costs used. In addition after a careful 
financial analysis we find that each ton of cement produced from a factory with capital of 
L.E. 1 billion where half of this capital is loans pays on average L.E. 60 as interest rate on 
such loans for each ton produced and if we add L.E. 30 for each ton produced as return 
on the capital we find that each ton is burdened with L.E. 90 as indirect costs, adding to 
that costs of labor, packaging etc we find that the fair price (factory door price) ranges 
from L.E. 232- 270. There is no monopoly in the market, and the multinationals control 
only 42% of the market. The price discriminations between the export price and domestic 
price are normal. There are no collusive agreements among producers of cement 
regarding pricing or geographical allocation. Moreover, among the cement produces there 
is one firm which is wholly owned by the state and there are another 2 where the 
government have large shares which means that that those three firms control 30% of the 
market. Despite that agencies and distributors may help in increasing prices, their 
presence is essential. Moreover, they view that the establishment of organizing body (as 
the one in telecommunications) does not fit the nature and number of firms in industry. 
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The first large fluctuation in prices started in 1997/1998 when prices fluctuated heavily 
between L.E. 196 and L.E. 215 for each ton and reached its peak in the high season 
(summer) to reach unprecedented prices of L.E. 300 per ton. Several reasons were behind 
this increase in prices and included a number of firms were undertaking maintenance at 
that date. The bad practice of some dealers (agencies and distributors) by not selling to 
increase prices in the high season intensified the problem and the physiological effect of 
increased demand during high seasons were the main reasons behind the skyrocketing of 
prices. The Public Sector Ministry investigations following the price crash in 1997/1998 
found out that the real causes of an increase of over 25 per cent in black market prices 
was a result of the shortage which has been attributed to the anti-competitive practices of 
five traders who stored huge amounts of cement in their depots in an effort to manipulate 
market prices. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that some cement factories halted 
their production over the past few weeks in order to undertake necessary renovations to 
their plants. These closures coincided with the increased demand in the market.  As a 
result, the factory price of L.E. 183 rose to as much as L.E. 300 in the black market. 
Besides, some argue that the increase in prices is a result of simple supply demand 
analysis where the mega projects undertaken by the government and the construction 
boom in the late 1990s are the main culprits for raising the prices of cement. 
 
The rise in prices in 2003, which was initially set following the informal agreement 
among cement producers in 2003, were held up not because of such agreement but as a 
result of other factors embedded mainly in the more profitable chances of exporting 
excess capacity. Such chances of profitable exporting was accompanied by a number of 
other factors including: 1) producers became more mature, eventually learning how to 
exploit export opportunities, reducing the downward pressure on local prices. 2) Given 
that export prices provide a floor to local prices, the rise in export prices suggested that 
the floor for local prices was now sustainably higher. 3)The shutdown of wet kilns, which 
took place mostly in 2002, helped reduce the pressure on local prices in 2003 by reducing 
industry capacity as compared to previous years. 4) Following the damage done by 
numerous price wars that the market had witnessed, a sustained rise in cement prices was, 
to some extent, a normal corrective result necessary to improve financial returns that had 
been decimated, even for the most resilient players. 5) The increase in production costs 
which is a result of the increase in prices of power with more than 30% so as the costs of 
labor and the devaluation which helped in the increase in prices. 
 
11. Effect on Consumers and Producers 
Due to the entrance of multinationals there was a huge increase in the production 
capacity. The increase in production reached 170% between 1985 and 1990 and 72% 
between 1995 and 2003. Production capacity reached more than 33,000 tons in 2003.  
 
Moreover the domestic consumption increased from 10.5 million ton in 1985 to 15.8 
million ton in 1990 to 18.5 million ton in 1995 to 26 million ton in 1999. Such huge 
growth in consumption was not matched by an equal growth of supply which created a 
supply shortage. This shortage was filled by imports reaching 4.4 million tons in 1999 
(equivalent to 16% of total consumption). Consumption has declined slightly since 1999, 
yet production capacity has increased significantly. From 1995 to 1999, cement demand 
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grew at a compounded annualized growth rate (CAGR) of almost 10%, representing 
twice the GDP growth rate for the period, driven by the real estate boom and heavy 
government spending on infrastructure and Mega Projects. However, since 1999 demand 
has experienced a negative CAGR of 0.9%.  Egypt's per capita cement consumption, at 
407 kilograms per capita, is low relative to emerging markets counterparts but high 
relative to the country’s GDP per capita. Local cement consumption declined 3% in 2003 
to 25.7 million tons from 26.5 million in 2002. In 2004, the gap between local demand 
and supply reached more than 10 million tons where the local demand figured around 25 
million tons and the supply reached 35 million tons. 
 
The gap between local and export demand combined and capacity narrowed to 3.6 
million tons compared to 5.6 million tons in 2002.Under these supply and demand 
conditions, it is normal that prices should have declined which has not been the case as 
investigated in the coming section. See Table 11. for the total amount of cement 
produced, consumed and, exported over the period 1995-2002. 
 




1995   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total capacity  17200 17700 19200 21200 24600 27050 28600 31000 
Consumption 18001 19480 21153 23727 27541 26334 26751 25840 
Exports  267 428 410 91 33 46 79 2801 
Source: Cement Council and EFG Hermes (2003) 
 
Average capacity utilization in the sector fell from 92% in 2000 to approximately 85% in 
both 2001 and 2002. In 2002, despite the slowdown in local demand, exports helped 
boost the capacity utilization of several companies.  
 
In summary, consumption and production were significantly affected by the price 
fluctuations. Consumers benefited for a while from the price war and the overvaluation of 
the Egyptian pound, however they suffered afterwards when price war stopped and was 
combined by devaluation which made the exporting market more profitable than selling 
domestically for the cement producers. Domestic cement producers suffered from the 
price war which implied that they either had to leave the market or join the cartel 
organized by the multinationals. The end result was that they joined the cartel and acted 
as free riders enjoying the high prices set domestically by the main key players. In fact 
they had no alternative to behave in this way. 
 
12. Summary of Industry Trends Post-Conviction 
The government used to interfere in the cement industry since its inception. The first 
initiative was in 1932 when there were only 2 firms in the market and the government 
established a body to coordinate the process of selling the production of the two firms, 
and undertake the responsibility of its marketing in the domestic market. 
 
In 1958, and as a result of the increase of the firms in the market (reaching 4), a new 
body “Office of Selling Egyptian Cement” was established to market the Egyptian 
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cement in local and foreign markets. Each of the existing firms was represented by two in 
this new body. The body was also responsible for coordinating the process of production, 
exporting surplus, importing necessary inputs and intermediates, and undertaking market 
research and forecasting. 
 
With adoption of a free market policy and increased privatization, the system was not 
suitable and hence in 1994, the “Office of Selling Egyptian Cement” was restructured and 
adopted a new policy where each of the firms was linked with identified distributors and 
agencies which were given a certain quota by this firm each month to sell. It was 
renamed as the “Cement Industry Committee”. Another main job of this body was 
controlling prices of cement in the Egyptian market, a job historically undertaken by the 
GOE even in times of excess demand where prices where not allowed to increase. 
Moreover, the GOE used to interfere to ensure import control through imposing duties 
which ranged from 10-20%. Such intervention has been viewed differently. Some viewed 
the imports’ duties as providing unnecessary protection for Egyptian producers who 
exploited their power in negative terms and closed the doors in front of highly price-
competitive alternative to local cement production. Others believed that such duties 
protected the local industry from dumping of imported cement 
 
Starting 1996, when the privatization program started and the Government started to lose 
its control on the market. The Office of Selling Egyptian Cement was not able to handle 
the first crisis of cement prices in 1997/1998, the. The government interfered by several 
means: 
1) It allowed large constructions projects to buy directly from cement firms without 
having to deal with dealers. 
2) It imposed a certain increase in production for all firms. 
3) It imposed penalties on dealers who undertake anti competitive behavior such 
Stopping any activity related to inventory of cement for a period that exceeds two 
weeks.  
4) It asked banks to monitor financial transaction of dealers to ensure that they do not 
increase prices in high seasons. 
 
In the second week of August 2004, the Government announced its readiness to interfere 
to stop the rise in prices of cement which reached very high limits that were never 
reached before which affected the construction sector negatively and resulted in 
recession. Hence, the GOE in August 2004 abolished the tariffs on cement which ranged  
from 10 to 20%. Moreover, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry announced that  
there is a trend towards establishing some sort of  a regulatory body for organizing the  
cement industry which includes representatives from the cement producers and the 
government which will be responsible for setting policies related to production, quality,  
costs, exports to ensure efficiency of production, fair distribution, and stability of market. 
  
The traders of cement announced that the Ministerial decree related to tariff reduction on 
cement will not help in reducing the domestic prices of cement as the world market prices 
for cement are higher than the domestic prices. In addition, the domestically produced 
cement is of a higher quality than that imported due to the comparative advantage that 
 25
Egypt has in producing cement. On the other hand, there was a group of specialists who 
were quite optimistic where there was high expectations that the dual decisions of 
abolishment of antidumping duties on steel and tariffs on cement will lower the prices of 
cement sold domestically.  
 
The actual short term effect of tariff abolishment was not very positive where the price of 
one ton increased from L.E. 280 to L.E.300. The arguments differ in trying to explain 
such counterproductive result of tariffs abolishment where some analysts believe that it is 
the behavior of agencies and distributors which is behind such increase in prices where 
other believe that the prices are still in its normal range and that it was under priced 
before. There is nothing remarkable or “chaotic” in this price behavior given the 
fluctuations in supply and demand over the period. Certainly cement companies, 
Egyptian-owned and foreign-owned, would prefer higher prices but this is no justification 
whatever for regulatory intervention in pricing decisions. Prices appear to have recovered 
since the May – June period of seasonally low demand. 
 
Today, Egypt faces a greater challenge in convincing investors that they can earn 
adequate returns on their investment than in combating colluding companies that are 
earning high profits. The prominent monopolies or price-fixing arrangements in Egypt 
are sanctioned by government, although private collusive arrangements no doubt exist as 
well. The soft budget constraints enjoyed by multinationals allowed them to control the 
market. Trade policy in terms of removal of tariffs was not able to solve the problem due 
to product differentiation and the lower domestic price prevailing than export price. It 
appears at this stage in Egypt’s development that government policies are more likely to 




















Case Study of the Film industry in Egypt 
1. Description of Product 
The film is a product that can be shown in cinemas, sold in the form of video tapes, CDs 
or DVDs, or shown in Television (paid or non-paid). 
 
2. Substitutes in Consumption 
The traditional film that used to be shown in cinemas is now threatened by the 
proliferation of paid TV channels, advances in technology where it is now can be easily 
copied in CDs and DVDs besides the video tape format. 
 
3. Cost Structure 
The cost of producing a film differs significantly from one film to the other ranging from 
half a million Egyptian pound to more than ten million Egyptian pounds. The main 
problem related to the cost of producing films in Egypt is the absence of bank financing 
which results in the necessity of depending on self finance. Banks are always reluctant to 
finance production of films due to the absence of physical collateral and high degree of 
risk involved. 
 
4. Industry Structure 
The film industry in Egypt is characterized by having a high degree of concentration in 
all its segments. The Industry is divided into five main segments5: production, 
distribution, shooting process (ownership of studios), printing and development of films 
(laboratories) and cinemas. In theory, a firm when registered by law as a firm working in 
the field of film industry is allowed to be engaged in all of the five aforementioned 
activities so as well as other activities specified according to the law6. In practice, firms 
have chosen to specialize in one or two activities. Nevertheless, such phenomenon of 
specialization has started to change recently by moving towards vertical integration, 
hence overcoming the segmentation of the different activities and increasing the level of 
concentration in the whole industry7. For example, according to the information obtained 
from the Chamber of Cinema Industry, the number of firms registered as firms having the 
right to undertake the different cinema activities reached more than 450 firms. However 
in 1992, 5 firms produced more than 50% of the total films with the share of the first one 
reaching more than 27%. The other 50% were produced by 29 firms. Between 2000 and 
2006 only 3-4 firms have been the regularly active firms in the production activity. The 
distribution activity is analogous where 5 firms control 75% of the market. The same is 
                                                 
5 Such classification is based on an interview with the head of the Chamber of Film industry and other 
experts in the field. It is non-conventional in the sense that it does not follow international or national 
guidelines, however it elaborates how the specialization in the different related fields is undertaken in the 
Egyptian Film industry. 
6 The Higher Council for Culture is responsible for issuing such licenses. There are annual fees that have to 
be paid separately on each of the following activities: production, broadcasting (which is related to the 
cinemas’ activity), shooting, printing & development, sound recording, transformation (refers to 
transformation from a normal film format to video format or other kinds) and distribution. See  Ministerial 
Decree No. 113 for 1993 for the Minister of Culture. 
7 Recently, few firms with relatively large capital and 35-40 permanent employees on their paying-roll have 
entered the business of production, distribution and ownership of cinemas, increasing the degree of vertical 
integration. This was undertaken mainly through mergers and acquisitions among existing firms 
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true in the case of cinemas’ ownership where two newly established firms have bought a 
large number (more than 60%) of the existing working 175 cinemas in Egypt. The 
phenomenon of the sole proprietor (family business) company is evident in the case of 
the Egyptian film industry. In the case of laboratories and studios business, the market 
structure is characterized by having few companies. Collusion has started to increase 
lately in this market where high concentration and the proliferation of vertically 
integrated large firms implied that collusion is the only way out for small firms to survive 
in the market through subcontracting.  
 
The film market is characterized by a specific feature of seasonality where films are 
usually broadcasted in certain seasons during the year. This implied fierce competition in 
such seasons where demand is usually concentrated.  
 
 Moreover, there is a geographical concentration of the cinemas in Greater Cairo8 and 
Alexandria that reaches more than 90% (Council of Cultural Castles, 2001).  
 
Foreign presence in the Egyptian film industry, though allowed by law and has been 
encouraged by recent laws and regulations, is minimal. The heavy participation of the 
foreigners is concentrated in the distribution of American films which is controlled by 
few American firms' representatives.  
 
Table. 12 summarizes the different market structure indicators of the film industry in 
Egypt. 
 
Table 12.: Different Market Structure Indicators of the Film Industry in Egypt 
• Vertical Integration Increasing rapidly 
• Market Concentration High 
• Cinema’s Geographical 
Concentration 
High 
• Direct Involvement of 
Government 
Low but recently increasing  





5. Location of Production 
Not relevant, however as mentioned above there is high concentration of cinemas in 
Cairo and Alexandria. 
 
                                                 
8 By Greater Cairo, we mean three governorates which are Cairo, Giza and Qalyobiya. About 20 million 
inhabitants live in Greater Cairo. 
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6. Distribution Mechanism 
The film has many distribution outlets, where it is generally starts by distributing it 
domestically through a distributor and in relevant foreign markets through another 
distributor. The distributors have generally played an important role in depressing the 
price of films purchased which affected negatively the profitability of producers. Other 
types of distribution (especially in video tape format) had its own channels, which is now 
vanishing due to its substitution by other methods as paid TV channels, CDs, and DVDs. 
 
7. Entry or Exit 
The entry to the market has been relatively easy before the formation of the new firm (see 
above in the industry structure). However since that firm entered the market it has 
resulted in difficulty of entry for new producers and large number of exists of old small 
size producers who were not able to compete with the vertically integrated firm at the 
beginning and with the oligopolistic market structure that prevailed afterwards unless 
they depended on a sub-contracting scheme. In the last two years, namely 2005 and 2006 
limited number of large producing firms has entered the market hence lessening the 
negative effect of the hegemony of the large incumbent producing firm. 
 
Moreover, the entry and exit in this market extends to independent producers who used to 
have small firms before the entry of large vertically integrated firms in the market. With 
the change of the structure of the market, the entry of those independent producers 
became dependant on the good will of subcontracting films to them from large firms. 
 
8. Technological Change 
It plays an important role in the different phases of film production. Due to the relative 
backwardness of technological development in Egypt in this field several producers used 
to print their films and/or undertake other related activities in other countries which 
increased the cost of production. 
 
9. Buyers' Industry Structure 
Normally in the case of film industry the buyers are distributors. However with the 
introduction of the vertically integrated firms the buyers were not necessarily 
independent distributors as the integrated firms distribute their own films in different 
cinemas (which they probably own). 
 
10. The Conspiracy 
There are several arguments as revealed from the interviews that show that there is 
prevailing anti-competitive behavior. The dominance of few firms in the market that are 
highly vertically integrated has forced all players in the market to play according to their 
rules. Hence, they controlled the independent producers who cannot compete with them 
and seek to be subcontracted. They controlled the distribution channels and cinemas 
where they can prevent a film not produced by them to be showed in different cinemas 
owned by the controlling firms. There was even a case of a movie whose producer argued 
that one of the controlling firms in the market prevented his film from being shown in 
another Arab county where this firm owns a number of cinemas there. The absence of a 
competition law was the main culprit for such behavior. Moreover, an investment law 
(law 8/1997) was passed and it granted large firms (with capital more than 10 million 
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Egyptian pounds) specific tax exemptions. The different producers see such exemptions 
as discriminatory behavior from the government that should aim at having a level playing 
field between large and small producers rather than discriminating against small ones. 
 
Owners of the controlling firms argue on the contrary that they never prevent a producer, 
or a director from working with them. They have a quality controlled selective criteria, 
based upon they decide which films they will produce. Moreover, they argue that they 
can never prevent a film from not being shown as they do not own cinemas in the whole 
country, but they preserve the good seasons for the films they produce which is a normal 
attitude that is being adopted in all industries. They argue that they help to flourish the 
film industry in Egypt where the lack of finance has been the major reason behind its 
deterioration. By being vertically integrated they ensured that the Egyptian film is not 
under priced when sold from the producer to the distributor and they cover their costs as 
they enjoy economies of scale by being able to show the film in different cinemas. Some 
believe that Law 8/1997 aimed at ensuring that the players in the field of film production 
should be large enough to face competition and hence that law aimed at increasing 
mergers and acquisition for the sake of the Egyptian industry as a whole and not for the 
aim of enhancing the larger players against the small ones. 
 
The presence of controlling firms has reduced the competition and inter-firm rivalry 
between small firms where its impact on the few dominating firms cannot be assessed as 
it might have increased the rivalry between them and might have resulted in collusion 
among them. Data and information available do not allow us to reach a conclusion 
regarding this issue. It is very difficult to assess whether there has been anticompetitive 
behavior or not. There are no clear criteria for assessing whether a film should be 
distributed or broadcasted or not. Moreover, even the revenues arising from specific films 
which can be used as a criterion for deciding on the actor or director performance are 
manipulated if the number of cinemas where the film can be broadcasted is constrained 
and controlled by some firms. The nature of the market which can only allow some form 
of constrained competition does not allow a fair assessment. However, it is worth noting 
that production of films has proliferated in the 2005 and 2006 to unprecedented levels 
reaching between 40 and 50 films per year, which is relatively high compared to a low of 
16 films in 1998. 
 
11. Effect on Consumers and Producers 
According to the data available from the Chamber of Cinema Industry there has been on 
average more than 40 films produced annually (a more detailed breakdown: average of 
20 films between 1927 and 1945; average of 50 films between 1945 and 1990 and 
average of 44 films between 1990 and 2000). A peak was reached in 1988 with 112 films 
produced. Afterwards there has been a declining trend and the number of films produced 
reached a minimum of 16 films in 1998. Such downward trend is difficult to relate to the 
ineffective policies and regulation that have prevailed for a long time and hence can not 
be the culprit for the weak performance. However, the upsurge in the number of films 
produced in the mid eighties and the declining trend afterwards should be interpreted 
with caution. The interviews revealed that the upsurge does not reflect a flourishing 
industry but rather a short term phenomenon arising from the availability of generous 
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financed advertisements interrupting the films when distributed in video format which 
encouraged producers to produce low quality films with low budgets to gain from their 
distribution on video tapes when such advertisements are included. The downward trend 
afterwards reflects the shift of such advertisements to satellite and pay TV channels, 
which prevented the producers from such generous form of finance and hence returned 
the industry to its initial position of scarcity of finance.  
 
The prices that we deal with in this case study are not the normal price tickets of 
watching a movie, which although should be regulated are in fact left completely to 
market pricing decided upon by supply and demand and by the nature of cinema (e.g. 
there are a number of five stars hotels that have opened cinemas in their campus and their 
prices are relatively higher than those located in poor areas). We rather deal with the 
prices of the films sold by producers to distributors, which according to the interviews 
have been suppressed since a long time and have faced downward pressures.  
 
The impact on individual producers was negative as they had no place in the market due 
to hegemony of the vertically integrated firms and hence they either had to exit the 
market or work through sub contracting schemes with the vertically integrated firms. 
Such an action depressed their profits. As for consumers there is no clear evidence that 
the vertical integration in the film production and the anti-competitive behavior affected 
them. It is not clear whether such newly integrated firms have reduced the number of 
films or not or have affected the quality of films produced. 
 
 
12. Summary of Industry Trends Post-Conviction 
The Egyptian laws and regulations do not contain any provisions that discriminate against 
foreign firms registering for one or all of the activities related to the film industry. 
 
There are a number of restrictions related to the foreign films broadcast domestically. In 
fact, Egypt was one of the countries that have asked for an MFN exemption in the 
audiovisual sector in the first GATS round of negotiations. Moreover, the Minister of 
Culture has discretionary power to determine the number of foreign films to be 
distributed by a domestic firm engaged in producing Egyptian films. Identifying a 
number of films to be distributed was thought of as a method of finance to Egyptian 
producers who can use the profits from the distribution of foreign films to finance the 
production of domestic films. Such a ratio was 1:5 where a producer who produced one 
Egyptian film has the right to distribute 5 foreign films with five copies per film 
maximum. Such a regulation has been facing endless debate where some of the producers 
asked for the increase in such ratio where the people concerned with cultural aspects and 
social impact of the Film industry in general refused such increase. The regulation has 
been altered by the Minister of Culture to 1: 8 while the number of copies from each film 
remained the same and then back to 1:5. There is no economic logic behind such 
regulation but rather weak protective interests, especially when we take in consideration 
that such a regulation has never been applied to firms performing only in the area of the 
distribution of foreign films. There is discrimination in tax treatment of foreign and 
Egyptian films, which defy the national treatment provision. Regarding screen quotas, 
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Egypt do not apply them except in a very marginal way in exceptional pre-determined 
events and it has a non binding import quota. 
 
Egypt, to a large extent, does not follow the norm in providing substantial support to the 
film industry. There has been a great decline in the amount of direct support provided by 
the government for that industry whereas the indirect support (in terms of tailoring rules 
and regulations for its favor) has been ineffective9.  
 
The government has retreated from different activities related to the film industry starting 
from the early 1970s. It retreated from the production of long entertainment films activity 
in 1971 and since the beginning of the 1970s it has been selling a number of cinemas that 
it has owned10. In the studios business, their ownership remained in the hands of the 
government, but it has leased two of the five existing major studios in the country to the 
private sector. Hence, an overall trend is obvious regarding the diminishing role of the 
direct involvement of the government in the Film industry. However, there is a reverse 
new trend where the government has recently started being engaged in production of long 
entertainment films through the establishment of a new body in 2001 as a reaction to the 
recent move of mergers and acquisitions happening in the private sector based on the fear 
of the dominance of the private sector in this field taking in consideration that the 
government involvement can provide this balance in the market. (The Production and 
Distribution Body is an independent body in which the government owns the lion’s share 
in its capital). It aims at flourishing the film industry, especially after the disappearance 
of an active role for the governmental agencies that used to operate in the past.  
 
The government is a large producer of short documentary films that are not highly profit 
oriented. The private sector engaged in such activity depends mainly on selling historical 
documentary films abroad. There are a number of firms engaged in such activity reaching 
about 10 firms. 
 
The government does not provide any form of direct grants or subsidies for the 
production of long entertainment films. There is a draft law for initiating this idea but still 
in it’s very early preliminary stages and not expected to materialize soon. There is a new 
semi governmental body where the share of the government in the capital is more than 
50% that aims at producing cinema films. The newly established body started to function 
in 2004 by producing a couple of films and hence its role cannot be assessed at this early 
stage. Its main aim is to flourish the Film industry especially after the problems it has 
experienced regarding finance. In 2005 and 2006, a few number of large producers 
                                                 
9 In 1957 a presidential decree was issued to establish Institution of Cinema Subsidization. However, by 
time this institution was not effective and its role faded out.  It is now under the umbrella of the existing 
Cultural Development Fund. 
10 Prior to 1952 the government was not engaged in the Film industry. Starting from Nasser era, the 
government has been heavily involved where a number of governmental organizations were created to 
enhance the Film industry. Such organizations included the Public Company for the Arab Cinema 
Production, The Public Company for Cinema Studios, the Public Company for Distribution and 
Presentation of Cinema Films, the Egyptian Public Company for World Cinema Production, the Public 
Company for Cinemas and, the Cairo Company for Cinema. Starting 1971, some of those companies have 
retreated while others remained. Nevertheless, by time those which remained have reduced their activities.  
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(integrated vertically in many cases) started to dominate the market. In fact the 
emergence of such large producers lessened the negative effect of the market being 
divided among two firms and paved the way for more competition and flourishing of the 
market. On the other hand, the role of the new governmental body started to fade away. 
 
The film industry has rather minimum protective measures, at least in practice, when 
compared to the Film industry in the EU or in other OECD countries. There are no 
effective screen quotas11. There is an import quota since 1973 of 300 foreign films per 
year (Ministerial Decree no. 459 of 1973). However, it has never been binding. 
 
Law No. 8/1997 did not aim in the first place to increase the degree of concentration 
which was already high, but rather aimed at increasing the capital of the existing firms to 
overcome the financial obstacles that hinder the Industry from development and enjoy 
economies of scale (and soften their budget constraint). Nevertheless, the tax exemption 
provided in the provisions of the law for firms with large capital did not encourage firms 
to merge (not to mention that it was challenged in courts as it was against the 
Constitution). In fact, the latest move of mergers took place after the establishment of the 
aforementioned private firm in the year 2000 which forced other small and medium firms 
to merge to be able to face the challenge of competing with it. The absence of a 
competition law or sectoral regulation is a major loophole in the institutional setup 
required to balance the incentives provided by the government to establish firms with 
large capital and encourage mergers and acquisitions against the possibility of arising 
anti-completive behaviors which might affect negatively the whole industry. 
 
The industry is moving rapidly towards mergers and high concentration which could have 
positive (economies of scale) as well as negative effects (anticompetitive behavior). The 
absence of a competition law or sectoral regulation is a major loophole in this regard. The 
domestic film industry is slightly favored in terms of indirect taxes imposed on it 
compared to imported films, but there is no discrimination when it comes to explicit 
subsidies, as there are no direct subsidies provided. Other rules and regulations, despite 
discriminatory in some regard are ineffective with the exception of the system used to 
provide incentives for the distribution of Egyptian films versus foreign films which could 
imply some explicit discrimination against foreign films. 
 
The trade protectionist tools used by Egypt did not serve their aims, and that the threat 
from destroying the Industry due to imports is magnified. The curing of the ills of the 
Film industry lies actually in domestic reforms which are explained below and not in the 
usage of protectionist tools that have proven to be ineffective. 
 
Regulatory reform is heavily needed in the film industry due to the proliferation of 
ineffective rules and regulations. A major reform would be to introduce a comprehensive 
law that take in consideration all the necessary rules and regulations needed to enhance 
                                                 
11 There is a law that was issued in 1956 (Law No. 373) that asserted the necessity of each cinema 
presenting an Egyptian film at least for one week per season where the year is divided into three seasons. 
Such a law is not enforced anymore.  Moreover, cinemas have to broadcast Egyptian films in the two 
Islamic feasts, which count only for 7 days in the whole year divided into 2 events. 
 33
the industry and be complemented by other effective laws concerning the industry as 
competition. The discretionary power allowed for cultural ministers should be lessened as 
it ends up with vague environment for investors. The scarcity of finance led to non 
transparent accounts which deprived the banks from entering into this business. Hence, a 
soft budget constraint is likely to cure many of the ills of this industry Moreover, the need 
for finance led the producers to sell cheaply the rights of distribution abroad which when 
combined by weak enforcement of IPR, domestically and abroad, led to loss of profits 
over time which made new entrants reluctant to enter in this business. Consequently, this 
led to few investments in the field of laboratories and studios which crowded out 
producers to use the facilities of other neighboring countries (e.g. Greece). The potential 
investors in those fields argued that the small size of the market (in terms of the number 
of films produced) do not allow them to come to Egypt. In other words, the Industry 
entered in a vicious circle of lack of finance and investments, weak IPR enforcement and 
absence of transparency. The government should take all such aspects in consideration by 
providing a clear vision with concrete steps to be undertaken. Necessary measures 
include ensuring a stable system for finance that does not encourage production of low 
quality films. This has to be prudently designed to make sure not to repeat the mistake of 
other countries in providing generous subsidies that ended up in production of low 
quality films.  
 
An effective competition policy is becoming a necessity for monitoring and disciplining 
the behavior of firms in this industry, which is experiencing evident moves of mergers 
and vertical integration. There is great need for designing a sectoral regulation that ensure 
fair competition and allow as well mergers and acquisitions as a general competition law 
is not likely to fit the nature of this industry. This might seems to be contradicting with 
what has been mentioned regarding the high concentration in all of the segments of the 
Film industry, but this can be explained by emphasizing that the main concern which 
created the debate on the need for competition policy was initiated when the distribution 
and cinema ownership were controlled. Those two last stages of the value chain in the 
Film industry are crucial to the extent that even if the former stages were enjoying fierce 
competition but the last two stages were controlled by very few firms, the extent of 
collusion and exploitation by such firms can be high. This is exactly what happened in 
the Egyptian case where the distribution channels were closed in front of small producers 
so as well the cinemas that were owned by the same distributors (who produce films as 
well). 
 
This case study confirms the hypothesis that a soft budget constraint can help in relaxing 
competition related problems. However, it does not confirm the second hypothesis that 
trade liberalization can help flourish competition, although the protectionist trade policies 
adopted by Egypt has been ineffective. The main reason is that the market is highly 
segmented and that liberalization of trade policy will not affect the competition of 
domestically produced films. On the contrary the liberalization may in this case kill the 





PART V. EMPIRICAL ANAYSES of THE DETERMINANTS 




This part of the study deals with testing empirically the effect of some competition 
related issues on some important variables as total factor productivity, technical progress, 
exports’ performance, and the missing middle syndrome. We aim also at testing a number 
of issues, including our two main hypotheses, namely trade liberalization does not affect 
the status of competition and inter-firm rivalry whereas soft budget constraints helps to 
enhance competition and inter-firm rivalry. We undertake four regressions, the first tests 
the effect of competition on price-costs margins. We would expect that higher degree of 
competition would lead to lower price-cost margins. In the second regression we 
investigate the impact of competition on total factor productivity. We would expect a 
priori that competition has positive effects on total factor productivity. The third 
regression aims at investigating the impact of competition on exports’ performance where 
we expect a positive impact. Finally we intend to study the impact of the determinants of 
competitive pressures on the distribution of firm size. Of interest here is whether the 
“missing middle” syndrome of medium sized firms emerges as competitive pressures 
tighten. Taking into consideration theoretical as well as preceding empirical results, 
model specifications followed the equations that will be used throughout this part of the 
paper in the four subsections: i) static effects; ii) growth effects; iii) export performance; 
and iv) the missing middle. 
 
We utilize time series data for the period 1981 to 1998 which is shortened in some of our 
regressions due to the unavailability of some variables. However, using pooled data 
analysis overcomes the econometric problems likely to arise from the shortness of some 
of time series of some variables. We use firm level data whenever possible accompanied 
by sectoral data. We depend on national sources as well as the international ones. 
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The general theme underlying all regressions is that economic liberalization and 
enhanced competition have positive effects on the firms’ characteristics related to 
productivity, technical progress, exports’ performance, etc. This is in line with the 
orthodox economic point of view on both theoretical basis and empirical grounds where 
most of the evidence points out towards the positive effect of competition and 
liberalization on firm-level characteristics. 
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I. Static Effects: 
 
I.1) Model Specification: 
In this section we aim at testing the effect of competition on price-cost margins. We use 
three main variables to capture the effect of competition, namely number of public firms, 
number of private firms, and import penetration. It is expected that the number of public 
firms coefficient has a negative effect whereas private firms and import penetration 
variables have positive effects. The number of public firms variable captures the hard 
budget constraint whereas the private firms variable captures the soft budget constraint. 
The import penetration variable captures the trade liberalization effect. Following what 
has been discussed in Part II, Part III, and Part IV budget constraint has a determinant 
effect on competition whereas trade liberalization does not have a deterministic impact. 
We were not able to have the price-cost margin and hence we used instead technical 
progress as a proxy for price cost margin. Consequently, the equation that is used to 
estimate the static effects is: 
ε+++= iiii MPRaaPubaogTech *Priv**Pr 321    …………..(1) 
where: 
TechProgi: Technical Progress for industry i 
 Pub: the number of public firms 
 Priv: the number of private firms 




Technical progress1 was estimated according to the following equation where the rate of 
technical progress at with imperfectly competitive markets depends on the estimated 
( )( ) tttttt akq*)1()klq(* =Δ−Δ−−Δ−Δ−Δ μβαμ
                                                 
1 The methodology for calculating technical progress is based on the one adopted in another IDRC project 
on competion. See Sekkat, Khalid and Najib Harabi (2003), Competition, Competition Policy and 





The markup is estimated using the following equation For each sector on 3 ISIC digit 
level  the following equation was estimated: 
 





( ) ( ) ( )




















β  the share of capital in turnover. 




I.3) Model Estimation: 
 
Originally we had a time series extending from 1983 to 1995, based on which we 
calculated averages to arrive at technical progress variable. Hence we undertook cross 
section OLS regression for 28 observations which are the number of industrial sub-
sectors at 3-digit level ISIC classification.  
Undertaking the regression resulted in the following equation: 
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TechProg = 0.0127 - 0.00028 (Pub) + 0.00003 (Priv) - 0.064151 (MPR)   
    (0.6798) (-0.485622)   (0.323437)   (-1.277482 ) 
 
Table 1.: Regression Results of Technical Progress on a Number of Variables 
Dependent Variable: TechProg 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1 28 
Included observations: 28 
Variable Coefficien
t 
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.012678 0.018650 0.679812 0.5031 
Pub -0.000280 0.000577 -0.485622 0.6316 
Priv 3.37E-05 0.000104 0.323437 0.7492 
MPR -0.064151 0.050216 -1.277482 0.2137 
R-squared 0.115778 Mean dependent var -
0.009286
Adjusted R-squared 0.005250 S.D. dependent var 0.056890
S.E. of regression 0.056741 Akaike info criterion -
2.769083
Sum squared resid 0.077268 Schwarz criterion -
2.578768
Log likelihood 42.76717 F-statistic 1.047497




I.4) Empirical results: 
Our former analysis confirmed that trade liberalization has no effect on competition 
whereas soft budget constrain has positive effect. The soft budget constrains contained in 
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our analysis is captured by the number of private firms as it is expected that private firms 
have soft budget constrains whereas public firms have hard budget constraints. Though 
this is not necessarily true, we assume that this is the case and especially that our analysis 
in former parts have confirmed this assumption. The regression results show that 
technical progress is not affected by any of the three independent variables implying that 
trade openness (as proxied by import penetration ratio) has no effect on the technical 
progress (which is a proxy for the price cost margin). The number of firms whether 
private or public (as a proxy for intensive competition) had also no effect on the technical 
progress. This implies that the intensity of competition in Egypt has not been affected by 
the increase of the number of private firms (inter-firm rivalry) and has also not been 
affected by trade openness. This is in line with one of our main hypothesis that trade 
openness does not affect competition in a positive way, however our empirical analysis 
failed to capture the positive impact of soft budget constraint on enhancing competition. 
We tried other model specifications by changing the type of relationship between 
variables where log linear specification was adopted as well as adding additional 
variables (business regulations), however the results were not significant. Such result was 
expected due to the weak correlation existing between the technical progress variable and 
the explanatory variables as depicted in the  table 2. 
 
 
Table 2.: Correlation Matrix of Technical Progress with different Explanatory 
Variables 
 TechProg Pub Priv MPR 
TechProg 1.00    
Pub -0.15 1.00   
Priv -0.11 0.98 1.00  




II. Growth Effects 
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II.1) Model Specification: 
In this section we intend to investigate the impact of policy changes that affect the degree 
of competitive pressures directly and have knock-on effects on firm productivity growth. 
Hence we intend to regress Total Factor Productivity (TFP) on the number of public 
firms, the number of private firms, and import penetration ratio as shown in equation (2).  
 
ttitititi MPRaaPubaTFP ε+++= ,3,2,1, *Priv**  …………..(2) 
where: 
TFP: total factor productivity growth of existing firms 
 Pub: the number of public firms 
 Priv: the number of private firms 
 MPR: import penetration ratio 
 
II.2) Data: 






























where VA is the value added, E is the number of employees and K is the capital.  
 
The pooled data set that is used here consists of 162 observations, which are 18 years 
(from 1981 to 1998) for each sector among the 9 industrial sub-sectors at the 2 ISIC -digit 
level. To avoid the problem of regressing TFP growth (which is a ratio) on absolute 
number of firms we replaced the number of firms with the structure of firms in the 
industry (dividing the number of firms in each sector by the total number of firms in the 
whole industry at the relevant year). In fact such transformation of variables did not 
affect the correlation between the TFP and the explanatory variables as shown in the 





Table 3.: Correlation Matrix before Transformation  
 TFP Pub Priv MPR 
TFP 1.00    
Pub 0.06 1.00   
Priv 0.04 0.89 1.00  
MPR -0.08 -0.27 -0.36 1.00 
 
 
Table 4.: Correlation Matrix after Transformation  
 TFP Pub Structure Priv Structure MPR 
TFP 1.00    
Pub Structure 0.06 1.00   
Priv Structure 0.05 0.95 1.00  




II.3) Model Estimation: 
Coefficients in equation (2) were estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) method. The result of the estimated equation is as follows in Table 5: 
 
TFP = 18.15 + 103.47 (Pub_S) - 91.35 (Priv_S) - 46.50 (MPR)   
  (3.05614) (1.717595)    (-1.355276)      (-2.582515)     
 
Table 5.: Regression results of TFP on Different Variables 
Dependent Variable: TFP? 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
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Sample: 1981 1998 
Included observations: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations 162 
Variable Coefficie
nt
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 18.15212 5.939558 3.056140 0.0026









    
Log likelihood -
884.6254
   
Unweighted 
Statistics 
    




















II.4) Empirical Results: 
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Based on the regression results the TFP is affected only by the import penetration ratio 
(MPR). This result is expected as the negative sign of the coefficient implies that 
increasing imports are likely to drive out inefficient firms which take time to exist the 
market. During this time their ability to produce efficiently is likely to decrease due to the 
increased competition effect arising from increased imports. Since we regress the TFP of 
both public and private firms and since a large number of firms in the market are public 
and likely to be inefficient then such result is expected especially that import penetration 
is focusing on final products and not raw and intermediate inputs that could have 
positively affected the TFP. This result is in line with the general theme of the study 
which has shown that competition is not correlated with efficiency. The analysis 
undertaken in Part II, Part III, and Part IV of the study has shown that some private firms 
are efficient when compared to public firms and that introducing competition is not 
necessarily reflected on improving total factor productivity as long as institutional 
impediments to the efficient performance of the market (in the form of antic-competitive 
behaviors as abuse of dominant position, cartel, etc.) affect the performance of firms in 
the market. 
 
It is worth noting that the model specification has been examined by trying different 
transformations for the variables as well as changing the number of explanatory 
variables, however the model specification that we have used was the best form of 
specification.  
 
III. Export performance 
 
III.1) Model Specification: 
In order to study the impact of intensified competition (through inter-firm rivalry and 
increased openness) on export performance we regress the total value of exports on the 
number of public firms, the number of private firms (as proxies for inter-firm rivalry), 
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import penetration ratio (as proxy for trade openness), and starting a new business and 
regulation index2. Accordingly, the regression equation is as follows:  
 
ttititititi BRaMPRaaPubaExp ε++++= ,4,3,2,1, **Priv**  …………..(3) 
where: 
Exp: value of exports 
 Pub: the number of public firms 
 Priv: the number of private firms 
 MPR: the import penetration ratio 




Pooled data set consists of 162 observations, which are 18 years (from 1981 to 1998) for 
each sector among the 9 industrial sub-sectors at 2-digit ISIC. 
 
 
III.3) Model Estimation: 
Coefficients in equation (3) were estimated using the SUR method. The final estimated 
equation is as the follows: 
Exp = -687536.2** - 410.83** (Pub) + 49.01** (Priv) - 573934.3** (MPR) + 
217424.0** (BR)  
    (-4.585713) (-11.93052)  (9.360772)   (-24.36513)           (7.245289) 
 
Table  6.: Regression results of Exports Value on Different variables 
Dependent Variable: EXP? 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
                                                 
2 This index is calculated from the World Economic Forum Report (several issues) based on its business 
regulation index which comprises price controls, administrative conditions and entry of new business, time 
with government bureaucracy, starting a new business, and irregular payments. The index used was a 
simple average of those sub index indicators. In general the index is calculated each 10 years and hence we 
assumed that the index is stable for the period 1985 to 1994 and took another value in 1995 for a period of 
ten years. 
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Sample: 1981 1998 
Included observations: 18 
Total panel (balanced) observations 162 
Variable Coefficie
nt











BR? 217424.0 30009.02 7.245289 0.0000
Weighted 
Statistics 
    
Log likelihood -
2044.209
   
Unweighted 
Statistics 
    



















The above table shows the results of the estimation where Durbin-Watson statistic is very 
low.  
 
To correct the positive serial correlation, AR(1) and then AR(2) were taken as shown in 
table 7 and the resulted equation is as follows: 
 
Exp = 18342.20 + 117.28 (Pub) + 38.69** (Priv) + 4880.87 (MPR) - 5017.88 (BR)  
    (1.250647 ) (2.076773)  (4.13093)   (2.375855)  (-2.183521) 
[AR(1)= 0.75, AR(2)= 0.19] 
  (8.974096 ) (2.23383) 
 
Table 7.: Regression results of Exports Value on Different Variables after 
Correcting for Serial Correlation 
Dependent Variable: EXP? 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1981 1998 
Included observations: 18 
Excluded observations: 2 
Total panel (balanced) observations 144 
Convergence achieved after 75 iteration(s) 
Variable Coefficie
nt
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 18342.20 14666.17 1.250647 0.2132
PUB? 117.2777 56.47110 2.076773 0.0397
PRIV? 38.68665 9.365117 4.130930 0.0001




AR(1) 0.749347 0.083501 8.974096 0.0000




    
Log likelihood -
1631.559
   
Unweighted 
Statistics 
    


















III.4) Empirical Results: 
Our results show that the export value is positively affected by the number of the private 
and public firms implying that competition and increased inter-firm rivalry have positive 
impact on exports. Moreover, exports are positively affected by trade openness as proxied 
by import penetration. This result is of crucial importance since there is a widespread 
mercantilistic misconception among policy makers where they believe that enhancing 
exports can go along with restricting imports. Our results prove that contrary to such 
misconception enhancing exports is positively correlated with increased imports. The 
negative significant sign of business regulations coefficient implies that better business 
regulations result in lower level of exports. Although this result is surprising, it might be 
the case that improving business regulations do not necessarily enhance exports as they 
are likely to increase the number of firms, especially small and medium in the domestic 
market, which in general have lower export propensity. However, we were not able to 
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explain even if this is the case why improved business regulations have not affected the 
larger firms’ exports performance. The only explanation we have is the poor proxy we 
have used which have focused on issues related to contestability of the market and have 
not dealt with exports or imports regulations.  
 
IV: The missing middle 
 
IV.1) Model Specification: 
We intend to study the impact of the determinants of competitive pressures on the 
distribution of firm size. Of interest here is whether the “missing middle” syndrome of 
medium sized firms emerges as competitive pressures tighten. The calculated GINI index 
is the dependent variable in regression equation; while the independent variables are the 
number of public firms, the number of private firms, import penetration ratio, and starting 
a new business and regulation index as the following: 
 
ttititititi BRaMPRaSaSPubaGINI ε++++= ,4,3,2,1, **Priv_*_*  …………..(4) 
where: 
GINI: GINI Index 
 Pub_S: the structure of public firms 
 Priv_S: the structure of private firms 
 MPR: import penetration ratio 
 BR: Starting a new business and Regulation index 
 
IV.2) Data: 
GINI index calculated as follows: 
 
entsEstablishm of No Total




























The value of GINI coefficient according to this equation indicates that whenever it has 
higher values, the distribution improves implying less concentration. We applied the 
same method of using the structure of public and private firms instead on numbers as 
used in the growth regression to avoid regressing numbers on ratios. 
 
Pooled data set consists of 126 observations, which are 14 years (from 1983 to 1998 
except 1994 and 1996) for each sector among the 9 industrial sub-sectors at 2-digit ISIC. 
 
IV.3) Model Estimation: 
Coefficients in equation (4) were estimated using the SUR method. Estimated equation is 
as follows: 
GINI = -0.256 - 1.201 (Pub_S) + 1.47 (Priv_S) + 0.065 (MPR) + -0.013** (BR)  
    (-1.095873) (-9.393163)   (10.17687)       (1.913397)  (-0.287151)  
 
Table 8.:Regression Results of GINI Index on Different Variables  
Dependent Variable: GINI? 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1983 1998 
Included observations: 14 
Excluded observations: 2 
Total panel (balanced) observations 126 
Variable Coefficie
nt







PRIV_S? 1.474591 0.144896 10.17687 0.0000







    
Log likelihood 115.0526    
Unweighted 
Statistics 
    















0.988948    
 
 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is very low which indicates that there is positive serial 
correlation. To account for positive serial correlation, AR(1) was used as shown in table 9 
and the resulted equation is as follows: 
 
 
GINI = - 2.2047- 0.776 (Pub_S) + 0.847 (Priv_S) - 0.031 (MPR) + 0.339 (BR)  
    (-7105.99) (-1518.712)  (3339.141)    (-1296.674)  (8280.713)  
  [AR(1)= 0.85] 
       (9485.409) 
 
Table 9.: Regression Results of GINI Index after Correcting for Serial Correlation  
Dependent Variable: GINI? 
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Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1983 1998 
Included observations: 13 
Excluded observations: 5 
Total panel (balanced) observations 99 
Convergence achieved after 48 iteration(s) 
Variable Coefficie
nt











BR? 0.338596 4.09E-05 8280.713 0.0000
AR(1) 0.850968 8.97E-05 9485.409 0.0000
Weighted 
Statistics 
    
Log likelihood 198.5405    
Unweighted 
Statistics 
    
















2.186253    
 
 
IV.4) Empirical Results: 
The estimated results show that the GINI index improves when public firms exit the 
market. Despite the fact this implies that when the structure of public firms worsens the 
GINI index improves, we believe that this is a result of the privatization process where 
the government has started with the less problematic firms employing less labor and 
having less capital and hence they were the ones which existed the market. The 
remaining ones are the large problematic firms. However, the exist of public firms even 
though  they are small and medium have resulted in an overall positive impact on the 
GINI index. The case is different in the private sector where the better the structure of 
this sector the better distribution and less concentration we are likely to have in the 
market. It is worth noting that our initial concern was testing the impact of budget 
constraints as proxied by the number of private and public firms, however to ensure right 
specification we had to replace number of firms (private and public) by the structure of 
firms. Such replacement to achieve meaningful statistical results might have blurred the 
economic rationale behind the structure of firms acting as proxies of budget constraints. 
Import penetration is negative and expected as the increased imports are likely to affect 
the small and medium sized firms more harshly as they cannot compete and hence they 
exist the market, which leaves the market with only the large firms hat are able to face the 
competition of foreign products. The business regulations coefficient had a positive sign 
implying that improved business regulations have positive impact on the distribution of 
firms. This result is expected especially since the components of the business regulation 
index reflect merely the contestability of the market which when improved is likely to 




The empirical analysis in this part faced a number of problems where the lack of robust 
theoretical underpinnings for the equations has affected the quality of interpreting the 
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results. Moreover, the lack of good quality of data and the usage of different data sources 
could have a negative impact on the consistency. Finally, the usage of several proxies has 
affected the accuracy of results obtained. Despite such limitations, the empirical part 
pointed out that the relationship between competition and enhanced inter-firm rivalry on 
the one hand and other economic variables as productivity, exports, and distribution is 
not clear and that increasing private sector participation is not necessarily reflected by 
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Appendix A: List of privatized firms with the method of 
privatization (1992-2002) 
Stake Sold  Company 







        
 Companies Privatized in 1993       
1 Upper Egypt Agriculture Co.    100% n.a. Dec-93 
2 Middle Delat Agriculture Co.    100% n.a. Dec-93 
3 West Nubariya Agriculture Co.    100% n.a. Dec-93 
4 El Nahda Agriculture Co.    100% n.a. Dec-93 
5 Nile for Exporting Agriculture Goods    100% n.a. Dec-93 
6 Cairo Fabricated Houses    100% n.a. Dec-93 
        
 Companies Privatized in 1994       
7 South Tahrir Agricultural Co.    100% n.a. Feb-94 
8 Coca Cola 90.0% 10.0%   286 Apr-94 
9 Pepsi Cola 90.0% 10.0%   131.1 Apr-94 
10 Farascor Co.    100% n.a. May-24 
11 Consulting Office of Irrigation  5.0% 95.00%  1.3 Jun-94 
12 Wady Kom Umbo for Land Reclamation  95.0% 4.73%  70.123 Sep-94 
13 El Nasr Boilers 10.00%    15.6 Sep-94 
14 General Company for Land Reclamation  95.00% 4.86%  60.054 Nov-94 
15 Egyptian Realstate Co.  95.00% 4.70%  45.7 Nov-94 
16 Egyptian Dredging Co.    95.00% 4.17%  18.54 Dec-94 
17 Irrigation for General Works  95.00% 4.76%  23.43 Nov-94 
18 Arabian Office for Designs  40.00% 5.00%  3.963 Jul-94 
19 Upper Egypt Dredging Co.  95.00% 4.80%  8.05 Dec-94 
        
 Companies Privatized in 1995       
20 Misr Chemicals    51.10%  65.4 Jan-95 
21 Regwa   95.0% 4.77%  28.28 Jan-95 
22 Arab Co. for Land Reclamation  95.0% 4.77%  61.224 Jan-95 
23 El Bihaira Co.  95.0% 3.20%  49 Feb-95 
24 Cairo General Foundation Co.    100.00% n.a. Feb-95 
25 General Co. for Sanitary Construction 
Work 
   100.00% n.a. Feb-95 
26 Extracted Oils  8.5% 43.00%  85 Mar-95 
27 Nile Pharmaceuticals  10.0% 23.30%  54.64 May-95 
28 North Cairo Flour Mills  8.3% 33.42%  135.9 May-95 
Stake Sold  Company 







        
29 Eastern Tobacco Co.  5.0% 28.70%  549 Jun-95 
30 Misr El Gadida Housing & Development  9.5% 17.61%  134.72 Jul-95 
31 Alexandria for Pharmaceuticals   30.00% 10.0% 51.7 Dec-95 
        
 Companies Privatized in 1996       
32 Almaco  90.0%    114.84 Feb-96 
33 High Dam Civil Works     100.00% n.a. Mar-96 
34 Middle Egypt Flour Mills   10.0% 30.07%  32.3 Apr-96 
35 Financial & Industrial Co.   10.0% 64.70%  70 May-96 
36 Madinet Nasr for Housing & constructions  10.0% 64.94%  189.63 May-96 
37 Abu Ker Fertilizer    2.80%  20 May-96 
38 United for Housing and Constructions   7.0% 3.11%  5 May-96 
39 South Cairo Flour Mills   10.0% 30.00%  29.8 May-96 
40 Starch & Glucose  10.0% 51.03%  67.6 Jun-96 
41 West & Middle Delta Flour Mills  10.0% 51.00%  177.1 Jun-96 
42 Kafr El Zayet Insecticides  5.0% 70.00%  51.1 Aug-96 
43 Misr Oil & Soap  10.0% 50.92%  73.2 Aug-96 
44 Nile Matches & Prefabricated Houses  8.9% 55.67%  33.9 Aug-96 
45 Arabia Pharmaceuticals  10.0% 30.00%  18.2 Sep-96 
46 East Delta Flour Mills  10.0% 51.00%  109.9 Sep-96 
47 Memphis Pharmaceuticals  10.0% 30.00%  47.5 Sep-96 
48 Upper Egypt Flour Mills  10.0% 51.00%  165.3 Sep-96 
49 TeleMisr  10.0% 90.00%  59.1 Sep-96 
50 Al Nasr Utilities 100.0%    40 Oct-96 
51 Alexandria Pharmaceuticals  10.0% 30.00%  51.7 Oct-96 
52 Silos & Storage  10.0% 30.00%  148.2 Oct-96 
53 Al Ahram Beverage 90.0% 10.0%   298.1 Nov-96 
54 Cairo Pharmaceuticals  10.0% 30.00%  61.9 Nov-96 
55 Helwan Portland Cement  5.0% 47.20%  541 Nov-96 
56 Ameria Cement   52.00%  461 Dec-96 
57 Arabia Cotton Ginning  10.0% 90.00%  87.1 Dec-96 
58 Misr Free Shops  10.0% 87.40%  132.7 Dec-96 
59 UniArab Spinning & Weaving  6.9% 60.40%  225.7 Dec-96 
        
 Companies Privatized in 1997       
60 Al Nasr for Dehydrating Agricultural 
Products  
 10.0% 90.00%  23.6 Aug-96 
61 El Mahmodia Constructing Co.   10.0% 69.75%  54.4 Jan-97 
62 General Batteries Co.     100.00% n.a. Jan-97 
63 Al Nile Cotton Ginning   10.0% 90.00%  294.8 Jan-97 
64 Misr Aluminum    8.00%  221 Feb-97 
65 Cairo Housing   10.0% 96.38%  117.8 Mar-97 
66 Development & Engineering Consultant 
Co.  
 10.2% 88.22%  104.4 Apr-97 
67 Nobaria Mechanical & Agricultural 
Engineering  
 20.0% 79.38%  26.95 May-97 
Stake Sold  Company 







        
68 Upper Egypt (El Said for Constructing)    100.00%  25 May-97 
69 Chromic  61.0% 10.0%   102.81 Jun-97 
70 Middle East Co. for Paper   10.0% 75.00%  54.8 Jun-97 
71 Kabo    63.00%  196.9 Jun-97 
72 Bolivara     n.a. 32.8 Jun-97 
73 El Giza Contracting Co.   10.0% 70.00%  33.17 Aug-97 
74 Canaltex     100.00% n.a. Aug-97 
75 Electro-Cables   5.0% 95.00%  320.8 Oct-97 
76 Industrial & Engineering Projects Co.   10.0% 79.90%  299.1 Oct-97 
77 Paints & Chemicals   8.0% 53.75%  8.358 Oct-97 
78 El Shams Housing   5.0% 50.46%  30.8 Nov-97 
79 Prefabricated Houses Co.     100.00% n.a. Nov-97 
80 El Nile for Goods Transport Co.   95.0%   24.1 Nov-97 
81 El Nile for Heavy Transport Co.   95.0%   27.2 Nov-97 
82 El Nile for In-Land Transport Co.   95.0%   27.3 Nov-97 
83 El Nasr Iron Casting  100.0%    47.5 Dec-97 
84 Ideal  90.0% 10.0%   311.1 Dec-97 
85 El Nile for Direct Transport Co.   95.0%   n.a. Dec-97 
86 El Nile for Transport Operation Co.   95.0%   n.a. Dec-97 
87 Alexandria Spinning & Weaving  5.4% 94.60%  82.4 Dec-97 
        
 Companies Privatized in 1998       
88 Demiatta Rice Mills  90.0% 0.10%  48.56 Jan-98 
89 Bisco Misr  9.3% 45.69%  74.7 Jan-98 
90 Extracted Oils  8.5% 42.50%  85 Jan-98 
91 Kaha 90.0% 10.0%   154.2 Feb-98 
92 Arabia & United Stevedoring  22.0% 29.50%  16.6 May-98 
93 El Nasr Civil Work  10.0% 70.60%  104.6 May-98 
94 Mokhtar Ibrahim Contracting  10.0% 3.45%  75.56 Jun-98 
95 Alexandria Flour Mills  10.0% 30.00%  125.1 Jun-98 
96 El sharquia Rice Mills  90.0% 0.10%  38.69 Jul-98 
97 Cairo Manufacturing Silk Textile    100.00% n.a. Jul-98 
98 Graphite    100.00% n.a. Sep-98 
99 Deqahlia Rice Mills  90.0% 0.10%  36.73 Sep-98 
100 Elbehira Rice Mills  90.0% 0.10%  21.79 Sep-98 
101 Rashid Rice Mills  90.0% 0.10%  11.5 Sep-98 
102 General Metallurgical Wealth Co.    100.00% n.a. Sep-98 
103 Alexandria Rice Mills  90.0% 0.10%  26.78 Oct-98 
104 Egyptian Company for Irrigation  30.0% 60.00%  5.178 Oct-98 
105 Marriut Agricultural Co.    100.00% n.a. Oct-98 
106 Egyptian Marine Supply & Contracting  51.0%   16.4 Oct-98 
107 Amoun Shipping Agencies  44.0% 44.00%  25.9 Nov-98 
108 Memphis Shipping Agencies  44.0% 44.00%  43.3 Nov-98 
109 Tibia & Abou Simbel Shipping Agencies  44.0% 44.00%  26 Nov-98 
Stake Sold  Company 







        
110 Mary TrancE  51.0% 44.00%  42.7 Nov-98 
111 El Wady for Exporting Agricultural 
Goods 
 27.0%   121.99 Nov-98 
112 Egyptian Leather Manufacturing Co. 68.0%   100.00% n.a. Nov-98 
113 Industrial Gases 90.0% 10.0%   60 Dec-98 
114 Arab Engineering Consulting Co.   40.00%  1 Dec-98 
115 Industrial Fitting & Services    100.00%  Jul-98 
        
 Companies Privatized in 1999       
116 Egyptian Co. for Seed Production – 
Nobaseed 
    103 Feb-99 
117 Janaklis Beverages 100.0%    32 Feb-99 
118 Misr Co. for Theatre & Movies 
Distribution 
100.0%    55 Feb-99 
119 Kafr El Sheikh Rice Mills 100.0% 90.0% 10.00%  12.99 Mar-99 
120 San El Hagr Agricultural Co.  95.0%   18 Mar-99 
121 Suez Stevedoring  61.9% 0.19%  21.84 Mar-99 
122 Beni Suef Cement 95.0% 5.0%   527 Jul-99 
123 Delta Sand Bricks Co. 90.0% 10.0%   62 Jul-99 
124 Arabia for Foreign Trade 90.0% 10.0%   14.9 Aug-99 
125 General Agricultural Co.    100.00% n.a. Sep-99 
126 General Co. For Agricultural Products & 
Services 
   100.00% n.a. Sep-99 
127 Egyptian Co. for Dairy & Meat 
Production 
   100.00% n.a. Sep-99 
128 North El Tahrir Agricultural    100.00% n.a. Sep-99 
129 GIMCO    100.00% n.a. Oct-99 
130 Assuit Cement 77.0% 10.0%   1196.6 Nov-99 
131 Alexandria Cement 90.0% 10.0%   670 Dec-99 
132 Telephone Equipment's Co. 80.0% 10.0%   100.3 Dec-99 
133 Misr Fab     n.a. n.a. 
134 Transportation Works  95.0% 0.13%  11.795 Jul-99 
135 Direct Transportation  95.0% 0.08%  17.71 Jul-99 
136 Soranaga    100.00% n.a. Dec-99 
137 Telemisr  10.0% 90.00%  59.1 Mar-99 
138 Sand Bricks Co.    100.00% n.a. Feb-99 
        
 Companies Privatized in 2000       
139 Plastic & Electricity Industries 90.0% 10.0%   93.6 Jan-00 
140 Ramsis Agricultural 90.0%    161.15 Jan-00 
141 Tura Cement  5.0% 76.40%  1226 Jan-00 
142 Amria Cement 29.0% 10.0% 61.00%  1295.2 Mar-00 
143 General Foundations Co.    100.00% n.a. May-00 
144 Egyptian Co. for Food Bisco Misr (45%)  8.0%   14 Jun-00 
145 Assuit Cement 13.0%    183 Jun-00 
146 United Co. for Poultry Production    100.00% n.a. Jun-00 
147 Cairo Oil & Soap  61.0%   33 Jul-00 
Stake Sold  Company 







        
148 Misr for Engineering &Tools (MICAR) 90.0% 10.0%   25 Jul-00 
149 Alex for Chocolate & Confectionary 10.0%    27.48 n.a. 
150 Egyptian Refractories    100.00% n.a. Feb-00 
        
 Companies Privatized in 2001       
151 Engineering Design & Irrigation Projects 
Consulting Co. 
 95.0% 4.00%  1.22 Jun-01 
152 Shaher & Romny    100.00%  Jan-01 
153 Segal    100.00%  Feb-01 
154 Egyptian Gypsom Co. 90.0%    83.299 Feb-01 
155 Alexandria for Refregeration. 90.0%    33 Jul-01 
156 El-Gharbiya Rice Miles'  90.0%   51.19 Jul-01 
157 Arab company for furniture and carpets 100.0%    50.1 Jul-01 
158 Misr Export and Import Co.  100.0%   17.9 Jul-01 
        
 Companies Privatized during January-March 2002 
159 United for Trade Company  98.0%   5 Feb-02 
160 Arab for Trade Company  98.0%   6 Feb 
161 Abou Zaabal Fertilizers 100.0%    182 Feb 
162 Shobra Factroy "Armnian"     8.5 Feb 
Source:  Quarterly Economic Digest, volume 8 no. 2, March-June 2002 , Ministry of Foreign Trade  
 
Appendix B: Total Public and Private Industrial Production Distributed by Sector* 
      in L.E million 

























Mining & Quarries 
Public Sector 300 6 277 6 325 6 344 6 360 6 320 5 
Private Sector* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 300 6 277 6 325 6 344 6 360 6 320 5 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 
Public Sector 11,584 37 12,119 37 12,518 37 12,802 33 12,259 33 11,568 30 
Private Sector* 3,900 568 4,832 568 5,500 568 6,338 696 6,700 717 8866 773 
Total 15,484 605 16,951 605 18,018 605 19,140 729 18,959 750 20,434 803 
Spinning & Weaving 
Public Sector 5,961 35 5,434 35 4,507 35 4,009 31 3,184 29 2,542 28 
Private Sector* 2,448 945 3,152 1,014 2,714 1,058 5,322 1,304 5,207 1,226 7,553 1,198 
Total 8,409 980 8,586 1,049 7,221 1,093 9,331 1,335 8,391 1,255 10,095 1,226 
Wood Products 
Public Sector 119 10 124 9 96 9 93 7 61 7 48 6 
Private Sector* 278 358 292 359 317 387 382 254 669 257 493 261 
Total 397 368 416 368 413 396 475 261 730 264 541 267 
Paper & Chemical Products 
Public Sector 4,369 34 4,720 34 4,299 34 3,103 30 2,473 27 2,137 27 
Private Sector* 3,182 1,050 3,688 1,060 3,986 1,067 6,984 863 8,314 928 7,704 1,013 
Total 7,551 1,084 8,408 1,094 8,285 1,101 10,087 893 10,787 955 9,841 1,040 
Pharmaceuticals, Drugs & Medical Supplies 
Public Sector 987 8 1,119 8 1,221 8 1,221 8 1,288 8 1,269 8 
Private Sector* 1,310 22 1,610 22 1,950 22 2,204 32 2,136 35 2,988 38 
Total 2,297 30 2,729 30 3,171 30 3,425 40 3,424 43 4,257 46 
Refractories 
Public Sector 2,571 18 2,881 18 3,203 18 3,678 16 3,628 15 1,603 10 
Private Sector* 1,656 250 1,544 250 1,889 250 2,520 704 2,922 868 4,644 875 
Total 4,227 268 4,425 268 5,092 268 6,198 720 6,550 883 6,247 885 
Metal Products 
Public Sector 3,656 12 3,706 12 3,327 11 3,418 11 2,877 11 2,765 11 
Private Sector* 1,878 127 2,121 127 1,724 127 3,278 109 4,284 129 6,006 160 
Total 5,534 139 5,827 139 5,051 138 6,696 120 7,161 140 8,771 171 
Engineering Industries 
Public Sector 2,374 25 2,553 25 809 25 2,428 24 1,403 24 1,224 21 
Private Sector* 3,025 457 4,314 457 4,168 457 5,467 599 6,056 721 6,670 719 
      in L.E million 

























Total 5,399 482 6,867 482 4,977 482 7,895 623 7,459 745 7,894 740 
Electrical Industries 
Public Sector 1,184 10 1,305 10 298 9 904 8 500 7 445 6 
Private Sector* 1,444 100 1,738 100 2,032 100 2,257 168 3,282 129 2,868 133 
Total 2,628 110 3,043 110 2,330 109 3,161 176 3,782 136 3,313 139 
Grand Total 
Public Sector 33,105 195 34,238 194 30,603 192 32,000 174 28,033 167 23,921 152 
Private Sector 19,121 3,877 23,291 3,957 24,280 4,036 34,752 4,729 39,570 5,010 47,792 5,170 
Total 52,226 4,072 57,529 4,151 54,883 4,228 66,752 4,903 67,603 5,177 71,713 5,322 
Excludes government workshops, military factories, ginning and grinding, bakery, tea packing, press and publishing ,* Private sector from 10 workers and more. 
* Source:  The Statistical Yearbook (1994-2001), CAPMAS. 






Appendix C: Differences Between Public Sector and Public Business  
Sector Public Sector Public Business Sector 
Structure Public Sector Authorities Public Sector Companies Holding Companies Subsidiary Companies 
Law Law no. 97/1983 which is 
amended by law no. 109/87 
Public sector companies are 
subject to: 
− Law no. 97/1983 which is 
amended by law no. 109/87 
− law no. 159/1981 where no 
specific provision of law no. 
97/1983 is provided 
Holding companies are subject 
to: 
− Law no. 203/1991, and  
− law no. 159/1981 where no 
specific provision of law no. 
203/1991 is provided 
Subsidiary companies are 
subject to: 
− Law no. 203/1991, and  
− law no. 159/1981 where no 
specific provision of law 
203/1991 is provided 
Legal Status an independent entity under the 
General Law 
Joint stock company Holding companies take the 
form of joint stock companies 
and are considered as one of 
special law persons 
Joint stock company 
Establishment  Public sector authorities are 
established according to a 
presidential decree 
based on a proposal submitted 
by a public sector authority and 
approved by the Prime Minister, 
public sector company is 
established according to a 
ministerial decree issued by the 
competent Minister  
Holding companies: 
− replace public sector 
authorities which were under 
law no. 97/1983 according to 
a presidential decree after the 
approval of the ministers 
council 
− are established by issuing the 
Prime Minister’s decree based 
on a proposal submitted by 
the competent Minister. 
Subsidiary companies: 
− replace affiliated companies 
which were under law no. 
97/1983 according to a 
presidential decree after the 
approval of the ministers 
council 
− are established by issuing a 
ministerial decree based on a 
proposal submitted by the 
board of directors of holding 
company. 
Supervision Competent Minister specified in 
its establishment presidential 
decree 
Public sector authorities Competent Minister specified by 
a presidential decree 
Holding companies 
Main Function − participating in the 
development of the national 
economy 
− achieving development plan 
targets in conformity with 
state policies and plans. 
Public sector companies are 
considered as a unit charged 
with executing an economic 
project in conformity with state 
policies and the social and 
economic development plan 
− investing its funds through 
subsidiary companies or 
implementing its investments 
itself when be needed 
− contributing to the 
development of national 
economy in its activities 
through subsidiary companies 
within the framework of the 
state policies 
 
Capital − the capital of affiliated public − capital is divided into nominal  − capital is divided into nominal 
Sector Public Sector Public Business Sector 
Structure Public Sector Authorities Public Sector Companies Holding Companies Subsidiary Companies 
sector companies which are 
fully state-owned. 
− the share of the state in the 
capital of affiliated companies 
where its capital is owned by 
the state as well as other 
public and private entities and 
individuals 
− funds allocated for it by the 
state  
shares of equal value 
− companies are not allowed to 
issue shares give their holders 
any kind of special 
advantages. 
− the statute of companies 
specify the nominal value of 
shares. 
− the value of a share must not 
be less than 5 LE and more 
than 100 LE. 
− shares owned by public sector 
banks must be traded among  
these public entities and in 
conformity with the executive 
regulation 
− shares owned by private 
entities and individuals can be 
traded in the stock market  
− based on a proposal submitted 
by the competent Minister 
and approved by board of 
directors, public sector 
companies can issue nominal 
bonds and after obtaining a 
permit from the Prime 
Minister 
shares of equal value 
− the statute of companies 
specify the nominal value of 
shares. 
− the value of a share must not 
be less than 5 LE and more 
than 100 LE. 
− shares are tradable in 
accordance with the 
provisions of general 
regulation of the stock 
markets promulgated by law 
no. 161/1957 and companies 
law no. 159/1981 
− incorporation shares, in-kind 
shares and founders’ shares 
can be traded as of the date of 
company’s registration 
Management Board of directors appointed 
upon a presidential decree and 
proposed by the competent 
minister for four years 
Board of directors consists of: 
− a chairman nominated by the 
competent Minister and 
appointed by a decree issued 
by the Prime Minister 
− members appointed by the 
competent minister represent 
a) 50% of total members if 
the company is fully owned 
by public entities; or b) the 
same proportion of public 
entities share in the capital 
− members representing private 
individuals proportionate to 
Board of directors is formed by 
a resolution of the general 
assembly upon a proposal by the 
company chairman for three 
years which are renewable and 
consists of an odd number of 
members not less than seven and 
not more than seven as follows: 
− a full-time chairman 
− a number of members not less 
than five selected from 
persons having experience in 
economic, financial, 
technical, legal and business 
− a company whose capital is 
fully owned by a single or 
multiple holding companies, 
public entities or public sector 
banks is managed by a board 
of directors appointed for a 
renewable term of three years. 
This board consists of an odd 
number of directors not less 
than five and not more than 
nine including the board 
chairman as follows: a) a part-
time chairman appointed by 
general assembly, b) a pat-
Sector Public Sector Public Business Sector 
Structure Public Sector Authorities Public Sector Companies Holding Companies Subsidiary Companies 
their share in the capital  
− other members are elected 
among employees according 
to law no 73/1973 
administration fields 
− a representative of the 
Egyptian workers general 
federation of syndicate to be 
selected by the federation’s 
board of directors 
time experienced members 
appointed by the holding 
company’s board of directors, 
c) a number of members equal 
to experienced members to be 
elected from employees 
according to law regulating 
this matter 
− chairman of the committee of 
syndicate who is not counted 
as a voting member 
 
Responsibilities − establishing joint stock 
companies either individually 
or in participation with public 
or private entities or with 
individuals 
− owning company shares either 
through purchasing or 
participating in its capital 
− approving general goals and 
plans of each affiliated 
company and group of 
companies in conformity with 
state policies within the 
framework of the social and 
economic development plan 
− conducting technical and 
economic studies related to 
the general activities of 
affiliated companies 
− following up the activities of 
affiliated companies specially 
production, productivity, 
sales, exports, investment, 
labor, profitability and wages 
− coordinating among affiliated 
companies and with other 
public companies authorities 
in order to achieve best 
production and benefit from 
The company board of directors 
enjoys all the power required to 
perform the tasks needed for 
achieving the purposes the 
company established for 
especially: 
− setting executive plans to 
ensure the development of 
production, control the 
quality, make best utilization 
of the available sources, raise 
the efficiency of production 
and maintain company goals 
− rationalizing the company 
financial policy to procuring 
sources required to finance 
current and investment 
operations 
− executing investment 
operations charged to the 
company and making follow-
up of execution 
− specifying expenditure items 
in accordance with the plan of 
action and the company 
targets 
− establishing joint stock 
companies alone or in 
participation with public or 
private judicial entities or 
individuals 
− purchasing or selling the 
shares of joint stock 
companies or participate in 
their companies 
− forming and managing a 
portfolio of the company 
including shares, stocks, 
bonds and any other 
instruments or financial assets 
− laying out general policies 
and specifying means 
required to accomplish these 
policies 
− undertaking all actions 
required to rectify financial 
structure and progress of 
unsuccessful subsidiary 
companies and enhancing the 
profitability of these 
subsidiaries and cutting down 
their costs 
 
Sector Public Sector Public Business Sector 
Structure Public Sector Authorities Public Sector Companies Holding Companies Subsidiary Companies 
mass production 
− lending affiliated companies 
or guaranteeing the loans of 
affiliated companies 
− proposing merger of affiliated 
company into another 
company or dividing it or 
joining it to another authority 
− proposing transfer of unused 
investment from affiliated 
company to another one 
supervised by the same 
authority 
Ownership funds of authorities owned  by 
the state unless otherwise 
declared in its establishment 
decree 
A public sector company is any 
company either: a) owned by a 
public entity alone or in 
participation with other public 
entities and public sector banks 
or companies, or b) one or more 
of public entities participate with 
private individuals and public 
share of capital, including the 
share of public banks and 
companies, must be not less than 
51% of total capital. 
The capital of holding 
companies is fully owned by the 
state or public judicial persons 
Holding companies must own at 
least 51% its capital 
Employment 
 
Subject to the provisions of 
public sector employees law no. 
48/1978 
Subject to the provisions of 
public sector employees law no. 
48/1978 
Regarding wages, each company 
sets its own rules approved by 
the prime minister; otherwise, 
employees are subject to law no. 
48/1978 
Regarding wages, each company 
sets its own rules approved by 
the prime minister; otherwise, 
employees are subject to law no. 
48/1978 






Appendix D: Distribution of  Number of  Establ ishments  versus 
Production in Manufacturing Sector 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on CAPMAS Industrial Production Statistics Bulletin, various issues. 

















Sector  Value  
in LE millions 
Date 
ICT    
The Egyptian Co. for 
satellites  
MenaNet 50.00 Aug 2000 
Link Intouch  Jun 2000 
Banking, investment and finance  
American ACI Commercial International Investment Company • CIIC 50.00 Aug 2000 
EFG Hermes NA Jul 1996 




Robert Fleming 300.00 Aug 2000 
Services  
Egyptian Hotels Egoth NA Mar 2000 
Metals, machinery ..etc  
Egyptian Electrical 
Cables 
Egyptian company for Distributing Electric Cable 450.75 Mar 2000 
Electronics 
Protech Triangle Group & Middle East Application 130.70 Dec 1998 
Textiles and Clothing  
El Nasr for Clothes 
(Kabo) 
The National Company for Spinned Textile and Clothes 273.00 Jan 2000 
Alexandria Spinning 
and Weaving 
The Egyptian Company for preparing Dying, Trading Textile 
Alexandria Spinning and Weaving 
478.00 Dec  1999 
Food and Beverages  
Chipsy Food Industries Crunchy 142.00 May 1999 
Other     
Egyptian Financial and 
Industrial company 
Arab Company for Granulated Fertilizers NA Feb 2000 




Acquirer Acquired Value  
in LE millions 
Date 
Chemicals and petrochemicals  
 Agwaa Holdings Misr Gulf Oil Processing 55.90 Apr 01 
 Esso Standard Mobil International Petroleum Corporation 1889.00 Oct 00 
 Savola Sime Egypt Misr Gulf Oil Processing 100.00 May 00 
 Shell National Gas Company (Natgas) 113.00 Feb 01 
 Anchor Investor Industrial Gases Company 60.00 Dec 99 
Poly-Serv Company Abou Zaabal Fertilizers 307.00 Apr 99 
 Albert Pesticides Kafr El Zayat Pesticides 7.83 May 03 
Food & Beverage      
 Kraft Foods International Service Inc. Family Nutrition 446.28 Apr 03 
 Heineken International  Al Ahram Beverages 3.16 Jan 03 
 Middle East Food & Trade El Rasheedy El Mezan Confectionaries 91.92 Jan 03 
Unilever Overseas Holding Limited   El Rasheedy El Mezan Confectionaries 90.43 Aug 02 
 Oaf Group Kaha Company for Preserved Food 144.00 Jan 01 
 Al Ahram Beverages Company 
(ABC) 
El Gouna Beverages Group 255.00 Mar 01 
Hero Egyptian French Agricultural Industries 
(Vitrac) 
47.04 Oct 02 
 Pepsico Finance Luxembourg Tasty Foods Misr 49.40 Jan 01 
 BestFoods El Rasheedy El Mezan 66.00 Apr 00 
Lucifer Company Egyptian Company for Yeast 21.20 Jan 00 
 BiscoMisr Alexandria Chocolate and Sweets (Corona) 1424.90 Jan 00 
 Edita for Food Industries International Food (Hostess) 32.60 May 03 
Banking, investment and finance     
 General Investment Authority-
Kuwaiti Government^ 
Arab African International Bank 49.36 Apr 03 
Berjaya Group Berhad - Malaysia Mohandes Insurance 38.01 Aug 97 
Barclays Bank Cairo Barclays Bank 74.69 Mar 99 
EIRaghyElMasrafia Mohandes Insurance 7.10 May 99 
ABN Amro Bank Delta EAB 7.40 May 99 
Commercial International Investment 
Company 
Arab African International Bank 23.50 Apr 00 
Flemings-CIIC El Ahli Fund Management 2.40 Nov 99 
El Rajhi Enterprises El Kinanah Brokerage 0.75 Nov 99 
Arab Banking Corporation Egypt Arab African Bank 1197.00 Jan 00 
Misr Insurance Company Novopark Hotel - Four Season 51.00 Jul 99 
Commercial International Investment 
Co (CIIC) 
Gezira Sheraton 65.00 Jan 00 
Arab Banking Corporation Egypt Arab African Bank 98.00 Oct 99 
Egyptian Financial Group- Hermes 
Holding Company 
Hermes Investment Company 1.04 Feb 00 






Star Development and Investment Aman Brokerage NA Jan 00 
Unicap Group Pharoniya Brokerage 0.75 May 99 
Arab Tourism Development and Real 
Estate Investment 
Dar El Rabwa Housing and Development 44.70 Apr 99 
 
 
J. Sainsbury PLC Egyptian Distribution Group (Edge) 225.00 Oct 99 
Anchor Investor Egyptian Shipping Transport 20.20 Mar 99 
AccorSA Guezira Hotels & Tourism 39.15 Nov 02 
Construction     
African International Development 
Bank 
Alexandria Iron and Steel 100.00 Feb 99 
Toublat (Arabian International 
Construction) 
Montasser Ready Mix Concrete 38.60 Dec 98 
El Ezz Steel Rebars Alexandria Iron and Steel 638.00 Dec 99 
 International Company for Modern 
Construction  
Sail Radio Holland N.V 960.00 Apr 00 
Pharmaceuticals     
United National Glass Company Advanced Pharmaceuticals Company 28.90 Nov 99 
Pharco Pharmaceuticals Amreyah Pharmaceuticals Industries 252.34 Oct 02 
Cement , construction tools      
Alexandria Development Limited Alexandria Cement   318.42 May 02 
Ciments Francais Suez Cement 952.62 Oct 01 
ASEC Helwan Portland Cement   1221.95 Oct 01 
Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS Ameriyah Cement 1661.00 Mar 00 
Holderbank Egyptian Cement Co. 150.90 Aug 00 
Cemex Copmany (Mexico) Assiut Cement 1265.00 Nov 99 
Suez Cement Torah Cement 1315.00 Jan 00 
Blue Circle Alexandria Cement 589.00 Dec 99 
Egyptian-French consortium Egyptian Gypsum 92.50 Dec 00 
Jacob DeLafon Egyptian French Industrial Company (SIFE) 2160.00 Nov 00 
Belleena Company Delta Sand Bricks 57.00 Jul 99 
Lafarge Company BeniSuef Cement 1400.00 Aug 99 
Commercial International Bank (CIB) Misr Sons for Constructions 20.00 Jun 99 
Cemex Misr Distribution Cemex Company (Mexico) 1265.00 Nov 99 
Orascom Construction Industries 
(OCI) 
Egyptian Container Handling Company 25.00 Mar 99 
Other Industries     
Pirelli Company Alexandria Tires 639.00 Jun 99 
El Tholathia Group El Nasr for Dehydrating Agriculture Products 9.80 Jun 99 
Atlantic Industries Coca - Cola Bottling Company Egypt 107.40 Jun 99 
Abou El Nasr and Ashour Group National Paper Company 70.00 Aug 99 
    
Unidentified firms     
Capex Holding Egyptian Anglo Fund Management 4.70 Aug 00 
Anchor Investor Egytrav NA Jan 01 
Alawqaf Association Ramsis Agriculture 152.50 Dec 99 
El Kahky Group NubaSeed 3.50 May 99 
Source: Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchanges, Monthly Bulletin, May 2003 
 
